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The New Economy: Essays in Network Economics and Two-Sided Markets
Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology ad-
vances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address spe-
cic issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network
e¤ects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential
market failures and nd new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social
welfare.
In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the
telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has
pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with
a xed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation
approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function
of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance
economic e¢ ciency beyond what is achieved with a xed access price. In particular, access
price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and
social welfare as compared to a xed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime.
Furthermore, we provide su¢ cient conditions under which the indexation can implement
the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to
obtain under xed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment
e¢ ciency must be sacriced for gains in pricing e¢ ciency.
In Chapter 2 we investigate the e¤ect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on
advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, rst, that advertising time regulation
may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an
advertising cap may reduce media platformsand rmsprots, while the net e¤ect on
viewers(subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from
a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribersdirect gain from watching fewer ads. We nd that
if subscribers are su¢ ciently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs
the direct e¤ect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest
that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume
of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating
quality proves impractical, take the e¤ect of advertising quality into consideration.
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In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs).
In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same
amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three-
party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction
volumes and heterogenous merchantstransactional benets of accepting cards to assess
the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and
the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are su¢ ciently strong, with the
exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR
is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail
price e¢ ciency for cardholders is also highlighted.
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Introduction
Network industries, i.e., industries that exhibit network e¤ects, represent an important
fraction of the world economy in the modern life. The new economy would be dreadfully
diminished without, for example, the telecommunications and Internet, the media and
the electronic payment networks. Network e¤ects are a specic kind of externality in
which agentsvalue functions are a¤ected by the number of other agents using the same
or a compatible good or service. The e¤ects may be positive, when agents benet from
an increase in the number of other agents sharing the same or a compatible brand. In
other words, there is complementarity on consumption of di¤erent types of agents that
participate in the network. Network e¤ects may also be negative,1 in which case the
number of agents makes the good or service less valuable for some consumers. This is
evident in sectors, such as public transports or media, where congestion or advertisements
can impose a negative e¤ect on commuters or viewers, respectively.
In this thesis we explore two relevant topics in the Network Economics literature:
(i) the technology advances and economic regulation in telecommunications and (ii) the
two-sided markets.2 More specically, this dissertation deals with three industries of
the so-called New Economy: telecommunications, broadcasting and electronic payments.
A specic question is addressed in each industry and an analytical model will support
the insights in each chapter. All the three chapters include welfare analysis and discuss
economic regulation policies within the context of each industry.
Telecommunications
Telecommunications services are based on an increasingly sophisticated network that
is able to o¤er a diverse variety of services that di¤er in nature of data, voice or video,
requirement of real timedelivery, among other aspects. This industry has been going
through a very signicant change namely in the US and in Europe. The provision of
voice services, broadband Internet access and video services exclusively over cable lines
in the local loop requires major technological advances and considerable investment
just for the conversion of the cable network to Next Generation Networks (NGNs). The
term NGN refers to the installation of high-speed physical infrastructures, mostly based
on optical ber for the transmission of voice, data and video. Under many respects the
NGNs represent a dramatic technological shift in the provision of telecom services: new
1For example, negative network e¤ects may result from snobbism or vanity, in that an agent loses the
feeling to belong to an elite group when a product or service is extensively and commonly used in the
population.
2Important topics in the Network Economics literature, among others, are: consumer demand under
network externalities, information networks and intellectual property, consumer demand under network
e¤ects and social inuence. See Shy (2010) for a survey on the network e¤ects literature.
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networks enable a bandwith up to 100 megabits per second, as compared to the maximum
of 20 megabits on DSL platforms.
Regulation and investment. Considerable and detailed regulation is desirable in some
telecommunications contexts, namely in NGNs, when the market forces are not su¢ cient
to reach the (price and investment) e¢ cient outcomes and social and private benets
di¤er. The public interest goal of telecommunications regulation is twofold. On the one
hand it is to increase total surplus, i.e., the unweighted sum of consumerssurplus and
rmsprots. On the other hand, it is generally accepted that the public interest should
promote innovation and growth.
It is noteworthy that there are also drawbacks related to the economic regulation
of telecommunication networks. First, regulators face several informational constraints
regarding the costs related to new technologies, but also regarding the willingness to
pay that consumers attribute to the new technologies. Second, in an industry that is
technically changing at fast pace, it may be di¢ cult to dene the appropriate range of
regulated services. Third, the regulatory setup may be slow, bureaucratic and politically
biased. Individuals or organizations with high-stake interests in the regulatory decisions
may center their attentions in attempting to gain their preferred policy outcome, while
dispersed individual consumers, each with only a small individual stake in the outcome,
will ignore it altogether. The regulatory capture refers to this disparity of attentions
dedicated to a policy outcome that succeeds at capturing inuence at the regulatory
body and put into practice the preferred policy of the special interest. For more about
the capture theory refer to La¤ont and Tirole (1991), and Levine and Forrence (1990).
Investments in telecommunication networks have been characterized by a strong growth
in the period up to 2000 and by a subsequent strong decrease. Such a decrease was mainly
due to two reasons. First, the end of the substantial initial investments in access and back-
bone infrastructures, both xed and mobile, by new entrants in the telecommunication
market, led by overoptimistic expectations on the pick up of Internet services. Second,
the end of the nancial bubble in the telecommunication industry, that pressed operators
and capital markets to be more focused on obtaining an adequate return on investment.
The excess capacity that has characterized the rst decade of the 21st century as a
consequence of the massive build-up of transmission infrastructures from 1995 to 2000 is
being eroded by the increase in demand for broadband Internet. Not just the number
of connections for broadband access has increased in Europe and in the US, but also
end-users now require networks with larger bandwidth, i.e., faster Internet connections.
NGNs will increase bandwidth, thus being the leading driver of the future investment in
telecommunication networks.
Placing ber up to the end-users location represents a signicant nancial e¤ort due to
the cost of obtaining building permits and of engineering works in urban and rural areas,
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which together represent from 50 to 80% of the overall capital expenditure (European
Commission (2007)). The main potential benets from NGNs are cost reduction in the
services supply (data, HDTV and voice in a single network, instead of multiple networks)
and increase revenues by delivering brand new services. The pace with which these benets
are made will depend on how NGNs are regulated.
The relevant trade-o¤ in NGNs is between the incentive to investment and the degree
of price competition in the future. On the one hand, incumbent operators that will
likely make most of the investment are waiting to see whether the regulatory bodies
decide to require permanent regulation wholesale obligations such as open access to other
operators at a price equal to the cost of the service. If this were the case, one could
infer that incumbents would have fewer incentives to build NGNs, as regulation would
wipe out the quasi-rents arising from the ber deployment. The existence of wholesale
obligations will also condition the behavior of the new entrants networks, which may
either, decide to invest or to make use of the incumbents network as the latter are
installed (free riding behavior), thus avoiding signicant xed costs. On the other hand,
regulatory bodies are concerned about removing any initial conditions of major advantage
to the incumbents that could prevent the rise of a competitive market. The potential
advantages include (i) the exclusivity of some network elements (regulatory holidays)
such as the engineering works to install the ber, and (ii) the control of a large base
of customers which could enable the incumbent to reach signicant network economies
before its competitors. Regulators such as the European Commission are usually against
regulatory holidays, i.e., the absence of all obligations on NGNs for a pre-dened period
of time.
The economic literature on the impact of regulation on investments is separated into
two strands of research.
A research strand is the investment analysis where the impact of regulation, either
rate-of-return or incentive regulation, is usually assessed in a static context. The rate-of-
return regulation has been criticized because it encourages overinvestment if the regulated
rate is set too high. This is the so-called AverchJohnson (1962) e¤ect. Also, some
dynamic models on the timing of infrastructure investment are applied, such as in Gans
and Williams (1999), Gans (2001) and Gans and King (2004). A survey of the static and
dynamic models of investment under di¤erent forms of regulation and optimal (Ramsey)
pricing may be found in Biglaiser and Riordan (2000).
Another research strand is the real option approach that captures the fact that de-
mand, technology and other factors impacting on investment decisions are subject to
uncertainty. As a result networks may have interest to delay the investment in order to
obtain more information and to decrease risk. Authors such as Dobbs (2004) have inte-
grated uncertainty and irreversibility in their models and have considered a more general
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problem of setting regulated prices when faced with non-constant demand and technology.
In Chapter 1 we will focus our attention on the impact that a change in the access
price rule (in a static context) has on the NGNs investments, on retail prices and on
welfare.
Two-sided markets
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we deal with specic questions in two-sided markets.
Below we present a brief introduction on two-sided markets, including: (i) a general view
of the economics of two-sided markets and its basic principles, (ii) a discussion of the
denition of two-sided platforms, (iii) regulatory concerns and (iv) examples of two-sided
markets.
A general view. Since Veblen (1899) it is established in the economic literature that
consumers choices may be a¤ected not just by their own preferences and income but
also by the consumption choices of other agents. These e¤ects are signicant in several
industries where the choice to purchase from a particular brand is a¤ected by the number
of agents buying the same product or patronizing the same product or service.
A two-sided platform facilitates the members of two distinct groups of agents to be
together in a way that adds value for the agents that could not get as e¢ ciently as without
the platform. The platform internalizes the network externalities among the groups of
agents. Some platforms may face more than two sides (i.e., groups of agents) but the
insights achieved in two-sided platforms to a large extent apply to multi-sided markets.
Two-sided markets are not a new sort of business. In fact, people have been using
the two-sided logic for hundreds of years. One example that goes back centuries ago is
the advertising-supported newspapers that help rms to advertise potential consumers.3
Though, the explicit identication that businesses across di¤erent markets have two-sided
characteristics, which have important economic implications, has started only after 2000.
The theory of two-sided markets was initiated by Rochet and Tirole in the seminal article
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets in 2003 and the subsequent article Two-sided
markets: a progress report in 2006. Vital contributions to the burgeoning literature of
two-sided markets are also Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Armstrong (2006), among
others.
Some factors have been bringing into play the two-sided market analysis to regulatory
authorities, particularly the following two. First, the two-sided market literature has been
developing notably since 2000 and has been a hot topic in economics since then. Second,
there is the impression that a number of key industries recurrently under discussion, for
3For example, in France in 1836 the newspaper La Presse was the rst to insert paid advertising on
their pages lowering the price to readers, which extended its readership and increased its protability.
The new business model adopted by La Press was a success and copied by other newspapers.
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example, software, communications, media or electronic payments, are either two-sided
markets or take part in a business environment such that two-sided platforms play a
substantial role.
Two-sided platforms must manage the demands of two distinct groups of agents that
exert cross-group externalities. In order to internalize the network externalities, platforms
choose pricing and non-pricing strategies that can be very di¤erent from rms that serve a
single group of agents. In order to put both sides of the market on board a platform has to
choose the price level and the price structure. If the cross-group externalities are strongly
unbalanced between groups, the structure of prices that balances the demands in each side
of the market can be extremely biased. For example, one side may be subsidized with price
below the respective marginal cost or be charged nothing to participate, whilst platforms
revenues are extracted from the other side of the market.4 The prot maximizing price
charged to agents on each side of the platform, in general, does not follow the standard
mark-up formula or track the marginal cost. Typically, the type of agents that generates
the highest level of network e¤ects will be charged relatively less. This is the reason why
agents on one of the sides might pay a price below marginal cost, or even below zero
(e.g., card payment rewards), whereas agents on the other side will be charged prices
considerably above marginal cost, generating most of the platforms revenues.
Provided that two-sided platforms must manage demands of agent groups that exert
network e¤ects among themselves, a price variation on one side of the market produces
side e¤ects on the other sides of the market. Hence, the analysis in two-sided markets
must consider the network e¤ects to measure the overall e¤ect of a price variation on
platforms prot.
Note that in the presence of network externalities across groups, the marginal revenue
related with each group of agents has a direct and an indirect element. First, by joining
the platform an agent generates directly revenues to the platform associated to the fees
he pays. Second, by joining the platform an agent increases the value of the platform to
consumers on the other side. This enables the platform to charge more to agents on the
other side. Thus, the prot maximizing condition, marginal revenue equals marginal cost,
for a two-sided platform, has to be adjusted such that the marginal revenue is corrected
for the existence of indirect network externalities across the groups.
Also, note that due to the existence of network e¤ects, if there are joint costs for
providing services to both types of consumers, it is neither prot maximizing nor socially
e¢ cient to follow the standard rule price equal to marginal cost in each side of the
market.
Denition. The term two-sided marketswas established in the seminal article of Ro-
4For example, this may happen in night clubs where men pay a high price just to enter while women
have some free drinks, i.e., women have their entry in the club subsidized.
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chet and Tirole (2003). Rochet and Tirole created the expression to dene circumstances
in which platforms supply at the same time two mutually dependent groups of clients.
For the sake of clarity, it is convenient to distinguish between two-sided platforms and
the markets in which they operate. Two-sided platforms may compete with single-sided
rms or compete in given markets with other two-sided platforms that serve a di¤erent
second side. The two-sided markets literature employs the term multi-homingwhen
customers use two or more platforms for the same service, and single-homingwhen just
one platform is in use. Multi-homing can occur on one or more sides of the platform.
For example, platforms such as computer operating systems have multi-homing only on
one side. Most end-users have a single operating system for their computers, while coders
tend to produce applications to run on several operating systems.
Evans (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2006), among others, have pointed out the
following features of a two-sided platform. First, there must be considered two distinct
groups of agents to whom the platform is an intermediary. A two-sided platform provides
goods or services simultaneously to these two groups.
Second, indirect network e¤ects exist across the two groups of agents. This means
that the value that an agent on one side captures from the platform is dependent on the
number of agents on the other side. For example, Sony PlayStation provides programming
code that reduces the e¤ort for game developers to write all code themselves and provides
a standard environment for end-users to run games. These actions from Sony increase the
pool of programmers and, thus, of games available, making more consumers willing to buy
a PlayStation. Also, programmers are more willing to write their games in Playstation
format when the number of players using that platform is higher. Another example is of a
search platform that will be more valuable to advertisers if more potential buyers use the
platform. Simultaneously, it will be more valuable to consumers looking to buy something
if more rms advertise on that platform since will be more likely that the consumer sees
a relevant advertisement.
Third, a two-sided platform is featured by the non-neutrality of the price structure.
Let the price level charged by the two-sided platform be the sum of the per-interaction
prices charged to each agent involved in the interaction. The price structure can be dened
as the part of the price level that is paid by each type of agent. Let total welfare be the
unweighted sum of the welfare of both groups of agents and the platform. The platform
will be one-sided if total welfare changes with the price level but does not change with
reallocations of the price structure between groups. For example, a tax on wheat charged
to buyers has the same welfare e¤ect as compared to the same tax charged to sellers.
The platform will be two-sided if total welfare changes with both the price level and the
price structure. Nonetheless, while useful to understand the two-sided logic, this is not a
general denition.
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Sometimes the two-sidedness of a market is a vital point for the analysis. Other times
it is just an interesting, but not fundamental, aspect of the market. And still other times
it is irrelevant. It is often the strength of the indirect network e¤ects that decides whether
the two-sidedness matters enough to have a substantive e¤ect on the results of economic
analysis, or whether it is only an interesting curiosity. Hence, two-sidedness is a question
of degree.
Regulatory issues. Like in telecommunications networks, two-sided markets regulation
can also be very challenging. In two-sided markets price variations may not imply welfare
variations. In markets without cross-group externalities prices and social welfare loss
move in the same direction, i.e., as price goes up, welfare loss goes up. Therefore, welfare
changes can be inferred from price changes. In markets with externalities, such as two-
sided markets, this may not be the case. In fact, prices and consumer welfare may move
in the same direction, this implies that prices and social welfare may be positively related.
Under network externalities prices do not serve for inferring about welfare and regulators
have to measure welfare directly, which is a much more subjective and demanding task
than measuring price di¤erences.
Social welfare is harder to compute in two-sided markets given that platforms and
consumers on both sides of the market should be taken into account. Moreover, the
welfare e¤ects on end-users on both sides of the market might change in di¤erent ways in
response to a policy measure. The net e¤ect from opposite welfare variations generated
by a regulatory policy will be more di¢ cult to predict as the number of groups involved
with the platform increases.
Given the existence of indirect network e¤ects across end-users the characterization of
the social optimum can be very demanding in terms of information. Moreover, since in
these markets the price structure plays a very important role, it might be also complex
to nd which directions policy measures should be taken to increase welfare.
Multi-sided platforms can and do follow anti-competitive behavior that can be equally
damaging as the anti-competitive behavior of rms in markets without network e¤ects.
Competition analysis in two-sided markets must take into account the network e¤ects to
evaluate platformscompetitive actions. For example, competition authorities have com-
monly followed the principle of price regulation according to marginal costs. Nonetheless,
due to the presence of network externalities, this principle should not be extended to
regulate prices of two-sided platforms. In particular, the social optimal prices have to
consider not only the cost-side but also the demand-side together with network e¤ects.
Two examples. Advertising-supported media platforms, e.g., TV, magazines, newspa-
pers and internet search engines, supply at the same time two distinct groups of agents:
viewers (consumers) and advertising rms. The media platforms supply contents to at-
tract viewers while the viewers are the bait to attract advertising rms.
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Network e¤ects are present between viewers and advertising rms. On the one hand,
advertisers value platforms with larger audiences for the reason that they get more cov-
erage. On the other hand, viewers value platforms with fewer advertisements due to the
nuisance caused by the advertising time. Hence, the prot maximizing prices result from
balancing the viewers and advertisers demands.
Advertising-supported media receives a large part of overall revenues from advertis-
ers. Advertising rms are frequently charged based on the number of subscribers of the
platform. The prices that platforms charge to advertising rms fulll the purpose of
subsidizing the contents that the platforms show to viewers. In fact, platforms such as
free-to-air TV charge viewers only an implicit price which is the cost of watching adver-
tisements and waiting for the show to resume.
Some relevant cases in the media market where the two-sided market analysis is im-
portant have been the European Commission against Newspaper Publishing, the Carlton
Communications/Granada merger, and the acquisition of DoubleClick by Google which
was studied by the FTC in US and by the European Commission.
Another example of a two-sided market is the card payment system. The payment
card analysis has played an important role in the progress of two-sided markets. Payment
systems, such as cash and payment cards, endow agents with the possibility of transacting
goods and services without having to barter. A payment system has an increasing value
to merchants as more consumers use it, and is more valuable to consumers as more
merchants accept it, and is only possible if both types of agents use it. Thus, there are
positive network e¤ects between the two groups of agents.
Cash payments involve no explicit costs both to consumers and merchants, but might
entail implicit costs such as the risk of theft or handling costs. With a card payment a fee
might be charged to each side of the market by the electronic payment platform. Usually
these platforms make most of their revenue from the merchant side of the market, i.e.,
merchants bear the entire cost per transaction while cardholders may pay a small xed
annual fee, in a number of cases even the annual fee is set down to zero and consumers have
rewards per card transaction. For example, consider a monopolist credit card platform
that charges a per transaction fee to both merchants and cardholders. The more it
charges merchants, the greater is the incentive to persuade cardholders to use their cards,
by reducing the usage fee or increasing their amenities (rewards). The merchants fee
works as a subsidy to the platform in serving consumers.
The two-sided market logic has been playing an important role on market regulation
namely in terms of the pricing charged by the electronic payment networks. Some cases
scrutinized by regulatory authorities comprise the analysis of the Reserve Bank of Aus-
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1 Can access price indexation promote e¢ cient in-
vestment in Next Generation Networks?
1.1 Introduction
Motivation. A key concern for the United States and Europe is the timely rollout of
Next Generation Networks (NGNs).6 Fiber optics technology is at the core of NGNs and
is considered the future of telecommunications infrastructure, since it allows faster and
wider transmission of all sorts of information than copper-based networks.7 Signicant
investments are required to supply the necessary communications infrastructure that con-
sumers and rms demand in order to e¤ectively compete in nowadaysknowledge based
society. While the technology exists today, it is uncertain when and to what extent it
will be deployed by network operators. In 2009, ber to the home (FTTH) had reached
nearly 13% penetration of US households in terms of homes passed and 4% in terms of
homes connected (RVA LLCMarket Research & Consulting, April 2009), in Germany and
Spain FTTH covered less than 5% of the households, and in Italy less than 10% (IDATE
Consulting & Research, February 2010). At the end of 2010, the percentage of subscribers
out of total homes passed by ber was 17.5% in Europe, 34% in the United States and
39% in Japan (IDATE Consulting & Research, 9 February 2011).8 These facts suggest
that residential and business users, particularly in Europe, are unsure about the benets
of FTTH given the level of retail prices charged by the operators.
Telecommunications regulators usually have the task of encouraging investment and
innovation and simultaneously ensuring that networks remain competitive, as competition
is a vital matter for end-users and for businesses relying on the new networks. However,
regulators and competition authorities seem to face a trade-o¤between static and dynamic
e¢ ciency. On the one hand, static regulation reduces the extent to which operators exert
6The idea behind the NGN is that a single network infrastructure transports all information and
services (e.g. voice, data, high denition TV, interactive gaming) allowing increased transmission speeds
by encapsulating information into packets.
7Aside from ber, there are a number of alternative technologies capable of supporting NGN access
such as: coaxial cable, mobile and xed wireless networks. Since ber is one of the fastest technologies
for content transmission (both downloading and uploading), debates on wired NGN access have focused
on ber deployment.
8Asian carriers occupy eight out of the top 10 spots in terms of ber subscriber numbers. Japan is
ranked number 1 with 13,839,000 subscribers. None of the top 10 FTTH market players is from Europe.
Asian operators were the rst to strongly invest in ber rollout, and have in 2011 achieved virtually
complete coverage in their respective national markets.
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market power on the downstream market, inducing retail prices to converge closer to
marginal cost.9 On the other hand, a xed access price based on cost, while it may promote
the statically e¢ cient use of the network, discourages investment (dynamic ine¢ ciency)
since the returns that can be earned by investors are constrained by the access price set
by the regulator.10
The question that telecommunications regulators face under the most used costing
methodologies11 is: how much price e¢ ciency must be sacriced to achieve a desired
level of investment? In this chapter we question whether such a trade-o¤ always exists.
The main challenge is thus to create an access price rule to respond to the question:
how to encourage investment in network (bottleneck) infrastructures without lessening
downstream price competition relatively to a xed access pricing methodology?
Description of the chapter. We consider a context of bilateral one-way access, i.e.,
there are two bottleneck facilities (networks) forced to provide access to each other under
some regulatory conditions.12 Underinvestment derives from the inability of networks
to capture the full social benet from investment. The problem of access obligations
mandated by regulation is that they di¤use the investment benets among operators and
consumers while the investment cost is concentrated on the investor (network owner).
Hence, underinvestment in infrastructure is aggravated by the non-exclusivity imposed
by regulation together with the fact that investment is costly.
Let a denote the access price per subscriber under the xed access price methodology,
which is currently used by many regulators. We compare the socially optimal xed access
price a to a new access price rule, which we call of access price indexation, in terms of
retail prices, ber coverage and social welfare levels. Under the indexation approach the
access price is dened by the regulator as a function of the operatorsinvestments in ber
coverage.
The main purpose of the new access price proposal is to reward or punish operators
9Setting access conditions in network industries is an essential issue for regulators to avoid anti-
competitive behavior on the part of the networks (bottleneck-facility owners). In particular, access
regulation is important to avoid networks that deter entry by refusing access to competitors and to
provide competitors with reasonable access prices, guaranteeing competitive parity among operators.
10Imposing open access with a xed access price calls to mind the classical free-riding problem in static
frameworks (see Olson (1965), Chamberlin (1974) and McGuire (1974)). The literature on free-riding
points out that the investment level of equilibrium in public goods is lower than the Pareto e¢ cient
investment level. In a monopolistic market structure the free-riding problem vanishes; however, the retail
price would become inated, generating potential welfare losses.
11In 2009, the long-run-incremental cost was the costing approach most often applied to European
markets for wholesale access at a xed location (64%) and the second most used for wholesale broadband
access (46%). The fully distributed cost approach had a share of 32% and 54%, respectively (ERG 2009).
With respect to investment in NGN, the European Commission recommendation (European Commission,
20 September 2010) suggested a risk premium when setting access prices to the unbundled ber loop in
order to compensate the investor for bearing the risk of failure alone.
12This is di¤erent from two-way access since in this model end-users do not interact with each other,
whilst two-way access environments are characterized by end-user interconnection.
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depending on the investments made by each one. On the one hand, the indexation
rule should reward an operator i for covering cities with ber, lowering the access price
aj charged by operator j when i requests access to js network. Thus, the indexation
rule can grant a competitive advantage at the downstream level to operators investing
relatively more. On the other hand, the new rule intends to punish the operator that
invests relatively less by increasing its access price to the other network. The indexation
can impose a competitive disadvantage at the downstream market to operators investing
relatively less in ber coverage. This is a solution that internalizes for operator i the
positive spillovers exerted from its investment, Ii, in the sense that ai should increase in
Ii. With the access price indexation suitably chosen by the regulator, the dilemmafaced
by the networks is that, whatever the other does and as long prots are non-negative,
each network is better o¤ investing relatively more since investments are a source of
a competitive advantage in retail prices. For example, by using a simple linear access
pricing rule depending on investments (Ii; Ij) by operators i and j, ai (Ii; Ij) = xIi   yIj,
where (x; y) 2 R2+ are regulatory parameters, we can create a causal link from retail price
competition to (investments in) ber coverage. This rule incentivizes networks to compete
more strongly in investments.
We show that the new rule increases economic e¢ ciency as compared to the xed access
price methodology. The indexation methodology dominates both a xed access pricing
rule and a regulatory holidays policy in terms of retail price e¢ ciency (or equivalently,
the number of consumers served with a ber connection), investment e¢ ciency (i.e., the
number of cities covered with ber) and social welfare. Furthermore, we provide conditions
under which the indexation rule can promote the socially optimal (rst-best) investment
or the Ramsey allocation, which would be unfeasible either with a xed access price or
with regulatory holidays.13
The intuition for these results is the following. Since part of the benets generated
by investments is retained by consumers, the monopolistic (regulatory holidays) outcome
is not only ine¢ cient in terms of retail prices but also ine¢ cient in terms of investment.
Under a xed access price, the introduction of competition in the downstream market
can only deteriorate investment e¢ ciency, while under the indexation rule networks have
incentive to compete in investments as a means to gain a competitive advantage in the
downstream market. By choosing the proper access price indexation, the regulator can
encourage operators to invest until a certain level, which under some conditions (set out
in Proposition 3) can go up to the Ramsey investment or even to the rst-best investment
level, as long as networks have non-negative prots. In fact, under the indexation ap-
proach, a welfare-maximizing regulator sets (x; y) such that, in a symmetric equilibrium,
13According to our model results, under the assumption that the regulator knows with certainty all
parameters, a xed access price is condemned to be ine¢ cient both in retail prices and investments.
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networksprots are zero (see Lemma 1). Therefore, if the regulator is able to incentivize
networks to invest up to the Ramsey level, by the zero-prot condition, Ramsey pricing
will be implemented as well. We conclude that in equilibrium the social welfare level
under the new rule lies outside the previously perceived second-best e¢ ciency frontier
under a xed access price approach.
The main contribution of this chapter is to show that an access price rule depending
on investments, without being informationally more demanding, can improve economic
e¢ ciency both in terms of retail prices and investments as compared to a xed access
price rule. In a nutshell, the access price indexation is a feasible instrument that can
enable a regulator to achieve higher social welfare.
Background. A crucial issue in the economics of regulation of NGN access is how to
encourage operators to invest in infrastructure. Attempts to develop and invest in NGNs
have been taken in many countries by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and Gov-
ernments. For example, in 2006, in Germany the incumbent operator Deutsche Telekom
told the Government that would make these investments only if the Government granted
regulatory holidays, i.e., the incumbent would be temporarily a monopolist without oblig-
ation to provide access to competitors at regulated prices.14 In 2008, the Spanish NRA
removed the requirement on Telefonica, the incumbent operator, to supply wholesale ac-
cess service to its FTTH network. This verdict gave Telefonica a regulatory holiday on
FTTH network access, similar to that held by Deutsche Telekom (ITU, 2009). The French
model follows the cost-sharing perspective. It forces network operators, which may invest
on their own, to make available access to ducts and supply information on planned civil
works and ber coverage, sharing the installation costs of additional ber at other opera-
torsrequest. Other options to stimulate the development on NGNs are the establishment
of public-private partnerships (PPP), as has happened in Singapore and Australia, and
the provision of credit lines and funds, for example in Portugal and, in a relatively small
scale, in the United States.15 In these cases Governments invest, provide funding or credit
to kick-o¤ projects on NGNs and accelerate ber deployment.
The introduction of competition into historical monopolies in telecommunications has
led to a number of research articles on access pricing issues, as regulators have been
14The European Commission opposed the adoption of regulatory holidays and sent Germany a formal
caution in February 2007, after repeated warnings that had been ignored. The case was taken to European
Court (European Comission vs. German Regulator and Deutsche Telekom) that ruled against German
regulatory holidays in December 2009. See ITU (2009) and EU court sets precedent in Germany
telecoms ruling, EurActiv, 4 December 2009, for further details.
15The Australian Government decided in 2009 to invest and to be the majority shareholder of a A$
43 billion super-fast national broadband network. The US Government under President Barack Obama
has allocated US$ 7.2 billion to support broadband build-up. In Portugal, in 2009, a protocol on NGN
was signed between the Government and four operators (Portugal Telecom, Sonaecom, Zon and Oni
Communications), in which there is a commitment of all parties to invest in NGN. The Portuguese
Government is committed to make available a credit line of, at least, EUR 800 million.
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confronted with the need to set the rules on which operators should have access to each
others network. The vast majority of articles on access pricing assume that access fees do
not depend explicitly on investment levels.16 Only recently some exceptions, as Hurkens
and Jeon (2008), Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), Klumpp and Su (2010) and Sauer (2012)
have considered the idea of having access prices as a function of strategic variables, namely,
retail prices, quantities or investments.
Gans (2004) presented a model to study the impact of access price regulation on in-
vestment timing. In particular, Gans investigated whether such regulation can improve
investment timing on equilibrium outcomes, relatively to the social optimal, whilst en-
couraging price competition. First, it is shown that investment might be delayed vis-à-vis
the socially e¢ cient timing if one rm is small. When two rms are large, compe-
tition accelerates investment timing and the investment might be provided too rapidly
at a higher cost than in the socially e¢ cient solution. Second, the article shows that
the regulator may use xed access charges to induce the investment timing outcome to
be socially e¢ cient, by controlling the preemption incentives of other possible providers.
Regulation may thus have an important role in preventing ine¢ cient acceleration of fa-
cility investment.
De Bijl and Peitz (2004) explored situations of one-way access in which an integrated
operator owns a network infrastructure and sells access directly to end-users and to a
downstream operator. This article discusses the investment incentives of the integrated
operator. In particular, De Bijl and Peitz show that it is possible to provide stronger
incentives for the integrated operator to invest in infrastructure quality by increasing the
sensitivity of the regulated access price to the network quality. Nonetheless, they do not
consider any explicit form for how the access price should depend on quality.
Bourreau, Hombert et al. (2010) focused on industries in which an intermediate in-
put (e.g. network access) is sold by vertically integrated rms that compete afterwards
in prices with di¤erentiated products in the downstream market with a non-integrated
downstream rm. They show that upstream price competition with homogeneous inputs
may not drive the input price down to marginal cost. The access price can be set at a level
above marginal cost in order to lessen downstream competition between integrated and
non-integrated rms. However, when nal goods are strongly di¤erentiated, downstream
demands are practically independent among rms, and thus we are back to the classical
Bertrand pricing result at the upstream level. The authors also derived conditions on the
demand and cost functions under which an access price cap can repair the competitiveness
in the upstream market.
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) analyzed investment incentives and consumer welfare
16See Valletti (2003), Guthrie (2006) and Cambini and Jiang (2009) for excellent reviews on how access
pricing and network investments have been investigated by the theoretical literature. This literature
points to the need to consider more deeply the impact of access regulation on investments and on welfare.
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under di¤erent types of access regulation to NGNs. They show that for a given level of
investment, risk-sharing (operators jointly deploy and share the costs of NGNs) induces
the highest competitive intensity in the product market, followed by, respectively, long-
run-incremental cost (LRIC), fully distributed costs (FDC) and regulatory holidays. They
also show that, under uncertainty, FDC or regulatory holidays encourage the highest level
of investments, followed by, respectively, risk-sharing and LRIC. Moreover, according
to simulation results, risk-sharing induces the highest consumer surplus, since it puts
together comparatively high ex-ante investment incentives with strong ex-post competitive
intensity.
Hurkens and Jeon (2008), following a two-way access analysis with n network in-
frastructures, studied the retail benchmarking approach. They propose access pricing
rules that determine the access price as function of the retail prices charged by both net-
works. They show that such a rule may induce the market outcome to achieve the socially
e¢ cient price at the retail level. Moreover, under two-part tari¤ competition, setting the
access price paid by rm i to depend linearly on its average retail price and let networks
invest in quality after the access pricing rule is determined and before they compete in
two-part tari¤s, it is possible to achieve both static and dynamic e¢ ciency.
The closest independent research work to this chapter is Sauer (2012) which compares,
from the social perspective, the performance of di¤erent regulatory access regimes. Sauers
research focuses on (i) the regime of endogenous access charges per user, contingent on
networksinvestment levels and (ii) the regime of investment cost-sharing with lump-sum
charges, i.e., the access price is proportional to the investment costs of the competitor.
Sauer shows that in the former it is possible to reach the socially e¢ cient investment level
without distorting downstream competition, whilst the latter is still below the socially
e¢ cient investment, despite the higher investment level than with xed access charges.
Our chapter is complementary since we focus on modelling techniques that di¤er at least
in two major aspects. First, Sauer uses the Hotelling model with fully served consumers,
while our model relies on the Hotelling model with hinterlands where consumers are fully
served in the city center but may not be fully served in the hinterlands. Therefore, while in
our model market power generates welfare e¤ects, this does not happen in Sauers model.
Second, Sauer assumes that the access charge received by an operator is a non-negative
function of its own investment. In this chapter access prices depend on investments of
both networks and may be negative.
Our chapter is related to the theory of yardstick competition and tournaments, and
incentives in teams. See Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stockey (1983), Holmström
(1982), Nalebu¤and Stiglitz (1983), and Shleifer (1985) for relevant theory developments.
Under a context of uncertainty, an agents low performance may be due to an unfavorable
state of nature rather than to low e¤ort. Such e¤ects can be detected, to some extent, by
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comparing the agents performance with that of other agents placed in similar conditions.
The literature calls this scheme of yardstick competition. Marino and Zábojník (2001)
show that by organizing a tournament between two teams and transferring output from the
team with inferior performance to the team with higher performance, this helps to solve
(i) the free riding problem inside each team, and (ii) lessen the moral hazard problem.
We use similar logic by creating a tournament between networks as a solution for an
underinvestment problem in NGNs.
1.2 The model
We start by presenting the basic modelling structure and providing the social optimum
as benchmark case. Then we solve the model for di¤erent regulatory regimes: (i) a xed
access price, (ii) access price indexation and (iii) regulatory holidays, and compare the
equilibria in terms of ber coverage, retail prices and social welfare levels.
Consider the market for ber broadband service in which two networks labeled i = 1; 2
o¤er di¤erentiated services. The timing of the model is summarized below in Table 1.
First, the regulator sets the rule for pricing access to bottleneck facilities.17 Second,
operators compete in investments (ber coverage). In our framework this is the equivalent
to each operator choosing the number of cities to cover by ber. Third, operators compete
in retail prices in the downstream market in all cities covered with ber. Investments are
made only once but operators compete in the downstream market over many periods.
Therefore, the third stage of the game may be interpreted as a reduced form of a dynamic
game of competition in the downstream market with a discounted stream of future prots.
This structure of the game is natural as operators decide on prices in the short-run and on
investments in the long-run, while regulators decide on access prices in the very long-run.
Table 1: Timing of the model
I. The regulator denes the access price rule per end-user, ai, which operator i
must follow when j is the accessing network.
II. Operators invest simultaneously and non-cooperatively in non-duplicable
network infrastructure, which we interpret as NGN infrastructure
(FTTH).18Immediately after, operators observe the investment outcome.
III. Operators compete simultaneously and non-cooperatively in retail prices.
17Access pricing rules should be dened by the regulator as networks would otherwise have an incentive
to set access prices too high.
18 NGN access refers to the network segment connecting an end-user to the nearest location which
houses the operators equipment. In Europe, NGN access refers essentially to the introduction of ber
into the local loop.
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Below we describe each of the participants in the model: the regulator, the networks,
and the subscribers (consumers in each city) of ber broadband services.
Regulator. The regulator can choose to x the access price at some level ai = a
or,19 alternatively, to set an access price depending on operatorsinvestment levels. For
technical simplication, we assume a linear access price rule depending on investments
dened by
ai (Ii; Ij)  xIi   yIj, (1)
where (x; y) 2 R2+ are the regulatory parameters, and Ii  0, Ij  0 denote the number
of cities covered by ber by operator i and j, respectively.20 The total number of cities
covered by ber is denoted by I, where I  I1+I2. Since the investment level corresponds
to the number of cities covered by ber we assume that investments are perfectly observ-
able by the regulator. For example, by observing the duct construction and networks
physical infrastructures for ber optic deployment in cities. We note that civil works cost
of network deployment are the most signicant in new build network construction.
We assume that the regulator is benevolent, i.e., maximizes social welfare, and can
credibly commit ex-ante to impose an access price rule.21 Otherwise, networks would
infer that once the investments had been made the regulator would set a new access price
rule stimulating competition in retail prices. Without a regulatory commitment networks
would be less prone to invest.
Operators. Network operators are prot maximizers. We assume that operators invest
in di¤erent regions, i.e., network infrastructures are non-overlapping.22 Fixing infrastruc-
ture duplication at zero favors technical simplicity and allows focusing our attention on
the static and dynamic e¢ ciencies without considering potential ine¢ ciencies regarding
infrastructure duplication.23
19Regulatory holidays may be interpreted as the case when the regulator sets ai = 1 for a period of
time.
20Under a linear indexation of access prices, the regulator will choose (x; y) such that in equilibrium
networksparticipation constraint binds, as shown in Lemma 1. Therefore, it is not possible to improve
on investment e¢ ciency without further distortions on retail prices. The linear indexation suits to show
the main goal of this chapter: an access price indexation is better than a xed access price in terms of
retail price e¢ ciency, investment e¢ ciency and social welfare.
21For example, in the UK, in March 2009, Ofcom published a policy statement setting out a regulatory
framework for Next Generation Access. Ofcom is the Independent Regulator and Competition Authority
for the UK Communications Industries. This gave su¢ cient regulatory certainty for BT to proceed with
the initial phase of super-fast broadband roll out. BT has invested £ 2.5 billion to make ber broadband
available to around two-thirds of UK premises by the end of 2014 (RFS 2012).
22For example, if I1 = 10 and I2 = 2, we interpret this as operator 1 covering ten cities in the north
part of the country; while operator 2 covers two cities in the south part of the country. It is implicitly
assumed that cities are identical with regard to their population, however they di¤er with respect to their
cost of ber coverage.
23We acknowledge, though, that di¤erent regulatory regimes may result in di¤erent levels of infrastruc-
ture duplication. By design, indexation brings further incentives for investment when compared to a xed
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The network installation cost (i.e., the cost of covering cities with ber) is convex
in the sense that it is more expensive to connect subscribers in peripheral cities.24 This
captures the fact that operators start investing from cities where ber is relatively cheaper
to install. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the investment cost follows the form
C(Ii)  cI2i =2, (2)
where c > 0 is a constant.25
We assume that subscribers pay independently of the tra¢ c volume exchanged in the
communications, i.e., they only pay for accessing the network, e.g. a periodical subscrip-
tion fee. This reects the fact that currently in the United States and in Europe a number
of broadband o¤ers are essentially at rates per month. Let then pi denote is retail price
to provide broadband access to one subscriber. The respective mass of subscribers using
is service in one city is denoted by qi.
Network i faces a marginal cost, per subscriber, for serving broadband access equal to(
0,
aj,
if subscriber is in is area
if subscriber is in js area
.
Subscribers. For each city covered by ber we assume a Hotelling model with hinter-
landsspecication regarding subscriberschoices.26
access price. Therefore, indexation may incentivize more infrastructure duplication than a xed access
price. However, note that when the access price is higher, operators have further incentives to deploy
their own network, which may result in ine¢ cient duplication of infrastructures. In Proposition 2, we
argue that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the access price resulting from the indexation approach can be
lower than the one resulting from a xed access approach. Thus, it may be also the case that indexation
is more e¢ cient than a xed access price in terms of duplication of infrastructures.
24Network installation cost also varies signicantly between areas due to di¤erences in geology and
ground cover. The convexity of costs also applies to postal services and third generation mobile telephone
systems. See Foros and Kind (2003).
25The main results in this chapter are not dependent on the quadratic form of C (Ii). Results hold as
long C (Ii) is su¢ ciently convex such that it guarantees that networksprots as a reduced-form function
of investments are concave with respecto to own investment. This is shown in Theorem 2.
26See the section Mobile market expansion in Amstrong and Wright (2009) for another application of
the Hotelling model with hinterlands.
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Figure 1: Hotelling model with hinterlands - the representative city.
Consumerswillingness to pay for broadband service o¤ered by network
1 and 2 represented by bold and thin dashes, respectively.
From the subscriber perspective there is some service di¤erentiation among networks
for reasons such as technical support, proximity to clients, marketing campaigns, advertis-
ing or switching costs. Each city comprises by the center plus two symmetric hinterlands
(West and East sides of the city center) as in Figure 1. We assume that subscribers
located in the city center, indexed by ~x 2 [0; 1], are fully served, while consumers in the
hinterlands, indexed by ~y, are partially served. In a representative city the surplus of a
consumer indexed by ~x and ~y is dened by, respectively, CS~x and CS~y
CS~x 
(
v   t~x  p1






v   t~y   pi
0
if nearest operator i = 1; 2
if no service
(4)
where v is the intrinsic value from subscribing to the service and t measures the sub-
scribers disutility of not being connected to their ideal taste network. We assume that
v > t > 0, i.e., service di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently small as compared to the intrinsic
value v of the service. There is a total mass 2 of consumers in a representative city. In the
city center represented by the unit interval [0; 1] there is a mass 1 of consumers uniformly
distributed with density 1, while in each hinterland there is a mass 1=2 of consumers uni-











surplus (utility), U , and consumer surplus, CS, in a city are thus
U (x1; z1; x2; z2)  v (x1 + x2 + z1 + z2) 
t (x21 + x
2







CS  U  
2X
i=1
pi (xi + zi) (6)
27By assuming density t=2v in the hinterlands we guarantee a xed mass 1=2 of consumers in each
hinterland. Otherwise the number of consumers in hinterlands would depend on t and v.
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where 0  xi  1 and 0  zi  12 denote the mass of subscribers located in the city center
and hinterlands, respectively, using network is service. Note that zi  yi t2v , where yi is
the distance to the nearest operator (city center) and zi may be interpreted as the mass
of subscribers, using network is service, along that distance. Since consumers are fully
served in the city center we have then x1 + x2 = 1.
















qi  xi + zi = 1 
(v + t) pi   vpj
2tv




A summary of the models notation follows in Table 2.
Table 2: Notation
ai Access price, per subscriber, charged by network i.
x, y Regulatory parameters under the indexation rule.
v Intrinsic value from subscribing to a ber service.
t Service di¤erentiation parameter.
c Investment cost parameter.
Ii Number of cities covered by ber installed by network i.
I Total number of cities covered by ber, dened as I  I1 + I2.
pi Retail price charged by network i for ber optic broadband service.
xi Mass of subscribers located in the city center using network is service.
zi Mass of subscribers located in the hinterlands of a city using network is service.
qi Total mass of subscribers using network is service in a city, dened as qi 
xi + zi.
Q Total mass of ber broadband subscribers in a city, dened as Q  q1 + q2.
U Gross consumer surplus in a city.
CS Consumer surplus in a city.
1.3 The social optimum benchmark
In order to assess the xed and the indexation access price rules from the social welfare
standpoint we compute, as benchmark, the rst-best solution that a benevolent planner
could achieve. Let the social value of providing ber broadband be dened as the sum of
consumer surpluses, CS, in all cities covered by ber, plus networkssubscription revenues
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minus the costs with regard to ber coverage. Access prices are mere transfers among
networks, therefore access revenues minus the access costs across operators sum up to
zero. For that reason access prices are not relevant in the rst-best analysis. In other
words, the measure of social welfare taken is the unweighted sum of consumer surplus in
all cities covered by ber and the industry prot.
Given that the cities covered by ber are identical, x1, z1, x2, z2 must be the same
across them. Hence, in the rst-best a benevolent regulator would solve
max
x1;z1;x2;z2;I1;I2









subject to x1 + x2 = 1.












U opt = 1
4
(6v   t)




The e¢ cient retail prices correspond to the social marginal cost of serving a ber
subscriber, i.e., zero by assumption. Thus, it is socially optimal to supply FTTH to all
consumers where ber broadband is available. Due to symmetry of willingness to pay for
ber broadband service between networks, the welfare-maximizing market shares in the
city center and hinterlands are given by xopti = 1=2 and z
opt
i = 1=2, respectively. The
e¢ cient network size (investment) is driven by parameters v and t, which a¤ect the gross
consumer surplus in a city covered by ber, and the cost of covering an additional city with
ber, which is a¤ected by parameter c. It is noteworthy that in the absence of lump-sum
transfers the social optimum is not feasible under any access price rule per subscriber. In
the social optimum popti = 0 and as a consequence networks would not extract revenues
from subscribers, while the access revenue aqoptj I
opt





symmetry. Prots would be then negative
opti = I



















and networks would prefer to exit the market. Therefore, the rst-best solution is not
feasible without lump-sum transfers that cover the networks investment cost. We can
conclude from here that to maximize social welfare subject to non-negative prots we
would derive strictly positive Ramsey prices.
Bearing in mind the rst-best benchmark in (10), in the following section we establish
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comparisons between the equilibria under: a xed access price, an indexation access price
rule and a regulatory holidays regime.
1.4 The subgame perfect Nash equilibria
In this section we compare equilibria where networks operate under a xed access
price, an indexation access price rule and a regulatory holidays regime. We use backward
induction to solve the model for a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under
each regulatory regime. First, given a regulatory regime and investment levels, we solve
the networksproblem for the prot maximizing retail prices. Second, given a regulatory
regime we solve the networks problem for optimal investments. Third, we solve the
regulators problem for welfare-maximizing access pricing rules (xed and indexed access
prices). Technical details and calculations follow in an appendix.
1.4.1 The xed access price approach
Below we solve the model for the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under
a xed access price rule. We identify economic ine¢ ciencies related to this type of regula-
tion. In particular, we stress that neither investment e¢ ciency nor retail price e¢ ciency
is feasible under a xed access price.
Stage III: retail price choices. In the retail pricing stage, operator is problem is,
given an access price a, a pair of investment levels (Ii; Ij) and pj,
max
pi
i = I  piqi + aqjIi   aqiIj   cI2i =2, (11)
where I  piqi corresponds to is subscription revenues and aqjIi   aqiIj represents the
access revenue received from network j subtracted from the access cost paid. Term cI2i =2
is the cost of covering Ii cities with ber. From the FOC of the problem in (11), in
equilibrium we get
pi =
(3v (2t+ a) + 4t2) v (Ii + Ij) + at (v (3Ii + 4Ij) + 2tIj)
(2t+ v) (2t+ 3v) (Ii + Ij)
, i; j = 1; 2, j 6= i, (12)
as long pi (a)  v   t=2. In plain words, in equilibrium the retail price must be below
the willingness to pay of the consumer in the middle of the city center. Otherwise, the
full coverage assumption of the city center would not hold. Note that in the case of
symmetric investments, i.e., Ii = Ij, the price equilibrium in (12) will be valid under the
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constraint a  a  (2v2   tv   2t2) = (t+ 2v). Plugging (12) into (8) we get that the mass
of consumers subscribing to is broadband ber broadband in a city is
qi =
(6v2 + 10tv + 4t2) v (Ii + Ij)  2a (t2Ij + v2Ii)  4v2aIj   atv (Ii + 6Ij)
2v (2t+ v) (2t+ 3v) (Ii + Ij)
(13)
and the total mass of ber subscribers in a city is
Q =
4v (t+ v)  a (t+ 2v)
2v (2t+ v)
.
Stage II: investment choices. In the investment stage under a xed access price, a,
network is maximization problem is
max
Ii
i = I  pi qi + aqj Ii   aqi Ij   cI2i =2,
where pi is dened by (12) and q

i by (13) in the retail price stage.
From the FOCs of networksproblems in the investment stage, @i =@Ii = 0, in equi-
librium we reach an investment level (per network) of
Ii =
(t+ 2v) (8v (6tv + 4t2 + 3v2)  a (25tv + 14t2 + 12v2)) a+ 16 (t+ v) (2t+ 3v) tv2
8cv (2t+ 3v) (2t+ v)2
.
(14)
Stage I: access price regulation. We compare now the rst-best solution to the
equilibrium outcome under a xed access price rule. We claim that under a xed access
price rule a regulator cannot induce the socially optimal level of investment, regardless of
how much static e¢ ciency is sacriced. Moreover, given that negative access prices are
not implemented in practice, we note that retail price e¢ ciency cannot be achieved.
Proposition 1 (underinvestment) Under a xed access price (i) it is not possible to
implement the socially optimal investment, i.e., there is underinvestment Ii < I
opt
i , and
(ii) retail price e¢ ciency would require a negative access price.
Proof All proofs are in an appendix. 
The intuition for the underinvestment result with a xed access price comes from
the fact that networks are unable to capture the full social benet of investment. This
inability stems from retail price competition and uniform pricing. The xed access price is
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a regulatory tool that may incentivize investments but sacrice retail price competition,
i.e., by increasing the access price. Nonetheless, even if the access price were set to
maximize the investment outcome, there would be benets captured by the subscribers due
to their heterogeneity in the willingness to pay for the ber broadband service and the fact
that networks are, generally, unable to price discriminate to extract the subscribersfull
valuations. Moreover, if networks were able to practice rst-degree price discrimination,
retail price competition would imply positive surplus to subscribers. Hence, in general,
networks cannot fully internalize the benets from their investments which implies a
choice that is necessarily ine¢ cient. With regard to retail price (in)e¢ ciency, due to the
existence of market power in the downstream market, the access price would have to
be negative to counterbalance the market power e¤ect. In a nutshell, bearing in mind
that negative access prices are not implemented in practice, the equilibrium outcome is
condemned to underinvestment and retail price ine¢ ciency. This result holds regardless
of the access price being privately bargained between networks in an unregulated market
or being set by a benevolent regulator.28
Theorem 1 extends Proposition 1 to a set of more general assumptions. The model
discussed earlier in this chapter satises all the assumptions in Theorem 1. Note that
the demand for ber broadband in a city does not change with consumersincome. This
follows the Marshallian notion that when a good represents a small fraction of the total
expenditure of a consumer then income e¤ects become negligible.29 Let maxU = U opt
where U opt is a positive constant denoting the maximum gross consumer surplus (willing-
ness to pay) derived from the ber broadband usage in a city. Hence, the gross consumer
surplus level U opt can be interpreted as the maximum revenue that networks can collect






Theorem 1 (underinvestment) Consider a sequential game such that the regulator
chooses the access charge a before networks compete rst in investments and second
in retail prices, and the following conditions hold: (a) network is prot is dened by
i  (Ii + Ij)  piqi + aqjIi   aqiIj   C (Ii), where C (Ii) is an increasing, twice dif-
ferentiable and su¢ ciently convex cost function ensuring that network is prot as a
reduced-form function of investments is strictly concave in Ii; (b) social welfare mea-
sure is W 
2P
i=1
[i + Ii  CS] where CS  U  
2P
i=1
piqi and U is a twice di¤erentiable,
strictly concave function in (qi; qj) such that U opt  pi qi +aqj + @i@pj
@pj
@Ii
; and (c) qi (pi; pj)
28Any access price being privately bargained between networks in an unregulated market will result in
lower social welfare level than when the access price is set by a welfare-maximizing regulator.
29See Vives (1987) for a formalization of the Marshallian idea on small income e¤ects. In 2008, telecom-
munications revenue as percentage of GDP was less than 2.6% in the Euro area and 4.3% in the UK. In
2005, the gure was slightly less than 3.1% in the US and less than 3.2% worldwide. Source: International
Telecommunication Union World Telecommunication Development Report and database and World Bank
estimates (http://www.econstats.com/wdi/wdiv_617.htm).
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is twice di¤erentiable and non-increasing in (pi; pj).
Thus, under a xed access price (i) is not possible to implement the socially optimal
investment, i.e., there is underinvestment Ii < I
opt
i , and (ii) retail price e¢ ciency requires
a negative access price.
To nd the socially optimal number of cities covered by ber, the regulator equates
the marginal social benet from covering an additional city by ber, U opt, to the marginal









to the marginal cost C 0 (Ii). Note that pi q

i is the revenue from selling ber broadband to





is the strategic e¤ect that is investment has on js retail price and consequently
on is prot. This strategic e¤ect is due to the fact that js best-reply in terms of retail
price depends on the investment levels (Ii ; Ij). Note that the marginal cost for network
j to serve ber broadband to a customer is zero if the customer is in a city covered
by j, otherwise j has to pay an access charge a. Nonetheless, the retail price is set
nationwide, i.e., network j charges the same retail price across cities. This means that
if network i increases its ber coverage and j responds by increasing the retail price in
all cities (because, on average, there is an increase in the marginal cost per customer)
network i may increase prots via this strategic e¤ect. We assume that the strategic




do not fully internalize the benets from their investments this implies a choice that is
necessarily ine¢ cient. The intuition for retail price (in)e¢ ciency is the same as discussed
for Proposition 1.
1.4.2 The new rule: access price indexation
Given the ine¢ ciencies in the use of a xed access price, we consider a new rule by
indexing access prices to networksinvestments. This new indexation rule has the purpose
of increasing investment incentives without sacricing static e¢ ciency and, ultimately,
boosting social welfare. In particular, the new access price rule is dened in (1) where
(x; y) 2 R2+ is the pair of regulatory parameters to be determined. Under access price
indexation, besides the impact via retail and access revenues, investments a¤ect networks
prots via changes in access prices.
We solve the three-stage game under the new rule and compare it to the equilibrium
obtained under a xed access price. We also solve the game for the case where the
regulators goal is to implement the socially e¢ cient (rst-best) level of ber coverage with
the lowest possible retail pricing. In Proposition 2 we show that access price indexation can
increase social welfare relatively to a xed access pricing. Theorem 2 extends Proposition
2 to a set of more general assumptions. In response to the title of this chapter, in
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Proposition 3 we show that under certain conditions the access price indexation can
promote the socially optimal investment. This may be particularly useful, for example,
to meet a universal service obligation. Moreover, we show that under certain conditions
the Ramsey outcome is feasible with the access price indexation.
Stage III: retail price choices under indexation. With access price indexation,
operator is optimization problem in the retail pricing stage is
max
pi
i = I  piqi + aiqjIi   ajqiIj   cI2i =2. (15)
Note that the problem in (15) is di¤erent from the one in (11) since access prices may
now di¤er among operators depending on investment levels.
Taking the FOC of the problem in (15) and solving for the equilibrium retail prices
we get
pi =
v (3tai + 3vai + 6tv + 4t
2) Ii + (6tv
2 + 4t2v + 2t2aj + 3v
2aj + 4tvaj) Ij
(2t+ v) (2t+ 3v) (Ii + Ij)
. (16)
Plugging (16) into qi in (8) we reach
qi =
v (10tv + 4t2 + 6v2   tai   2vai) Ii + 2 (t+ v) (2tv + 3v2   taj   2vaj) Ij
2v (2t+ v) (2t+ 3v) (Ii + Ij)
. (17)
Stage II: investment choices under indexation. In the investment stage, network
is maximization problem is
max
Ii
i = I  pi qi + aiqj Ii   ajqi Ij   cI2i =2,
where pi is dened in (16) and q

i , and analogously q

j , in (17). The networks optimal












@Ii| {z } = 0,
direct e¤ectindexation e¤ect
(18)
while under the xed access approach only the direct e¤ectexists. The direct e¤ect
accounts for the marginal private benet and marginal cost of covering cities with ber
assuming that access prices are held constant. The indexation e¤ectaccounts for the
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networks prot variation due to changes in access prices (both paid and received by the
network) that come via the networks investment.
Under a xed access price ak = a does not depend on investments, thus @ak=@Ii = 0
and the indexation e¤ectis zero. Under the indexation approach the indexation e¤ect









(+) (+) ( ) ( )
meaning that network is prot increases (decreases) if i charges (pays) a higher access
price, and the access price charged (paid) increases (decreases) in is investment. In
plain English, the marginal benet from investment is higher when networks are under an
access charge indexed to investments than under a xed access charge. As a consequence,
networks have incentive to invest more under the indexation approach than under xed
access.
Assuming investment symmetry, operator is FOC for investment can be written as
8><>:





c (2t+ v)2 + v (t+ 2v) y

  2 (t+ 2v) (6tv + 4t2 + 3v2)x

Ii+
+16tv2 (t+ v) (2t+ 3v)
9>=>; = 0,
(19)
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Stage I: regulators choice under indexation. The welfare-maximizing regulator










=2 subject to (21)
xi (Ii; Ij; x; y) = x

i (Stage III)
zi (Ii; Ij; x; y) = z

i (Stage III)
qi (Ii; Ij; x; y) = q

i (Stage III)
pi (Ii; Ij; x; y) = p

i (Stage III)
di =dIi = 0 (Stage II)
d2i =dI
2
i  0 (Stage II)
i  0 (PC),
where PC denotes network is participation constraint. Plugging the restrictions from
stage III into the objective function in (21) and assuming investment symmetry, the





2 + 12t2v   4t3 + 6v3)+
 4v
 
c (2t+ v)2 + 2t (t+ 2v) (x  y)

Ii+




di =dIi = 0 (Stage II)
d2i =dI
2
i  0 (Stage II)
Ii
16tv2 (v + t)  2v (4ct (v + t) + cv2 + v (2t+ 4v) (y   x)) Ii   (x  y)2 (t+ 2v)2 I2i
4v (2t+ v)2
 0 (PC).
Lemma 1 (participation constraint binds) In a symmetric equilibrium, networks
participation constraint will be binding, i.e., i = 0, with a welfare-maximizing regulator
using an access price indexation yielding (x; y) 6= (0; 0) and a  0.
Recall that in the social optimum (rst-best) networkswould have negative prof-
its. Given that the social optimum is not feasible in the absence of transfers, the best
that a welfare-maximizing regulator can do under the indexation approach is to choose
a regulatory regime (x; y) subject to networks zero-prot condition. If networks pre-
sented positive prots in equilibrium, the regulator could enhance the social welfare by
choosing (x; y) such that retail prices were lower (i.e., improving static e¢ ciency) and/or
investments in ber coverage were higher (i.e., improving dynamic e¢ ciency).
Proposition 2 (indexation vs xed access) In a symmetric equilibrium, a linear
access pricing rule depending on investments with (x; y) 2 R2+ can simultaneously (i)
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expand total investment in ber coverage, (ii) expand the mass of subscribers in each city,
and (iii) enhance social welfare, as compared to a xed access price a > 0.
The introduction of an access price indexation can create a scheme of rewards to in-
vestors and punishment to those who do not invest or invest relatively less. In particular,
the network that invests relatively more will benet from a lower access price when ac-
cessing other network, while beneting from a higher price when providing access. As a
result of the additional incentives to investment derived from the indexation approach,
for a same access price, a, in equilibrium networks invest more than under a xed access
price a.
The total mass of ber subscribers depends on the retail price level which in turn
depends on the access price level. Therefore, if the equilibrium access price under the
indexation rule is below the one dened under a xed access price rule, the mass of
subscribers will be higher under the former, rather than under the latter rule. Suppose
that with a xed access price rule the access price is set at a. Under the access price
indexation the regulator can choose (x; y) such that ai = xIi   yIj = a   ", " > 0, while






are above the equilibrium investment
levels under a xed access. With investment symmetry in equilibrium, we can write
x   y < a=Ii. Note that x and y can be set at a level such that the di¤erence x   y is
su¢ ciently small to assure that the access price will be below a. However, x and y must
be set su¢ ciently high to incentivize more investment than under a xed access charge.
In relation to social welfare, we note that, in equilibrium, the mass of subscribers
in each city is higher under the indexation approach than under a xed access charge.
Consequently, both the gross consumer surplus in each city and the marginal social benet
from investment increase. In fact, in the xed access equilibrium the marginal social
benet from investment is positive, implying that further investment would enhance the
social welfare level. Hence, if the xed access rule is the status quo, the social welfare
variation due to the implementation of access price indexation must be positive. This is
explained by the increase of gross consumer surplus in each city together with the increase
in the number of cities covered by ber (while the cost of covering an additional city by
ber is lower than the gross consumer surplus generated).
In Theorem 2 below we claim that Proposition 2 is robust to a set of more general
assumptions.
Theorem 2 (indexation vs xed access) Consider a sequential game such that the
regulator chooses the access price ai before networks compete rst in investments and
second in retail prices, and the following conditions hold: (a) network is prot is dened
by i = (Ii + Ij) piqi + aiqjIi   ajqiIj  C(Ii), where C (Ii) is an analytic,30 increasing
30An analytic function is a function that is locally given by a convergent power series. Typical examples
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and su¢ ciently convex cost function ensuring that network is prot as a reduced-form
function of investments is strictly concave in Ii; (b) @i=@pj  0 in equilibrium; (c)
i is strictly concave in pi; (d) qi (pi; pj) is an analytic function and non-increasing in
(pi; pj); (e) social welfare measure is W 
2P
i=1
[IiU   C(Ii)]; and (f) gross consumer
surplus in a city, U , is di¤erentiable and decreasing in (pi; pj) 2 R2+.
Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium, an access pricing rule depending on investments
can simultaneously (i) expand total investment in ber coverage, (ii) expand the mass of
subscribers in each city, and (iii) enhance social welfare, as compared to a xed access
price a > 0.
Under the assumptions set out in Theorem 2, for a same access price a, the marginal
private benet from investment for a network is higher under the indexation approach than
under a xed access charge. This comes as a consequence of the additional incentives to
investment generated by the indexation approach. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium
where the access charge is a, networks have incentives to cover more cities with ber
under the indexation approach, rather than under a xed access charge.
Under the indexation approach it is feasible to expand of the number of cities covered
with ber even if in equilibrium the access price, a   ", " > 0, is lower than the xed
access price a. To check this we rely on the assumption that i is an analytic function
so that it can be rewritten as a Taylor series around a xed access price a. By doing this
we can isolate the e¤ect of " and show that for a su¢ ciently small (but strictly positive)
", the marginal private benet from investment for a network is still higher under the
indexation approach than under a xed access charge at a. Thus, networks will have
further incentives to cover more cities with ber under the indexation approach even if,
in equilibrium, the access price is below (but su¢ ciently close to) a.
In relation to social welfare, a reduction in retail prices diminishes static ine¢ ciency
while enhancing the gross consumer surplus, U , in each and every city covered with
ber. Given that U increases when the regulator imposes an indexation rule, this means
that the social marginal benet from investment, U   C 0 (Ii), increases as well (when
compared to the use of a xed access price). If the social marginal benet from investment
in equilibrium under a xed access price is positive (i.e., U   C 0 (Ii ) > 0), then an
increase in investment will boost social welfare. Otherwise, the regulator would not need
to incentivize more investment and the social welfare level would increase via access price
reduction only.
In the following section we show that with an indexation rule, contrarily to a xed
access price, a regulator may aspire to achieve objectives such as the socially e¢ cient
(rst-best) investment level and the Ramsey outcome.
of analytic functions are: polynomial, exponential, trigonometric, logarithm, and power functions. Any
analytic function is smooth, that is, innitely di¤erentiable.
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Stage I revisited: universal service and the Ramsey solution. A regulator may
choose a regulatory policy (x; y) with the purpose of implementing the rst-best invest-
ment level, Iopti = (6v   t) = (4c). This action may result, for instance, from the existence
of a universal service requirement. Universal service is an economic, legal and business
term used mostly in regulated industries, referring to the practice of providing a base-
line level of services to all residents of a country at an a¤ordable price. Examples of
this concept may be found in the Telecommunications Act of 199631 and the Directive
(2002/22/EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of
7 March 2012. In this section we suggest that the access price indexation may be used
to promote an objective of universal service. In particular, we argue that if the degree
of service di¤erentiation, t, is su¢ ciently small, then there will exist a regulatory policy
(x; y) such that the rst-best investment level can be implemented.
Within the context of this chapter, the Ramsey solution is a policy concerning what
price and investment a monopolist would set, in order to maximize social welfare, subject
to a constraint of non-negative prot. In Proposition 3 we set out the conditions under
which the Ramsey solution is feasible.
Proposition 3 (rst-best investment level and Ramsey solution) In a symmetric
equilibrium, if service di¤erentiation, t, is su¢ ciently small, a linear access pricing rule
depending on investments can implement (i) the rst-best investment level or (ii) the
Ramsey solution.
A regulatory regime (x; y) will implement the rst-best investment if, at Ii = I
opt
i ,
the pair (x; y) passes three tests: (i) the network FOC in (19), (ii) the SOC, which is
characterized by inequality (20), and (iii) non-negative prots. In equilibrium, for Ii =
Iopti , the regulator chooses (x; y) such that networks have zero prots and simultaneously
satisfy the FOC. A small di¤erentiation parameter is a su¢ cient (but not necessary)
condition to ensure that the SOC is satised in networksproblems. Intuitively, if service
di¤erentiation is small it implies ercer price competition between the two networks.
When price competition is more intense, networks have further incentives to cut prices
in the sense that a small price cut shifts a large mass of subscribers towards the network
with the lowest price. Therefore, if price competition becomes ercer, operator i will
have more incentives to invest under the indexation approach as a means to inate ai
and reduce aj, achieving a competitive advantage at the retail pricing stage. If service
di¤erentiation decreases, it will be easier for the regulator to ensure the implementation
of higher investment levels, namely the rst-best investment level.
31The US Telecommunications Act of 1996, set out the following goals: (i) to promote the availability
of quality services at just, reasonable, and a¤ordable rates; (ii) to increase access to advanced telecom-
munications services throughout the Nation; and (iii) to advance the availability of such services to all
consumers, including those in low income, rural, insular, and high cost areas at rates that are reasonably
comparable to those charged in urban areas.
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The Ramsey investment, IRamseyi , is lower than I
opt
i ,
32 and at (x; y) = (0; 0) the in-
vestment of equilibrium under the indexation approach is lower than IRamseyi . Therefore,
by continuity of the FOC that denes Ii under the indexation approach, we can guar-
antee the existence of a pair (x; y) such that the investment in equilibrium is equal to
the Ramsey investment. Recall that, from Lemma 1, the participation constraint binds,
and at Ii = I
Ramsey
i the retail price in equilibrium shall be set such that networks have
zero-prot. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium, pi corresponds to Ramsey pricing.
Note that under symmetry, as pj = pi and Ij = Ii, the Ramsey outcome is simply
characterized by two instruments: pRamseyi and I
Ramsey
i . Under the indexation approach,
pi and I

i are functions of two regulatory instruments: x and y. Thus, for a su¢ ciently
small degree of di¤erentiation between ber broadband services, we can nd a mapping






. However, in the event of an asymmetric Ramsey











the Ramsey outcome may o¤er a higher social welfare level than an access price indexation
with only two regulatory instruments (x; y).
1.4.3 Regulatory holidays
In this section we show that the indexation rule can perform better than regulatory
holidays with regard to ber coverage, retail prices and social welfare.33 In a city monop-
olized by operator i (located at point 0 and point 1) that is unable to price discriminate,













if v  pi > v   t2
if 0  pi  v   t2
.
Operator i chooses pi and Ii solving the following maximization problem
max
pi;Ii
moni = Iipiqi   cI2i =2.
We demonstrate in an appendix that each monopoly network chooses to charge the retail
price pmoni = v   t=2 serving qmoni = 1 + t= (2v) subscribers in each city. Each network
covers Imoni = (4v
2   t2) = (4cv) cities with ber and attains a prot level of moni =
32The social marginal benet from investment is maximal when U is maximized, which happens in the
rst-best solution when retail prices are set at zero.
33The regulatory holidays case can also be seen as a special case of the indexation rule, for example,
by setting x = 1, y = 0. In this case, for any investment Ii > 0 the access price, under the indexation
rule, becomes innite which is equivalent to granting local monopolies.
34In an appendix we solve for both the cases where the monopolist o¤ers one or two brands, i.e., it
is present in one or both hinterlands of a city. Assuming that v > 2t, the results in Proposition 4 hold
regardless of the monopolists presence in one or both hinterlands. Here we present the two-brand case
which only requires v > t to verify Proposition 4.
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(2v   t)2 (2v + t)2 = (32cv2). The ine¢ ciency of the monopoly with respect to retail prices





2   t2) = (4cv) <
(6v   t) = (4c) = Iopti , provided that v > t. In a nutshell, the retail price ine¢ ciency
derives from networksmarket power, while investment ine¢ ciency is due to a part of
the surplus generated by the ber service being captured by consumers (given uniform
pricing and no lump-sum transfers). We conclude that the indexation approach can do
better than regulatory holidays in terms of social welfare.
Proposition 4 (regulatory holidays) A linear access pricing rule depending on invest-
ments can simultaneously decrease retail prices and increase both investment and social
welfare levels as compared to the regulatory holidays regime (i.e., local monopolies).
Granting a local monopoly expands total investment relative to a xed access price
but at the cost of a retail price distortion which reduces the mass of ber subscribers. The
regulatory holidays regime is dominated by the proposed access price indexation rule, both
in terms of investment (broadband coverage by ber) and retail price e¢ ciency, resulting
in higher social welfare with the indexation approach rather than with regulatory holidays.
Intuitively, the regulatory holidays policy consists of alleviating price competition pressure
in order to increase the investment rewards as a way to encourage further investment. The
indexation approach works in the opposite direction proposing a tournament where
networks have incentives to compete in investments.
1.5 Informational issues under access price indexation
The assumption that investments (i.e., ber broadband coverages) are observable and
veriable to a third party is fundamental for the access price indexation to fulll its
intended outcomes (as set out in previous sections). In this section we discuss the reason-
ableness of this assumption, bearing in mind that networks may have an incentive to use
the access price indexation to increase their own prots. In particular, in order to gain a
competitive advantage at the downstream level and, ultimately, increase prots, networks
may have an incentive to report wider ber broadband coverage than they actually have.
We argue that regulators may, at least in part, observe and verify (at some cost) the
ber optic infrastructures. The economics of FTTH network deployment is usually char-
acterized by high xed costs of which the dominant component is the civil works: digging
the roads (including construction permits) and laying ducts, whose existence is observable
and veriable.35 Moreover, regulators engage with stakeholders in the industry, therefore,
35In some areas, pole distribution may be the norm; while in others direct buried cable can be used as
well.
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if a network reports a ber coverage that does not e¤ectively own, eventually another net-
work will become aware of that fact36 and expose such type of misconduct. Note that, by
the denition of access price indexation, networks have an incentive to expose such type
of misconduct from competitors.37 Also, the quality of ber networks may be inferred
from fault rate information, consumer complaints and from a number of websites that
allow to freely test broadband speeds (the process is as easily as clicking one button).38
Some regulators also produce maps showing accurate information on broadband take-up,
speeds and availability.39
An additional way to tackle potential unintended consequences, due to lack of perfect
observability and veriability of investments, is to attach a price-oor and a price-cap to
the access price indexation rule. For example, a regulator may impose a price cap equal to
a (optimal xed access price) combined with a price oor at ai (the intended access price
under the indexation approach). This guarantees that in the event of a mistaken (x; y)
choice, the access price in equilibrium will still be within a deemed reasonable interval.
To conclude, we also point out that the need for information it is just as much a
problem for the indexation approach as it is for the xed access approach. Under the xed
access approach the optimal level of a requires to the regulator information on consumers
willingness to pay and networkscosts. A regulator may obtain relevant information in a
number of ways. For example, Ofcom has available the following instruments and sources
of information.
 Regulatory nancial statements. British Telecom Group plc (BT) has a regu-
latory obligation to prepare and publish audited Financial Statements and their as-
sociated documents.40 Relevant, reliable and timely regulatory information informs
many of Ofcoms decisions. Ofcom requires this information in order to monitor and
enforce various obligations that are placed on BT and as a source of data for setting
and monitoring charge controls. It is also a tool of assurance that BT is complying
with its regulatory obligations.
 Engagement with stakeholders. This includes devising questions and respond-
36For example, when a network requests access in an area that is allegedly covered with ber by another
network while, in fact, it is not.
37Networks may try to collude on ber coverage reports, agreeing on not to disclose rivalsmisconducts.
However, such an agreement shall hardly be sustainable, namely when the degree of service di¤erentiation
is small such that a small price cut drives a large proportion of consumers to switch operators.
38For example, see http://www.speedtest.net.
39See, for example, http://maps.ofcom.org.uk/broadband, where a map showing broad-
band information by administrative authority in the UK has been produced by Ofcom.
This forms part of Ofcoms ongoing work to provide useful information about broad-






ing to stakeholder questions, asking and providing further explanation (e.g. in the
form of Call for inputs and Consultation Documents) and disclosure where possi-
ble. Ofcoms responses to individual stakeholder queries are published on Ofcoms
website,41 in order to provide transparency and to ensure that all stakeholders are
provided with the information and data. During these processes Ofcom may hold
bilateral and multilateral meetings with stakeholders upon request. Ofcom seeks
stakeholdersviews and experiences both on specic products and the industry in
general. Communications providers (CPs) are usually aware of the market practices
of other CPs and are able to identify key issues and provide industry information
contributing to an improvement of observability and veriability.
 Formal information request under section 135 of the Communications Act
2003. A person required to provide information under this section must provide it
in such manner and within such reasonable period as may be specied by Ofcom.
Moreover, the person is required to ensure that the response is on time, complete
and accurate. Failure to comply with a formal information request may result in
enforcement action being taken by Ofcom (e.g. nancial penalties, suspension of
entitlement to provide network services, prosecution).
1.6 Conclusions
Investment incentives have been at the core of the access debate. Some authors argue
that networks will not invest in facilities subject to strong access regulation (e.g. Sidak
and Spulber (1996) on open access). Others have supported the idea of forced access
because of the gains in static e¢ ciency, but advise that the access price must take into
account investment incentives (e.g. La¤ont and Tirole (2001)). This chapter contributes
to this debate with the formulation of a new rule for access pricing. We have shown that
access pricing rules depending on the investment level of each network, without being
informationally more demanding, can boost investment e¢ ciency without sacricing retail
price e¢ ciency and ultimately enhance social welfare vis-à-vis the rules of xed access
price.
Under the proposed indexation rule operators are aware that by investing less they will
pay (receive) a higher (lower) access price when competing in the downstream market.
Free riders on network investment will become less competitive in the downstream market,
thus being punished with a lower prot level relatively to an operator that invested more
and consequently is awarded with a competitive advantage. By setting the appropriate
41Ofcoms web-site at http://www.ofcom.org.uk.
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indexation rule, regulators can open an important avenue for harsher competition in in-
vestment. We have shown that the proper calibration of the indexation rule can induce
to achieve the socially e¢ cient level of investment or the Ramsey solution, which are
impossible to reach with a xed access price. Moreover, access price indexation can per-
form better in terms of social welfare than granting regulatory holidays. While granting
regulatory holidays consists of a temporary reduction of retail competition to stimulate
investments, the indexation rule works in the opposite way, enticing competition among
operators beginning from the investment stage.
While our model is placed within the NGNs context, namely in the ber deployment
problem, the logic of our results goes beyond particular cases. In general, the results herein
presented should remain valid to any infrastructure facilities facing an underinvestment
problem and whose operators have to choose non-cooperatively the investment levels and
compete in retail prices or, equivalently, in quantities.
There are some issues which we do not address in this chapter but that may be of
interest for future research. First, we have assumed full information over the analysis, in
particular in the decision-making process of the regulator. A question for future research
is whether results will hold when the regulator faces informational constraints, e.g. un-
certainty on a set of parameters with regard to demand or costs. We note, as discussed
in the previous section, that the need for information it is just as much a problem for the
indexation approach as it is for the xed access approach. The estimation of the relevant
parameters is inevitably imperfect, and estimation errors may imply e¢ ciency losses un-
der both methodologies. Second, we do not model the entry decisions made by networks,
as we assume, for sake of technical simplicity, that there are two symmetric networks.
We believe, though, that results and intuitions on the indexation rule should extend on
a similar logic to non-symmetric cases and to the N -operator case as well.42 Third, we
do not consider what happens if the networksfacilities are subject to congestion. While
this is not currently a concern for NGNs since these are considered high-speed networks,
one may want to relax the non-rivalry assumption in applications to other type of in-
frastructures. Despite the shortcomings, this chapter demonstrates the potential benets
of a new access pricing rule that welfare dominates both the regulatory holidays and the
xed access pricing solutions.
42De Bijl and Peitz (2004) studied a case of extreme asymmetry where an integrated operator owns a
network infrastructure and sells access directly to end-users and to a downstream operator. De Bijl and
Peitz reached a conclusion consistent with this chapter that it is possible to provide stronger incentives
for the integrated operator to invest in infrastructure quality by increasing the sensitivity of the regulated
access price to the network quality.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Hotelling model with hinterlands
A short list of main assumptions. (i) In a given city, the surplus of a consumer
indexed by ~x and ~y is dened by CS~x and CS~y, respectively, where
CS~x 
(
v   t~x  p1






v   t~y   pi
0
if nearest operator i = 1; 2
if no service
.
(ii) Each city comprises the center and two hinterlands (West and East side of the city
center). In the city center there is a mass 1 of consumers (indexed by ~x) uniformly
distributed with density 1 in the unit interval [0; 1]. Each hinterland has a mass 1=2 of
consumers (indexed by ~y) uniformly distributed with density t=2v.
The gross consumer surplus U and the consumer surplus CS in a representative city
are, respectively
U (x1; y1; x2; y2) 
Z x1
0
(v   t~x) d~x+
Z y1
0





(v   t~x) d~x+
Z y2
0
(v   t~y) t
2v
d~y
= v (x1 + x2 + z1 + z2) 
t (x21 + x
2







CS  U  
2X
i=1
pi (xi + zi) ,
where zi  yi t2v .
(iii) The city center is fully served, i.e., x1 + x2 = 1.
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(iv) Ii corresponds to the number of cities covered by ber by operator i = 1; 2. The total
number of cities covered by ber is I, where I  I1 + I2.
(v) Investment cost for operator i is given by technology
C(Ii)  cI2i =2.
(vi) The marginal cost of serving subscribers is zero (except access charges, when applica-
ble).
The rst-best solution. The rst-best solution is obtained by solving
max
x1;z1;x2;z2;I1;I2











=  t (I1 + I2) (2x1   1) = 0
dW
dz1
=   (I1 + I2) v (2z1   1) = 0
dW
dz2























U opt = 1
4
(6v   t)









  pi   pj
2t
,












qi  xi + zi =
1
2





= 1  (v + t) pi   vpj
2tv




The xed access price approach. We compare below the rst-best solution with a
symmetric subgame Nash equilibrium under a xed access price.




1 = (I1 + I2) p1q1 + aq2I1   aq1I2   cI21=2
FOC :






2 = (I1 + I2) p2q2 + aq1I2   aq2I1   cI22=2
FOC :






2 (Ii + Ij) + 6tv
2 (Ii + Ij) + 4t
2v (Ii + Ij) + 3atvIi + 4atvIj




(6v2 + 10tv + 4t2) v (Ii + Ij)  2a (t2Ij + v2Ii)  4v2aIj   atv (Ii + 6Ij)
2v (2t+ v) (2t+ 3v) (Ii + Ij)
,
Q =












In a symmetric equilibrium
Ii =
(t+ 2v) (48tv2 + 32t2v + 24v3   a (25tv + 14t2 + 12v2)) a+ 16 (t+ v) (2t+ 3v) tv2
8cv (2t+ 3v) (2t+ v)2
.
The Socially Optimal Solution vs Equilibrium Under a Fixed Access Price
The socially optimal (rst-best) solution is characterized by
Iopti = (6v   t) = (4c) ,
xopti = 1=2, z
opt
i = 1=2, q
opt
i = 1, Q
opt = 2,
popti = 0, U
opt = (6v   t) =4, W opt = (6v   t)2 = (16c) .
Hence, in the rst-best solution operators would present negative prots
opti = I



















A symmetric equilibrium under the xed access price approach is characterized by
Ii =
(t+ 2v) (48tv2 + 32t2v + 24v3   a (25tv + 14t2 + 12v2)) a+ 16 (t+ v) (2t+ 3v) tv2
















2v2   (2v + t) a
4v (2t+ v)
, Q = 1 +






48av4 + 144tv4 + 6a2t3   24a2v3 + 240t2v3 + 96t3v2+





48av4 + 48tv4   14a2t3   24a2v3 + 80t2v3 + 32t3v2+
+120atv3 + 32at3v + 112at2v2   62a2tv2   53a2t2v
!
128cv2 (2t+ 3v)2 (2t+ v)4
,
U =









48av4   276tv4 + 32t4v   10a2t3   248t2v3   16t3v2   72v5+





14a2t3 + 24a2v3   48av4   48tv4 + 62a2tv2+
+53a2t2v   80t2v3   32t3v2   120atv3   32at3v   112at2v2
!
64cv2 (2t+ 3v)2 (2t+ v)4




(at+ 2av + 4tv) = 0 = popti
, aefficient =   4tv
t+ 2v
< 0.








(t+ 2v) (48tv2 + 32t2v + 24v3   a (25tv + 14t2 + 12v2)) a+ 16 (t+ v) (2t+ 3v) tv2




14at2 + 12av2   24tv2   16t2v   12v3 + 25atv
cv (2t+ 3v) (2t+ v)2
= 0
, ainvest = 4v 6tv + 4t
2 + 3v2





25tv + 14t2 + 12v2







  Iopti = 2v
45tv2 + 39t2v + 11t3 + 18v3





2   2t2 + 3tv) (27tv + 14t2 + 12v2)
4c (2t+ 3v) (25tv + 14t2 + 12v2)
< 0
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provided that v > t by assumption.
The access price indexation approach. Let the access price charged by operator i,
per subscriber of operator j using is infrastructure, be dened by ai  xIi   yIj, where
(x; y) is the pair of regulatory parameters.




1 = I  p1q1 + a1q2I1   a2q1I2   cI21=2
FOC :
 
2tvI1 + 2tvI2 + tI2a2 + vI1a1 + vI2a2+











2 = I  p2q2 + a2q1I2   a1q2I1   cI22=2
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Assuming investment symmetry in equilibrium, Ii = Ij, we get that ai = aj =
(x  y) Ii. Plugging Ii = Ij and ai = aj into the operator is FOC we reach
0BBBB@
3 (t+ 2v) (y   x) (10t2x  2t2y + 10v2x  6v2y + 19tvx  7tvy) I2i +
 8v
 
8ct3 + 3cv3   8t3x  12v3x+ 6v3y + 14ctv2+
+20ct2v   30tv2x  28t2vx+ 7tv2y + 2t2vy
!
Ii+
+16tv2 (t+ v) (2t+ 3v)
1CCCCA
8v (2t+ 3v) (2t+ v)2
= 0,
while the SOC, in the equilibrium, must hold the following inequality
 
0B@ 8v (2t+ 3v) (8ct
3 + 3cv3   8t3x  12v3x+ 14ctv2 + 20ct2v   30tv2x  28t2vx)+
+ (t+ 2v)
 
132t3x2 + 4t3y2 + 162v3x2 + 18v3y2   120t3xy   180v3xy+




8v (2t+ v)2 (2t+ 3v)2
< 0.
Stage I: Regulatory Regime Under Indexation
Suppose that the regulator maximizes the social welfare under the indexation ap-











= (Ii + Ij)
 
v (1 + zi + zj) 
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xi (Ii; Ij; x; y) = x

i (Stage III)
zi (Ii; Ij; x; y) = z

i (Stage III)
qi (Ii; Ij; x; y) = q

i (Stage III)
pi (Ii; Ij; x; y) = p

i (Stage III)
di =dIi = 0 (Stage II)
d2i =dI
2
i  0 (Stage II)
i  0 (PC).





2 + 12t2v   4t3 + 6v3)+
 4v (4ct2 + cv2 + 2t2 (x  y) + 4tv (c+ x  y)) I1+




di =dIi = 0 (Stage II)
d2i =dI
2





The regulatory holidays case. Below we derive two equilibria under regulatory holi-
days.
Monopolist o¤ering two brands: two hinterlands served
In a city monopolized by operator i (located at point 0 and point 1) that is unable to













if v  pi > v   t2
if 0  pi  v   t2
.
Operator i chooses pi and Ii by solving the following maximization problem
max
pi;Ii
moni = Iipiqi   cI2i =2.
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Suppose that v > t and pmoni = v   t2 . We check now whether the monopolist has an

































= Ii (t+ 2v)
t  v   2"
tv
< 0, for v > t,
therefore, the monopolist does not have incentive to increase the price above pi = v   t2



























Therefore, the monopolist does not have incentive to decrease the price below pi = v  t2 .
We conclude that pmoni = v   t2 and q
mon



















t2   4v2 + 4cvIi
v




and obtains a total prot of
moni =
(2v   t)2 (2v + t)2
32cv2
.























2 + (xmon2 )


















(4v   t) (t+ 2v)
8v
,




























1CA = (2v   t) (t+ 2v)2
8cv
.
Monopolist o¤ering one brand: one hinterland served
Assume that v > 2t and the monopolist (located only at point 0 or only at point 1) is












if v  pi > v   t
if 0  pi  v   t
.
Operator i chooses pi and Ii by solving the following maximization problem
max
pi;Ii
moni = Iipiqi   cI2i =2.
Suppose that pmoni = v  t and check now if the monopolist has an incentive to deviate
the price by an ". If the monopolist increases the price by " it will get




















2t  v   2"
tv
< 0, for v > 2t,
therefore, the monopolist does not have incentive to increase the price above pi = v   t
given that v > 2t. If the monopolist decreases the price by " it will get


















therefore, the monopolist does not have incentive to decrease the price below pi = v   t.
We conclude that pmoni = v   t and qmoni = 1 + t2v .
The monopolist chooses its level of investment by solving
max
Ii










FOC :  tv + t
2   2v2 + 2cvIi
2v
= 0, Imoni =
(v   t) (t+ 2v)
2cv
,
and obtains a total prot of
moni =
(t+ 2v)2 (v   t)2
8cv2
.
With regard to social welfare, in the monopoly equilibrium with one hinterland served
we have
xmoni = 1, x
mon





, zj = 0,










2 + (xmon2 )
















(2v   t) (t+ 2v)
4v
,
Wmon  (Imon1 + Imon2 )Umon   c
 
(Imon1 )
2 + (Imon2 )
2 =2
=
2v2   tv   t2
cv












Proof of Proposition 1 (i) The socially e¢ cient investment is dened by (10). Invest-














48tv2 + 32t2v + 24v3+
 a (25tv + 14t2 + 12v2)
!
a+ 16 (t+ v) (2t+ 3v) tv2




14at2 + 12av2   24tv2   16t2v   12v3 + 25atv
cv (2t+ 3v) (2t+ v)2
= 0
, ainvest = 4v 6tv + 4t
2 + 3v2





25tv + 14t2 + 12v2







  Iopti = 2v
45tv2 + 39t2v + 11t3 + 18v3




=  (3tv   2t
2 + 6v2) (27tv + 14t2 + 12v2)
4c (2t+ 3v) (25tv + 14t2 + 12v2)
< 0
provided that v > t by assumption.




(at+ 2av + 4tv) = 0 = popti
, aefficient =   4tv
t+ 2v
< 0. 
























= C 0 (Ii) .
According to (a) and (b) the social welfare measure can be written as W = (Ii + Ij)U  
C (Ii)  C (Ij) and in the rst-best the regulator equates
U opt = C 0 (Ii) . (22)









. Hence, Iopti > I

i , given that by assumption
(a) C 0 (Ii) is an increasing function.
(ii) The marginal cost of providing ber to a subscriber in a covered city is zero, thus
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popti = 0. Networks choose retail prices by solving
@i
@pi






















Ii   Ij @qi@pi

+ qi (Ii + Ij)










Ii   Ij @qi@pi

+ qi (Ii + Ij)
  (@qi=@pi) (Ii + Ij)
= 0
, aefficient =   qi (Ii + Ij)
@qj
@pi
Ii   Ij @qi@pi
< 0,
since @qj=@pi > 0 and @qi=@pi < 0 by assumption (c). 
Proof of Lemma 1 In a symmetric equilibrium, the Lagrangean function of the regula-
tors problem is
L = W (x; y; Ii) + 1 [i (x; y; Ii)] + 2 [S (x; y; Ii)] + 3 [F (x; y; Ii)] ,
where i (x; y; Ii), S (x; y; Ii) and F (x; y; Ii) denote the network is prot, and the second
and the rst order conditions with respect to investment, respectively. The optimality
conditions to the regulators problem are8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
L0x  0, xL0x = 0
L0y  0, yL0y = 0
L01  0, 1L
0
1
= 0, 1  0
L02 < 0, 2L
0
2
= 0, 2 = 0





To show that networks participation constraint is binding we need to check that the
respective Lagrange multiplier, 1, is non-zero. Suppose that x 6= 0 and y 6= 0, thus,
L0x = 0 and L0y = 0. Solving the system of simultaneous equations(
L0x = W 0x + 10x + 3F 0x = 0



















for non-negative access prices, ai  0, i.e., x  y, we have
F 0xW
0
y F 0yW 0x =
I3i (t+ 2v)
2 (4tv + (t+ 2v) (x  y) Ii) (8tv + 6v2   3Ii (t+ v) (x  y))
4v2 (2t+ 3v) (2t+ v)3
6= 0,
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since 4tv+(t+ 2v) (x  y) Ii > 0 and 8tv+6v2 3Ii (t+ v) (x  y) 6= 0, Ii 6= 8t+6v3(t+v)(x y)v.
To see that Ii 6= 8t+6v3(t+v)(x y)v, suppose by contradiction that Ii =
8t+6v
3(t+v)(x y)v and plug the









4cv (4t+ 3v) (2t+ v) (t+ v)+
+v (28tv2 + 17t2v + 2t3 + 12v3) (x  y)
!
6 (2t+ v) (t+ v)2 (x  y)
< 0,
which means that the FOC with respect to investment is not satised and Ii 6= 8t+6v3(t+v)(x y)v
must hold. Provided that F 0xW
0
y F 0yW 0x 6= 0 and 1  0, we conclude that in equilibrium
1 > 0 and, thus, the participation constraint binds. 
Proof of Proposition 2 (i) Under a xed access price the regulator sets ai = a. We can
show that for a given access price a > 0, in a symmetric equilibrium, networks invest more
under indexation than under xed access. Under a xed access price, networks choose
the investment level in accordance with the condition @i =@Ii = 0, since ai = aj = a
 is
xed and, thus, @ai=@Ii = @aj=@Ii = 0. Under access price indexation networks choose















if i = k
if i 6= k














= Ii (t+ 2v)
 
12v3x  9av2x+ 3av2y   2atvy + 24tv2x  16atvx+
+16t2vx  8at2x+ 16t2vy   4at2y + 16tv2y
!
4v (2t+ 3v) (2t+ v)2
and 12v3x > 9av2x, 3av2y > 2atvy, 24tv2x > 16tvax, 16t2vx > 8t2ax, 16t2vy > 4t2ay,






> 0 then @i =@Ii < 0. For ai = a
, (12) and (16) are identical, thus
@i =@Ii = @

i =@Ii < 0, and by the (SOC) concavity of the prot function with respect
to Ii, i.e., @2i =@I
2





(ii) The total mass of subscribers in a representative city is determined by (8), thus
the mass of subscribers will expand if retail prices decrease. Retail prices will decrease if
ai decreases. Suppose that the regulator, in equilibrium, would like to attain, under the
indexation approach, ai = a   ", where " > 0 is arbitrarily small and a is the optimal




i for " su¢ ciently small. Replacing ai by a
   " in @i =@Ii we can show that
@i
@Ii






(14t3 + 24v3 + 62tv2 + 53t2v) ("  2a)+
+ (48v4 + 120tv3 + 32t3v + 112t2v2)
!
8v (2t+ 3v) (2t+ v)2
"
and in the limit
lim
"!0
(14t3 + 24v3 + 62tv2 + 53t2v) ("  2a) + (48v4 + 120tv3 + 32t3v + 112t2v2)
8v (2t+ 3v) (2t+ v)2
" = 0.
(25)
Hence, by continuity of the expression in (25) there exists " > 0 such that
 
 
(14t3 + 24v3 + 62tv2 + 53t2v) ("  2a)+
+ (48v4 + 120tv3 + 32t3v + 112t2v2)
!
















> 0 as shown in (i). Condition (24) implies that @i (a
) =@Ii <
0, which combined with the concavity of i with respect to Ii results in I

i (a
   ") >
Ii (a
) for " > 0 su¢ ciently small.
(iii) The social welfare measure is
























We can show that @W=@Ii > 0 under the xed access price approach, where the expres-
sions U (a) and Ii (a) are dened under the heading The xed access price approach
in an appendix. We note that
d(U cIi )
da
< 0, and a  2v2 tv 2t2
t+2v
in order to guaran-




















It is trivial that @W=@qi > 0 when there are consumers without a broadband ber
connection in a city. Recall that, by assumption, all consumers have a non-negative
willingness to pay for a broadband ber connection. Therefore, as the mass of subscribers
increases, the social welfare level will rise.
Provided that both the total investment in ber coverage and the mass of subscribers
expand under a linear access pricing rule, as shown in (i) and (ii), thus, the social welfare
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level will be higher when compared to the case where a xed access price is used. 













= a > 0 networks invest more under indexation than under a xed access
price. Under a xed access price networks choose the investment level according to con-
dition @i =@Ii = 0 while under access price indexation networks choose the investment











where @i =@Ii = @




























pj=pj| {z } :
@pj
@ai|{z}







 0 since @2j=@p2j < 0 by (c) and
@2j=@pj@ai =  Ii:@qj=@pj  0 by (d).
Given that i is innitely di¤erentiable,43 both @i =@ai and @

i =@aj must be nite.













> 0 and @i =@Ii = @

i =@Ii when ai = a
, thus @i =@Ii < 0 by (26).
Due to su¢ cient convexity of C (Ii), i is concave in Ii (SOC in the investment stage).
Therefore, the investment solution Ii dened by (26) must be higher than I

i which is
dened by @i =@Ii = 0.







a   ", for " > 0. We show that this is compatible with having Ii (a   ") > Ii (a) for
" su¢ ciently small, while equilibrium prices decrease with ".
In relation to retail prices






 0 since @2i=@p2i < 0 by (c) and
@2i=@pi@ai = Ii:@qj=@pi  0 by (d).
In relation to investments, replacing a by a   " in @i =@Ii and taking the Taylor























is nite, since @i =@Ii is di¤erentiable innitely many times, and inde-










































By (26) we get that @i (a
) =@Ii = @

i (a
) =@Ii < 0 and conclude that, by concavity
of i with respect to Ii, I

i (a
   ") > Ii (a) for " > 0 su¢ ciently small.








= U   C 0 (Ii) ,
@W
@pi




It is straightforward that @W=@pi < 0 given @U=@pi < 0 by assumption (e). Provided
that the retail prices will decrease under a linear access pricing rule (when compared to
the use of a xed access price, as shown in (ii)), ceteris paribus, this reduction will enhance
the social welfare level.
Given that U increases when the regulator employs a linear access pricing rule (com-
pared to the use of a xed access price), this means that the social marginal benet from
investment increases as well. Note that if U C 0 (Ii ) > 0, then an increase in investment
at level Ii (derived from the xed access case) will increase social welfare. Otherwise, if
U   C 0 (Ii )  0, the regulator would not need to incentivize more investment. In the
latter case, the social welfare level would increase via a retail price reduction. 
44An analytic function is innitely di¤erentiable and is equal to its Taylor series.
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Proof of Proposition 3 (i) For Ii = I
opt
i = (6v   t) = (4c) to be implemented with the
indexation rule a regulatory regime (x; y) has to pass three tests: (a) the network FOC in
(19), (b) the SOC whose signal is dened by (20), and (c) prots, dened by (15), have to
be non-negative, otherwise networks exit the market. Therefore, the e¢ cient investment
can be implemented if there exists a regulatory policy (x; y) that satises
(a)
8>>>><>>>>:








8ct3 + 3cv3   8t3x  12v3x+ 6v3y + 14ctv2+
















(132t3 + 162v3 + 433tv2 + 404t2v)x2+





(c) 16tv2 (v + t)  2v
 
4ct (t+ v) + cv2+










If the participation constraint is active (see Lemma 1) and parameters (v; t; c) satisfy the




 444 320t10v   4272 480t9v2   13 002 620t8v3+
 12 144t11   139 968v11 + 16 472 160tv10+
+103 878 864t2v9 + 269 586 480t3v8 + 373 756 596t4v7+









1092tv4 + 412t4v + 891t2v3+








442 440tv6   12 212t6v + 638 472t2v5+
+384 866t3v4 + 40 005t4v3   47 334t5v2 + 600t7 + 112 752v7
!
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA





1092tv4 + 412t4v + 891t2v3+





together with v > t > 0 and c > 0 by assumption, then the regulatory solution (x; y) will






clearly satises condition (28). Therefore, if service di¤erentiation, t, is su¢ ciently small,
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the regulatory regime (x; y) dened by the zero-prot condition and (19), by continuity
of S, will implement the e¢ cient level of investment.
(ii) The Ramsey problem is
max
xi;xj ;zi;zj ;Ii;Ij








subject to i = j = 0
where U  v (x1 + x2 + z1 + z2)  
t(x21+x22)+2v(z21+z22)
2
and i = (Ii + Ij)  piqi + aqjIi  
aqiIj   cI2i =2 = 0.
Appealing to symmetry of the problem, the Ramsey solution yields Ii = Ij, xi = xj =
1
2




































Maximizing in order to zi
FOC : 8v




t+ 2v   24vzi   48vz2i
c
< 0.












c (2t+ v)2 + v (t+ 2v) y

  2 (t+ 2v) (6tv + 4t2 + 3v2)x

Ii+
+16tv2 (t+ v) (2t+ 3v) = 0
.
Consider the system of equations formed by the FOC and restriction from the Ramsey
67














c (2t+ v)2 + v (t+ 2v) y

  2 (t+ 2v) (6tv + 4t2 + 3v2)x

Ii+







In order to prove that the Ramsey solution is feasible under the indexation approach
we need to show that there is at least one point (x; y; zi; Ii) such that all conditions in
(29) are satised.
Note that: (a) according to (i), for t su¢ ciently small, the indexation approach can
implement the rst-best investment level Iopti = (6v   t) = (4c); (b) at (x; y) = (0; 0) the








45 Therefore, by continuity of the FOC for Ii under the indexation approach, we can








Proof of Proposition 4 (i) Suppose that both hinterlands are served by a monopolist
o¤ering two di¤erentiated services (one product at point 0 and another product at point
1 in each city) and the regulator, using indexation, intends to implement the retail price
pi = v   t=2   "p < pmoni and the investment level Ii = 4v
2 t2
4cv
+ "I > I
mon
i , where
"p; "I > 0. This proof consists in verifying if it is possible to nd a regulatory regime
(x; y) such that networks have non-negative prots, and (19) and (20) are satised for
some "p > 0 and "I > 0.




In order to implement a retail price pi = v   t2   "p, the access price must satisfy
ai = (x  y) (Imoni + "I) =
2v2   tv   2t2
t+ 2v
  "a
where "a  4t+2vt+2v "p. Moreover, the network choice regarding the investment level has to
45The inequality Ii (0; 0) < I
Ramsey
i can be shown plugging Ii = Ii (0; 0) into the zero-prot condition
and solving in order to zi. Then, plug zi derived from the zero-prot condition into the FOC for zi
derived from the rewritten Ramsey problem. The left hand side of the FOC for zi becomes negative
when evaluated at that level. This together with the zero-prot condition imply that the Ramsey solution
























8ct3 + 3cv3   8t3x  12v3x+ 6v3y+














0B@ 3t2"2a + 12v2"2a + 12tv3 + 4t3v + 12t3"a   8v3"a + 9t2v2+












4"2a   124tv5 + 404t5v + 120t5"a   48v5"a+















Plugging the previous regulatory regime (x; y) and Ii =
4v2 t2
4cv
+ "I into the SOC










2548t7v   5984tv7   9136t2v6   6512t3v5+
+604t4v4 + 5938t5v3 + 5687t6v2 + 476t8   1728v8
!
8 (2v   t) (t+ 2v) (7tv + 3t2 + 6v2)2 (2t+ v)2
< 0,
since 2548t7v < 9136t2v6, 604t4v4 < 1728v8, 5938t5v3 + 476t8 < 6512t3v5, 5687t6v2 <
5984tv7, provided that v > t > 0 by assumption. Hence, by continuity of the SOC we
can assure that there exists "p > 0 and "I > 0 su¢ ciently small such that (x; y) dened
by (30) can decrease retail prices and increase the investment relatively to the regulatory




i ), by continuity of
the prot function, for "p > 0 and "I > 0 su¢ ciently small we can guarantee that prots
are still non-negative with the implementation of (x; y).
With regard to social welfare,






















2 + (xmon2 )













Taking the derivatives of welfare in order to investments and retail prices
@Wmon
@Ii
= Umon   cImoni =





































since v > t > 0 and c > 0. Therefore, for a su¢ ciently small increase in investments and
a su¢ ciently small decrease in retail prices, the welfare level increases relatively to the
regulatory holidays case.
(ii) Suppose that only one hinterland is served by a monopolist that o¤ers only one
service and that the regulator, using indexation, intends to implement the retail price
pi = v   t   "p < pmoni and the investment level Ii = 2v
2 tv t2
2cv
+ "I > I
mon
i , where
"p; "I > 0. In order to implement a retail price pi = v   t   "p, the access price must
satisfy
ai = (x  y) (Imoni + "I) =
2 (v   2t) (t+ v)
t+ 2v
  "a



















8ct3 + 3cv3   8t3x  12v3x+ 6v3y+














0B@ 3t2"2a + 12v2"2a + 4tv3 + 16t3v + 24t3"a   8v3"a   8t2v2 + 32t4+












4"2a   172tv5 + 1472t5v + 240t5"a   48v5"a   204t2v4+














Plugging the regulatory regime (x; y) and Ii =
2v2 tv t2
2cv
+ "I into the SOC whose






8v (2t+ v)2 (2t+ 3v)2
= c
 
4128t6v2   108v8 + 2808t5v3   338tv7   629t2v6+
+247t4v4   812t3v5 + 656t8 + 2624t7v
!
4 (2t+ v)2 (v   t) (t+ 2v) (5tv + 3t2 + 3v2)2
< 0
since 4128t6v2 < 108v8, 2808t5v3 < 338tv7, 247t4v4 < 629t2v6, 2624t7v+656t8 < 812t3v5,
given that v > 2t > 0. Hence, a linear access pricing rule depending on investments can
decrease retail prices and increase investments as compared to the regulatory holidays
regime.




= Umon   cImoni =
(2v   t) (t+ 2v)
4v
  c2v





















=  (v   t) (t+ 2v)
cv








since v > t > 0. Therefore, for a su¢ ciently small increase in investments and a su¢ ciently





2 How does airtime regulation inuence advertising
quality? A two-sided market perspective
2.1 Introduction
Motivation. Individuals in developed countries spend a signicant share of their time
connected to mass media platforms.46 In 2009, the average US American spent almost
ve hours per day watching TV,47 while in Japan, the average time is three hours and
thirty minutes per day. In the UK, the average viewer aged 4+ watched more than four
hours of television per day in 2012. This has increased from three hours and forty-two
minutes in 2004 (Communications Market Report 2013).
Advertising plays a signicant role in the TV broadcasting business model in most
western countries. Mass media platforms o¤er an opportunity for rms to advertise to a
large pool of consumers. Some rms spend billions of dollars per year in advertising,48
an industry that reached a revenue of over US$ 780 billion worldwide in 2010, with the
largest share of it going to TV broadcasting.49
In many countries regulatory authorities limit advertising airtime on TV networks.
Time restrictions (advertising caps) are generally intended to ensure that viewers are not
exposed to excessive amounts of advertising, and that the quality of the overall viewing
experience is maintained. With the conspicuous exception of the US, where the frequency
and length of commercial breaks are generally unregulated, a number of examples of
regulatory constraints on advertising time on TV arise in developed countries. For in-
stance, advertising is limited to an average of six minutes per hour in France; the limit
goes up to nine minutes in Germany, while English regulators impose a seven-minute
46TV is the dominant medium for media consumption and advertising. Computer usage has sup-
planted radio as the second most common media activity and print ranks fourth,The New York Times,
8 Hours a Day Spent on Screens, Study Finds, March 27, 2009.
47See Television, Internet and Mobile Usage in the U.S., Three Screen Report Volume 7 - 4th Quarter
2009, The Nielsen Company, 2010.
48For example, Advertising Age (2005) reports that, in 2003 in the U.S., General Motors spent $3.43
billion to advertise its cars and trucks; Procter and Gamble devoted $3.32 billion to the advertisement of
its detergents and cosmetics; and Pzer incurred a $2.84 billion dollar advertising expense for its drugs.
Advertising is big business indeed.(Bagwell, 2005).
49See Karawang Business, Information, Tips and Solutions for Business and Finance,World Cup 2010:
World Advertising Expenditures, Translucent US $780 Billion, June 13, 2010. In the UK, income from
broadcast-based TV advertising declined in 2012 by 2% to just over £ 3.5 billion (Communications Market
Report 2013).
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ceiling (o¤-peak) for public service broadcasters50 and nine minutes an hour for all other
broadcasters.51
The amount of advertising watched by consumers has increased over time in a number
of countries.52 In fact, advertising time represents a remarkable proportion of the total
airtime of some TV networks. For instance, some programs on major TV networks in the
US have recorded advertising levels in excess of twenty minutes per hour.53 This suggests
that the quality of advertisements should matter not only for commercial purposes, e.g.,
to convince consumers to buy more products in the market, but also because it a¤ects
the quality of the viewing experience. Advertising caps may drive rms to change the
quality of adverts. In this chapter we are concerned with the impact of advertising airtime
restrictions on advertising quality and, ultimately, on social welfare.
Advertising quality is hard to verify and quantify. In this chapter, the term adver-
tising qualityrefers to the nuisance of watching an advert and the viewers probability
of purchasing an advertised product. Within this context, higher qualitycould result
from celebrity endorsement of the product to be advertised. This may not necessarily
be synonymous with a higher art form. In practice, institutions such as the Australian
Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) appear to be increasingly using costs as a proxy for quality.
However, the ABT acknowledges that cost should not necessarily be equated with quality
(Wright (1994)). Since 2007, Google has been exploring ways to measure the quality of
TV ads. Google aggregates data describing the precise second-by-second tuning behavior
for millions of TV set-top boxes, covering millions of US households, doing so for several
thousand TV ads every day. From this data, Interian et al. (2009) developed measures
that can be used to gauge how appealing and relevant commercials appear to be to TV
subscribers.54 In 2013, VideoHub launched eQ in the US, a new quality score for video
advertising. VideoHubs eQ score is a patent-pending formula to determine the potential
of a video ad campaign to grab and keep viewersattention.55
50In the UK no commercial advertising is allowed on BBC. Public television is funded by TV licences.
TV viewers in the UK are required to have a TV licence.
51The maximum average number of minutes per hour in peak time (6pm 11pm) is eight minutes
for public service broadcasters in the UK. For more on the regulation of the quantity of advertising on
television in the UK, see Regulating the quantity of advertising on television (Ofcom 2011). In 1992, the
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal introduced regulations limiting the amount of non-programme (i.e.,
promotions and advertisements) to thirteen minutes per hour during prime time and fteen minutes per
hour at other times (Wright (1994)).
52In the UK, between 2006 and 2010, the number of di¤erent advertisements watched by a viewer rose
by 20.9%. In the US, overall, advertising time on TV has been steadily increasing since 1982. This may
be due to the fact that there has been a general increase in the overall level of TV viewing. See Regulating
the quantity of advertising on television (Ofcom 2011).
53It is estimated that the average US American is exposed to 61 minutes of TV ads per day. The New
York Times, 8 Hours a Day Spent on Screens, Study Finds, 27 March 2009.
54One such measure is the percentage of initial audience retained: how much of the audience, tuned in
to an ad when it began airing, remained tuned to the same channel until the ad nishes. TV retention
scores are used to determine how highly an ad ranks.
55According to Videohub, eQ is the rst scoring method of its kind and is the only measurement tool
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Description of the chapter. A distinctive aspect of the mass media industry is that
it simultaneously serves two groups of agents mutually linked by cross-group network ex-
ternalities: the subscribers (consumers)56 who may or may not be sensitive to the volume
and quality of advertisements, and the advertising rms whose prots increase with the
number of subscribers watching commercials. We utilize a model of subscriber-advertiser
supported broadcasting in a two-sided market57 framework that yields predictions on how
advertising quality is determined by rms. The aim of this chapter is to formally in-
vestigate the link between regulations limiting the advertising airtime and advertising
quality.
The main features of the model are as follows. There are two prot maximizing
media platforms competing non-cooperatively in prices by setting them simultaneously
and independently, selling ad-airtime to rms and content to subscribers. The advertising
quantity is measured as the number of time units dedicated to advertising per time unit
of overall broadcasting. We assume that platforms face the same level of costs regardless
of whether the content is produced in-house or bought from a third party (e.g. a studio
producer).
Amass of subscribers (normalized to one), who are also consumers in the goods market,
extract a benet from the content of media platforms, e.g., information or entertainment,
and di¤er in their attitudes towards the number and quality of advertisements. We assume
that a proportion  of subscribers are ad-sensitive, while the remaining (1  ) are ad-
indi¤erent. This assumption is crucial in the chapter as the main results are related to the
proportion of ad-sensitive subscribers.58 Furthermore, regardless of type, every individual
subscriber has an idiosyncratic preference for his favorite media platform, i.e., his favorite
type of programming.
The existence of a proportion of ad-sensitive subscribers is supported by the adver-
tising economics literature, namely, the persuasive and the informative views on ads.
The persuasive view states that advertisements alter consumerspreferences and augment
product di¤erentiation and brand loyalty. As a result, advertising boosts rmsprots.
The informative view holds that many markets su¤er from imperfect consumer informa-
tion because searching costs may prevent consumers from learning of a products existence,
that weighs viewability throughout an ads duration, player size, and completion rate. See http://www.
videohub.tv/news/dated/2013-02 for an interview with Greg Smith, General Manager of VideoHub
Marketplace, on the launch of eQ score.
56We will use the terms subscriberand consumerinterchangeably.
57In a two-sided market, two di¤erent groups of agents relate to each other through a platform. The
latter sets access prices taking into account the cross-group externalities. For a general introduction to
the theory of two-sided markets, see the seminal papers of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Armstrong
(2006).
58Ad-sensitive subscribers value increases in ad quality but simultaneously dislike ad-airtime. With-
out the presence of ad-sensitive subscribers, advertising quality would not play any role and would be
optimally set to zero.
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quality and price. Advertising comes out as one of the endogenous answers to imperfect
information, supplying consumers with further information at low cost, e.g., regarding
rm location, product description or prices. Both advertising views will be considered in
our model.59
Wilbur (2008) estimated a two-sided model of the TV industry in the US and found
that viewers tend to be averse to commercials. In our model the ad-sensitive subscribers
are averse to advertising airtime, while also appreciating the quality of advertisements. For
example, ad-sensitive subscribers enjoy the participation in ads of famous performers or
athletes.60 The nuisance perceived by ad-sensitive subscribers is related to the duration
or number of commercials. In particular, this negative e¤ect of commercials may be
understood as the boredom and wasted time that the ad-sensitive subscribers bear each
time there is a commercial break on TV. It is implicitly assumed in our framework that
ad-sensitive subscribers have no way to receive the media platform contents while skipping
advertisements.
There is empirical evidence that TV subscribers attempt to avoid the advertising
time.61 We also consider a group of ad-indi¤erent subscribers who are insensitive both
to the number of ads and their quality. The proportion of ad-indi¤erent subscribers may
be interpreted, for example, as the percentage of multi-taskers who browse the Internet
during the advertising airtime on TV. These subscribers capture the informative part of
the adverts (e.g. existence of a new product). However, ad-indi¤erent subscribers do not
pay enough attention to ads and ignore their quality.
We consider a mass of advertising rms (normalized to one) that obtain a benet from
informing potential customers about their products (the informative view). Advertising
products to consumers increases the probability of those products being purchased. Addi-
tionally, rms may upgrade their ad quality in order to increase the purchase probability
of ad-sensitive consumers (the persuasive view).
We show that the average ad quality in a media platform may be increasing in the
volume of ads broadcast. This will be the case when rms with a higher informative e¤ect
59Another theory holds that advertising is a complement to the consumption of the advertised good.
According to this perspective advertising does not transform consumerspreferences and need not supply
any information. For example, this happens if the consumption of a good generates more prestige to
consumers when the good is advertised. See Bagwell (2005) on the economic analysis of advertising.
60Nikes Write the Future commercial campaign during Fifa World Cup 2010 had the participation of
some of the best soccer players in the world. The commercial hit almost 20 million views in only two
months after its release (on May 17, 2010) on YouTube.
61Speck and Elliott (1997) explain that there are at least three possible ways to avoid advertising:
a cognitive strategy (ignoring it), a behavioral strategy (e.g., leaving the room, multi-tasking), and a
mechanical strategy (e.g., switching channels, DVRs). Multi-tasking, i.e., conducting more than one
activity at the same time, is becoming commonplace. Just over half (53%) of all UK adults are regular
media multi-taskers. Moreover, 49% of all UK adults are regularly media-stacking (conducting unrelated
media tasks, such as surng the net, social networking or shopping online while watching TV). See the
Communications Market Report 2013 and Regulating the quantity of advertising on television (Ofcom
2011).
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are simultaneously those with fewer incentives to invest in ad quality. In other words,
the marginal gain of investing in ad quality is lower for rms with a higher informative
e¤ect, where the informative e¤ect is measured in terms of consumer purchase probability
of the advertised product. Therefore, the marginal advertiser on a platform exhibits
higher ad quality compared to rms with a higher informative e¤ect and, consequently,
if platforms sell more advertising slots, doing so will increase their average ad quality.
Within this context, an advertising cap connes advertisement slots to rms with a higher
informative e¤ect, which are also the rms with higher willingness to pay for an ad slot,
to the detriment of rms that would invest in ads of higher quality but are now excluded
from the advertising market due to the cap. We found that an advertising cap may cause
the average advertising quality to decrease.
Also, we show that an advertising cap may result in the following welfare e¤ects.
Media platforms become worse o¤ when their advertising airtime is constrained. Given
that a lower advertising cap incentivizes platforms to set higher advertising fees, as a
lower advertising fee cannot increase the volume of advertising sales in view of the cap,
a tighter advertising cap will necessarily hurt advertisersprots. The net e¤ect on sub-
scriberswelfare is ambiguous. Although there are fewer ads when an advertising cap is
imposed, advertising quality is also reduced. We found that if ad-sensitive subscribers are
su¢ ciently sensitive to advertising quality, a cap may lower social welfare. The welfare
results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation
of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising qual-
ity or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the e¤ect of advertising quality into
consideration.
Related literature. Seminal normative work on advertising, such as Steiner (1952) and
Spence and Owen (1977), tended to focus on the benets that commercials generate to
the audience but ignored the surplus obtained by the advertising rms. The assumptions
of xed levels of advertising airtime and prices prevent the analysis of whether the market
under- or over-provisions advertisements.
More recently, Wright (1994) examined the e¤ect that an advertising time ceiling has
on programming quality and viewer welfare. Wright showed that regulations that limit
the amount of advertising content per hour of television broadcasts can reduce program-
ming quality and that this e¤ect on viewer welfare is ambiguous. Under some conditions
fostering competition can both reduce the number of advertisements and increase program
quality, being preferable to an advertisement time ceiling.
Anderson and Coate (2005) explored the market failure in the broadcasting industry
by modeling how media platforms fulll their role of providing content to subscribers
and simultaneously supplying eye-balls to advertising rms. Their work connects the
goods market to the advertising market and analyzes the trade-o¤ between the nuisance
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stemming from commercial breaks during the broadcasts and the informational gains
generated by the content of these commercials. Nonetheless, the authors ignored the
possibility of rms investing in ad quality, which we consider in this chapter. They show
that the market equilibrium may under- or over-provide advertising airtime, depending on
the nuisance cost to viewers, the substitutability of programs, and the expected benets
to advertising rms from contacting viewers.
Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2005) studied whether advertising subsidizes the
newspaper prices charged to readers. They showed that in a two-sided market framework
with advertisers on one side and readers on the other, the answer depends on the reader-
ships attitude towards advertising, i.e., it depends on the proportion of readers that are
ad-lovers or ad-avoiders. Dukes (2004) showed that less product di¤erentiation or more
media di¤erentiation leads to higher market levels of advertising. In particular, if media is
su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, the advertising levels will surpass the socially optimal solution.
Dukes (2006) investigated how competition in the media market shapes decisions about
advertising and program quality. Dukes showed that product di¤erentiation using adver-
tising is more e¤ective when media markets are less competitive, increasing the prices
for advertised products. Gantman and Shy (2007) used an advertising-supported media
model (free-to-air broadcasting) to study the rmsincentives to improve the quality of
their advertisements. They showed that if improving adsquality is protable to rms,
then it will be unprotable to broadcasters.
This chapter is also related to the two-sided markets literature. The seminal articles
by Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) investigate the determinants of the
price balance between two groups of end-users when each group exerts an externality on
the other, and both are intermediated by a platform. Some of the discussed determinants
of the price balance are: (i) possibility of multi-homing (i.e., some end-users subscribe
or use more than one platform), (ii) platform di¤erentiation, (iii) presence of same-side
externalities, (iv) platform compatibility, (v) per-transaction (or lump-sum) pricing and
relative size of cross-group externalities.
To the authors knowledge there has been no previous work on the link between regula-
tion limiting the advertising airtime and advertising quality. In part, the lack of published
research no doubt reects the scarcity of data with which to undertake formal analysis of
this topic. This may be due to the fact that quality is a hard to measure concept. De-
spite the di¢ culties involved in measuring quality, Google has been trying to do so since
2007 and Videohub launched an E¤ective Quality(eQ) score for video ad placements in
2013. In the near future, as big data sets on advertising quality become available across
countries with di¤erent ad ceilings, it may become possible to empirically test the theo-
retical results presented in this chapter, in particular those on the relationship between
ad quality and ad ceilings.
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2.2 The model
In this section we present a subscriber-advertiser supported media model, characterize
each participating agent (platforms, subscribers and advertising rms) and describe how
they interact in a three-stage game. For an illustration, think of media platforms as TV
broadcasters. In Europe, an application of our model can be the direct broadcast satellite
channels such as Canal Plus that are partially nanced by subscription pricing. In the
US, premium channels such as HBO and Showtime frequently have an individual price.
Also, our qualitative results extend to the case where programmes are broadcast over the
air and consumers can costlessly access such programming.
Media platforms. There are two media platforms indexed by i = 1; 2 competing simul-
taneously and independently in two markets: (i) content subscription to subscribers and
(ii) advertising airtime to rms whose prot level increases in the number of subscribers
(potential customers). We assume that media platforms charge a xed price to agents on
each side of the market, e.g., a monthly at rate to subscribers and a fee per 30-second
advertising slot to rms. Platforms provide horizontally di¤erentiated contents and each
individual platform has the capacity to fully cover both sides of the market.
Each advertisement takes a xed amount of time which will be deducted from the
programming time. We assume that platforms face a xed cost, K, regardless of the
broadcast mix of advertising and regular programming.62 Let fi denote the advertising
fee per slot charged to rms, and si the subscription fee charged to subscribers by platform
i. Platform i chooses a pair of access prices (fi; si) 2 R2+ that maximizes prot. Platform
is prot is dened as follows
i (fi; si)  fix̂i + siDi  K, (31)
where 0  Di  1 denotes the mass of subscribers on platform i and 0  x̂i  1 is the
mass of rms advertising on the same platform.
Subscribers. There is a mass one of subscribers, each of whom subscribes at most
one platform, i.e., subscribers do not watch more than one TV channel simultaneously.
62As a matter of technical simplicity, platforms have constant marginal costs normalized to zero in
providing their services. Alternatively, fi and si may be interpreted as markups over constant marginal
costs. Our qualitative results are una¤ected if programming costs more than advertisements, i.e., there
may be higher costs associated with acquiring or producing media content. In that instance, more
advertisements (and, thus, less programming) reduce total cost for media platform i. Thus, fi may be
interpreted as the net markup over a negative marginal cost of ads (representing the cost savings from
not having to purchase or produce further content) while K > 0 may be interpreted as the cost of content
for an ad-free station. The amount K must be su¢ ciently small such that, in equilibrium, i  0.
Otherwise, platform i would exit the market.
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We assume that all subscribers already have the necessary hardware (e.g., televisions)63
to allow them to receive the service. Subscribers are heterogeneous in two dimensions:
(i) with respect to content in each platform, and (ii) regarding their attitude towards
advertising. In particular, a proportion , 0 <  < 1, of subscribers is ad-sensitive, i.e.,
their utility depends on the ad-airtime and on the average ad quality.64 The remaining
1   are ad-indi¤erent, i.e., their utility does not change with either the duration, or the
quality of advertisements. We will refer to ad-sensitive consumers as S-type consumers
and to ad-indi¤erent ones as being I-type.
Formally, the utility derived by an S-type subscriber, indexed by y 2 [0; 1], from
subscribing to network i at a subscription price si, is given by
US (y) 
8><>:
v   x̂1 (1  q1)  s1   ty






Subscribers gross benet of accessing an ad-free platform broadcasting his preferred pro-
gram is denoted by v > 0. We will assume that subscribersbenet of accessing a platform
is su¢ ciently high to ensure full participation.65 Parameter  > 0 measures the nuisance
cost of ads and is the same for all viewers. The term qi, where   0, is an ad quality
evaluation factor or, alternatively, the discount on the nuisance cost of ads airtime due
to the average quality of advertising. This means that for a given volume of ads on plat-
form i, x̂i, an increase in the average ad quality, qi, will attenuate the nuisance costs of







if x̂i > 0
0 if x̂i = 0
, (33)
where 0  qx < 1 is rm xs ad quality in equilibrium.67 The formula in (33) is the
unweighted average of ad quality across rms that advertise on platform i. As will be
63According to the Nielsen Company (July 2009), the average US American household in
2009 had 2.86 TV sets but only 2.5 individuals. Article More than Half the Homes in
U.S. Have Three or More TVs available at http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2009/
more-than-half-the-homes-in-us-have-three-or-more-tvs.html.
64Previous research by Ofcom has shown that a majority of viewers sometimes or often see advertising
on TV as interferingwith their enjoyment of content, but they also see adverts as informativeand
clever. See Regulating the quantity of advertising on television (Ofcom 2011).
65This assumption is realistic for some markets. For example, in 2013 the proportion of UK homes
with digital TV is 97% (Communications Market Report 2013).
66In the limit case  = 0 subscribers would not care about the average ad quality. Note that for 
su¢ ciently high and depending on the average ad quality level, subscribers may enjoy advertising.
67We assume that in an ad-free platform the average quality of advertising is zero. This is an innocuous
assumption because for x̂i = 0, we get that x̂i (1  qi) = 0, for any qi 2 R. See the section below on
advertising rmsfor more on how a rm x chooses the ad quality qx.
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discussed further below, each rm is of some type x, where x is uniformly distributed on
[0; 1]. Only the rms in the range 1   x̂i to 1 will advertise their products on platform
i. Thus, only these rms contribute for the ad quality average. The di¤erentiation para-
meter t > 0 represents the degree to which the platforms are substitutes or subscribers
disutility of being prevented from watching their preferred programs. Subscriberstastes
are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], so that the fraction of S-type subscribers with taste
parameter less than y is simply y. For simplicity, we assume that not watching any pro-
gram yields a zero net utility. Moreover, subscribers are aware of the advertising level
and content type of each platform even before they subscribe (see the three-stage game
description below for further details).
The utility of an I-type subscriber, indexed by z, where z is uniformly distributed on
[0; 1], is dened by
UI (z) 
8><>:
v   s1   tz






The key di¤erences between the utility functions of S-type and I-type subscribers are:
(i) the e¤ect that advertising volume exerts on S-type subscribers (but not on I-type
subscribers), and (ii) the average advertising quality level, qi, that positively a¤ects US (y)
(but not UI (z)) when ads are broadcasted.
Note that the subscribers choice in the media market is independent of the goods
market. Advertising provides product information (e.g., informs subscribers of the nature
of new products in the market) that may inuence consumersshopping behavior. We
assume, like Anderson and Coate (2005), that subscribers receive no other benets from
purchasing advertised products than those inherent to the product itself. In other words,
rms extract the entire incremental surplus that advertising generates for their goods.
This simplication allows us to focus on the media market without concerns about an
endogenous distribution of informational gains between subscribers and advertising rms.
Hence, subscribers choice with respect to platforms does not depend on the information
received, i.e., subscribers are solely interested in the programming contents, rather than
the information conveyed by advertising.
Since the total measure of subscribers is equal to one, under the full coverage and
single-homing assumptions the measure of subscribers on platform i corresponds to its
market share Di  ŷi + (1  ) ẑi on the subscription side of the market, where ŷi and
ẑi are, respectively, the proportion of S-type and I-type subscribers on platform i. A
summary of the notation for subscribers follows in Table 1.
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Table 1: Notation for subscribers
 Proportion of S-type subscribers.
 Ad quality evaluation parameter.
qi Average ad quality on platform i.
x̂i Advertising volume (time) on platform i.
y Index for S-type subscribers.
ŷi Proportion of S-type subscribers on platform i.
z Index for I-type subscribers.
ẑi Proportion of I-type subscribers on platform i.
v Subscribers gross benet of accessing an ad-free platform broadcasting
his preferred programme.
t Subscribers disutility from not being able to watch his preferred pro-
gramme.
US (y) Utility of an S-type subscriber, indexed by y.
UI (z) Utility of an I-type subscriber, indexed by z.
fi Advertising fee (per spot) charged by platform i.
si Subscription price charged by platform i.
Di Platform is market share on the subscription side of the market.
Advertising rms. There is a mass one of rms, each of which produces at most one
new good. Each rm may advertise in more than one platform, i.e., multi-homing is feasi-
ble for rms. Firms may use media platforms as an advertising outlet to reach consumers
and thus increase prots. We assume that ads are placed by monopoly rms of new prod-
ucts to inform potential customers about the existence, characteristics, and prices of the
products that they o¤er as well as persuade them to buy. All viewers (subscribers) are
homogeneous to advertisers so that there is no matching of advertisements to program-
ming (e.g. tennis clubs advertising in a tennis program). Having received advertising for
a particular new product, a consumer knows his willingness to pay for it and will pur-
chase it with some probability if his willingness to pay is no less than its advertised price.
New products are produced at a constant cost per unit c > 0. Each rm/new product
is characterized by a purchase probability x, where x is uniformly distributed on [0; 1].
Products with a higher x are more likely to be attractive to consumers.
A rm x may wish to invest in advertising quality, qx. The incentive for rm x to
spend resources to improve ad quality is driven by the increase in the buying probability
displayed by S-type consumers (perceived quality) for the advertised product. Moorthy
and Zhao (2000) found evidence that advertising expenditure (taken as proxy for ad qual-
ity) and perceived quality of the underlying product are in general positively correlated
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for both durable and nondurable goods, even after accounting for objective quality, price
and market share.
One might expect that there exist diminishing returns to advertising quality, i.e., as
the ad quality level for a given product increases, the increment in the probability of
purchasing that product becomes smaller. We impose the following conditions on the
ad quality e¤ect A (qx): A (0) = 0, 0  A (qx) < 1, A0 (qx) > 0, and A00 (qx) < 0, for
0  qx < 1. In the analysis that follows, it will be useful to specify A (qx) 
p
qx.
Henceforth, if a rm with a new product of type x invests in qx units of quality, an ad-
indi¤erent consumer will purchase the product with probability x, while an ad-sensitive
consumer will purchase the product with probability x + (1  x)pqx.68 Firm x pays a
cost of implementing quality level qx equal to qx, with  > 0. The higher , the more
expensive the ad quality technology.
A consumer will be willing to pay ! > c or 0 for advertised products. Thus, all rms
will advertise price !. Note that a lower price does not increase the probability of a




(!   c)Dx;1   qx   f1
(!   c)Dx;2   qx   f2




if platforms 1 and 2
if no ads
, (35)




is the demand for rm xs product when it
advertises in platform i.69 The demand Dx;i reects the fact that (1  ) ẑi ad-indi¤erent
consumers will buy product x with probability x, and ŷi ad-sensitive consumers will buy
product x with probability x+ (1  x)pqx, as previously discussed. We assume that the





; (!   c)2
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(36)
to guarantee that in an equilibrium where rms multi-home (i) qx < 1 and (ii) @D

x;i=@x >
0. Condition (i) guarantees that no ad-sensitive consumer purchases a product with
68Suppose that rm xs commercial featured a well-known public gure rather than an anonymous per-
former. Then, S-type subscribers would have purchased the advertised product with a higher probability,
whereas I-type subscribers would not have purchased the advertised product with a higher probability
as a result of the presence of the public gure. Recall that I-type subscribers are only concerned with
the products features (objective information), not with the way those features are presented.
69Note that (35) is compatible with both classical views of advertising: informative and persuasive.
The term ((1  ) ẑi + ŷi)x corresponds to the informative role of advertising since all subscribers of
platform i learn about the existence and features of xs product upon watching the advertisement. The
term ŷi (1  x)
p
qx captures the persuasive e¤ect of advertising.
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a probability exceeding 1. Condition (ii) guarantees that ad quality does not have an
explosive e¤ect on consumer demand. Despite the fact that rms with a low x have
further incentives to invest in ad quality, the demand faced by a rm with a low x (low
purchase probability) will not be higher than the demand faced by a rm with a higher
x (high purchase probability). In other words, ad quality will help rms to sell more
(specially those with a low x), though, not to a point where a low x rm sells more than
a rm with a higher x.
If a rm does not advertise, we assume for simplicity that the product will not be
known in the market and thus generates no prot. Note that the cost, qx, of producing
an advertisement of quality qx is only incurred once by the rm, regardless of the number
of platforms broadcasting the advert.70 A summary of the notation for advertising rms
follows in Table 2.
Table 2: Notation for advertising rms
(x) Firm xs prot.
qx Firm xs ad quality.
! Willingness to pay for a product by each consumer.
c Marginal cost of producing a product.
x Index for advertising rms.
Dx;i Demand for rm xs product when it advertises in platform i.
fi Advertising fee charged by platform i.
 Cost of one unit of ad quality.
The three-stage game. The participating agents interact according to the following
three-stage game. Prot-maximizing platforms move rst by choosing the subscription
price and the fee per advertising spot. Second, the advertising slots are sold and rms
with a slot choose on the level of advertising quality. Advertising rms produce their
advertisements and decide the price of the products they sell. Platforms broadcast content
and the advertising spots, and nally, consumers make their choices regarding the media
subscription and the product market. A summary of the timing of the model follows in
Table 3.
70Advertising rms generally use either a production company or an advertising agency to produce
their commercials. The cost of the commercial will depend on the creative content, music, location, cast,
etc., as well as the overall production quality of the commercial. Once the shooting is complete and the
ad produced, the advertising rm needs to buy advertising slots on platforms in order to broadcast. More
on how to get a commercial made at http://www.thinkbox.tv.
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Table 3: Timing of the model
I. Media platforms choose simultaneously and independently the pair of
prices (fi; si). Each platform i chooses (fi; si) such that it maximizes
(31).
II. Firms decide if they want to buy advertising slots from one, two or none
of the media platforms, depending on the advertising airtime prices and
their (rational) expectation of how many subscribers there will be in each
platform. Advertising rms choose the ad quality level that maximizes
(35) and set the product price at !.
III. Subscribers, indexed by y and z, maximize (32) and (34), respectively,
choosing between the two media platforms according to their idiosyn-
cratic preferences regarding the programming type, the subscription
prices, the advertising airtime and the average ad quality in each plat-
form. Advertising airtime and average ad quality are only taken into
consideration by S-type subscribers (and not by I-type subscribers).
2.3 The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
The model is solved by backward induction in order to nd a (symmetric) subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). All computations are relegated to an appendix.
In stage III we solve the subscribersproblem, indexed by y and z, to maximize (32)
and (34), respectively. Given that v is su¢ ciently high to ensure full participation of
all consumers, an S-type subscriber at point y will choose to subscribe platform 1 if
v   x̂1 (1  q1)  s1   ty > v   x̂2 (1  q2)  s2   t (1  y). Thus,




 (x̂j (1  qj)  x̂i (1  qi)) + sj   si
2t
. (37)
An I-type subscriber at point z will choose to subscribe platform 1 if v   s1   tz >
v   s2   t (1  z). Thus







In stage II, the following result regarding ad quality choice emerges from rm xs
problem.
Proposition 1 If advertising rms buy advertising slots in both platforms, the ad quality
chosen by an advertising rm x equals
qx =






Proof All proofs are in an appendix. 
Proposition 1 underscores the driving forces that a¤ect the decision of rm x to spend
resources on advertising quality. First, as the proportion of subscribers liable to be per-
suaded by ads, , increases, the return to persuasive advertising also increases. As a
consequence, rms have more incentive to invest in ad quality. Second, the quality in-
creasing technology is crucial since it a¤ects costs. Therefore, the incentive to improve
quality increases with cheaper technologies (lower ). Third, higher prot margins in the
goods market increase the return to persuasive ads and, thus, increase the incentive to
invest in better ad quality. Fourth, intuitively rms with lower types (i.e., low x) have a
higher incentive to invest in ad quality as a means to compensate for the weak informative
e¤ect of their ads. New products with a high probability of being bought may be those
released by more established and better-known rms. Consumers will buy those products
with higher probability. Firms with lower types may be interpreted as relatively unknown
rms.71
Lemma 1 In a symmetric equilibrium, where f i = f
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advertise on both platforms (multi-homing) or do not advertise at all.
The solution in (39) is conditional on rm x multi-homing, which assures that its











, the advertising rms will indeed multi-home, rather than single-home,
while the remaining rms (with lower types) will not advertise at all. From (35) it is
straightforward to conclude that in a symmetric equilibrium, where Dx;i = D

x;j and
f i = f

j , if (!   c)Dx;i qx f i > 0, then it must be the case that (!   c)Dx;j f j > 0
(recall that the cost qx is incurred only once at the time of the ad production) and the
rm will choose to multi-home.
Also, if platforms exhibit a su¢ ciently small di¤erence in advertising fees and adver-
tising rms expect Dx;i to be su¢ ciently close to D

x;j, each rm will multi-home or not
advertise at all. We can show this in the following way. Without loss of generality, assume






j . Take rst the rm located at x = 1. This rm
has the highest willingness to pay for an advert and will choose q1 = 0 regardless of the
number of platforms broadcasting its advert. A necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition
71An example of this is Apple that, in 1984, had a relatively small market share in the personal computer
market. In that year, Apple released the ad 1984in the US television introducing the Apple Macintosh
personal computer. The ad, directed by Ridley Scott, is considered a masterpiece in advertising and
widely regarded as one of the most memorable and successful television commercials of all time in the
US. A more recent example can be found in the UK where Sky exhibits a market share of 12% in the
residential xed line market, while BT (the incumbent) is the major operator with 45% market share.
Contrarily to BT, Sky has hired the services of Hollywood stars such as Bruce Willis and Al Pacino to
advertise its services in the UK.
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for this rm to advertise only on platform i is (!   c)D1;i   f i > 0.72 This implies that
for
 




su¢ ciently close to
 




, the rm will also attain a positive prot,
(!   c)D1;j   f j > 0, from advertising on platform j.
Take now the advertising rms characterized by 0  x < 1. They will choose an
ad quality qx > 0. A necessary condition for these rms to advertise on platform i is
(!   c)Dx;i   qx   f i > 0. In addition, if a rm advertises on platform j, the prot
from doing so will be (!   c)Dx;j   f j , which will be positive for
 











. Intuitively, given the absence of an advertising production cost when
broadcasting the same advert via a second platform (e.g., platform j), a rm x 2 [0; 1)
is willing to pay a higher advertising fee (or pay the same fee for a smaller audience)
to platform j, as compared to platform i. A costly advert to be broadcasted via only
one platform (that will be watched by a fraction of consumers) may be unprotable or
will generate less prot compared to a multi-homing solution (which ensures that all
consumers watch the advert).73 Moreover, note that the optimal ad quality, qx, increases
when rms choose multi-homing, rather than single-homing. This is due to the fact that
the benet from an additional unit of ad quality increases with the size of the audience.
From (39) we can compute the average ad quality level on platform i and write it as
a function of the advertising volume broadcasted by that platform.
Proposition 2 If advertising rms purchase advertising slots in both platforms, the av-









Importantly, the average ad quality is increasing in the volume of ads broadcast.
The advertising rms willing to pay more for an advertising slot are those with a higher
informative e¤ect (i.e., higher x). These are also the rms with fewer incentives to invest
in ad quality. As a consequence, when platforms sell more advertising slots, the marginal
advertiser will exhibit an above-average ad quality, thus increasing the average ad quality
broadcast by the platform.
Plugging the ad quality solution qx into (x), we obtain
72Note that if (!   c)D1;i = fi , there is essentially no advertising, as rms with lower willingness to
pay, i.e., those in the interval 0  x < 1, will choose not to advertise at all. We concentrate our analysis
on the case where (!   c)D1;i > fi . Otherwise, advertising airtime regulation would not be a concern.
73The presence of an ad production cost that is paid only once regardless of how many stations air
the advert induces scale economies, which lie at the root for this preference for multi-homing. That ad
production costs may be signicant is suggested by the following examples. In 2004, Chanel paid US$
33 million for a two-minute commercial. Nicole Kidman reportedly received $3 million to act in this ad.
Other big spenders include Guinness, which spent US$ 16 million to create a domino e¤ect through a
small town in Argentina, and a British insurance company that paid US$ 13 million for celebrities such
as Ringo Starr and Bruce Willis. More at http://www.businessinsider.com.
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(x) = (!   c)x+ 1


(!   c) (1  x)
2
2
  f1   f2.
The prot of the marginal advertiser is zero. From this zero-prot condition we can derive
rmsdemand function for advertising slots in platform i










as long 0  x̂i  1. As discussed further below, this will be the case in equilibrium.
In stage I we solve platform is prot maximization problem
max
fi;si
i (fi; si)  si (ŷi + (1  ) ẑi) + fix̂i
where x̂i, ŷi and ẑi are dened, respectively, by (41), (37) and (38).
Conventional wisdom and the standard IO literature suggest that prices are strategic
complements. However, in this particular case, we can show (see the SPNE appendix)
that the advertising fees (fi; fj) are strategic substitutes, i.e., platformsreaction functions
are downward sloping regarding the ad-fees. This is due to the one-o¤ cost supported
by advertisers when investing in ad quality. For the marginal rm, advertising is only
protable if the same commercial can be broadcasted via both platforms, rather than just
one. If one of the platforms were to slightly increase its advertising fee, the marginal
advertiser would be unable to fully recover the cost of producing the advert and, thus,
would choose not to advertise at all. As a best-reply, the other platform chooses to slightly
decrease its advertising fee in order to recover the marginal advertiser.



































9 + 52 (!   c)
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The assumption in (36) yields 0 < x̂i < 1.
The following comparative static results on the sensitiveness of consumers to the qual-
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ity of advertising are of interest.
Proposition 3 In a symmetric equilibrium, an increase in the proportion of ad-sensitive
subscribers, , will: (i) expand rms demand function for advertising slots; (ii) make
platforms set lower advertising fees; and (iii) produce no impact on the subscription fees.
An increase in the proportion of ad-sensitive subscribers means that there are more
consumers willing to pay ! with probability x+
p
qx, rather than just probability x. This
implies that advertising rms have an additional incentive to upgrade their ad quality.
The prots of advertising rms are increasing in the proportion of ad-sensitive subscribers,
. Thus, rms are willing to pay more for an advertising slot as  increases, which works
out as an expansion of rmsdemand for advertising slots.
As depicted in Figure 1 below, the rms(inverse) demand function for advertising
slots is convex74 and has an intercept that is independent of . Note that an advertiser
with the highest willingness to pay for a slot (i.e., an advertiser at x = 1) will sell its




Figure 1: Firmswillingness to pay for advertising slots.
An increase in the quantity demanded of ads brought about by a change in  is
increasingly bigger the lower the willingness to pay of advertisers. As a result, an increase
in  induces to a atter demand for ads, which in turn makes it more attractive to lower the
price of slots since a given increase in sales can be obtained with a smaller price decrease
and, hence, a smaller inframarginal reduction in revenue. In other words, the e¤ect on
platformsprots of a slight price cut of advertising slots is more than compensated by
the expansion of the quantity demanded of those slots. This explains why an increase in
 leads to a decrease in the price of ads.
In a symmetric equilibrium, both platforms exhibit the same volume of advertisements
and average ad quality. As a consequence, from the subscribers point of view (both
74This can be mathematically veried by checking that the signal of the second derivative with respect
to advertising fees of (41) is positive.
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ad-indi¤erent and ad-sensitive), platforms can only di¤erentiate themselves in terms of
content, with such di¤erentiation measured by parameter t. In equilibrium, si = t and,
thus, the proportion of ad-sensitive subscribers does not have any impact on subscription
fees.
Proposition 4 In a symmetric equilibrium, an increase in the proportion of ad-sensitive
subscribers, , will: (i) increase media platformsprots; (ii) produce no impact on the
utility of ad-indi¤erent subscribers; (iii) decrease (increase) the utility of ad-sensitive sub-
scribers, if  is su¢ ciently low (high); and (iv) increase advertisersprots.
Ad-indi¤erent subscribers are not a¤ected either by advertising airtime or the average
ad quality. In fact, as per the utility dened in (34), ad-indi¤erent subscribers are only
concerned with their idiosyncratic preference with respect to content and the subscription
fees. In equilibrium, the subscription fees equal t, thus being independent of . Hence,
an increase in  will not produce any e¤ect on the utility of ad-indi¤erent subscribers.
In equilibrium, an increase in the proportion of ad-sensitive subscribers results in more
advertisements but also in enhanced advertising quality on average. In general, the net
e¤ect on S-type subscribers welfare is ambiguous. On the one hand, if the subscribers
valuation of average ad quality, , is negligible, then, the nuisance e¤ect of ads will
dominate the quality e¤ect, and S-type subscribers will be worse o¤. On the other hand,
if  is su¢ ciently high, the ad quality enhancing e¤ect dominates the nuisance e¤ect of
ads and S-type subscribers will be better o¤.
Advertisersprots increase due to two distinctive e¤ects. First, as explained in Propo-
sition 3, in a symmetric equilibrium platforms have an incentive to decrease advertising
fees when the proportion of S-type subscribers expands. Thus, lower advertising fees
increase the prots not just of rms that would advertise at higher advertising fees, but
also allow more rms, that at higher prices would not advertise their products, to buy
an advertising slot. Second, as  increases, so does the marginal benet of ad quality
for rms. In fact, there is an increased fraction of S-type consumers willing to buy the
advertised products at an enhanced probability. Thus, advertising rms increase sales
and prots.
2.4 Advertising caps
As mentioned earlier, advertising airtime is regulated in a number of countries. In this
section we address how the presence of advertising caps may a¤ect the average quality of
advertisements and, ultimately, platformsprots, subscriberssurpluses and advertisers
prots. Let the regulated volume of advertisements be given by x, where x < xi , i.e., the
advertising cap is binding.
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Proposition 5 In a symmetric equilibrium, a lower advertising cap will reduce the average
quality of advertisements.
Equation (40) shows that a lower advertising cap will cause the average advertising
quality to decrease. In Proposition 2 we highlighted that the average ad quality is increas-
ing in the volume of ads broadcast. This is explained by the fact that rms with a higher
informative e¤ect (i.e., higher x and also higher willingness to pay for an advertising slot)
are simultaneously the rms with fewer incentives to invest in ad quality. As the marginal
advertiser exhibits higher ad quality as compared to rms with a higher informative e¤ect,
platforms selling more advertising slots will broadcast higher ad quality on average. A
lower advertising cap will, thus, restrict advertisements to rms with a higher informative
e¤ect to the detriment of rms that would invest in ads of higher quality. In Proposition
6 we consider the welfare e¤ects of an advertising cap.
Proposition 6 In a symmetric equilibrium, a lower advertising cap will (i) decrease media
platformsprots; (ii) produce no impact on the utility of ad-indi¤erent subscribers; (iii)
decrease (increase) the utility of ad-sensitive subscribers, if  is su¢ ciently high (low);
and (iv) decrease advertisersprots.
The platforms are clearly worse o¤ through being constrained in advertising airtime
given that the advertising cap x < xi is binding by assumption.
As previously mentioned, ad-indi¤erent subscribers are concerned with their idiosyn-
cratic preference with respect to content and the subscription fees, but are not concerned
with the volume or quality of advertising broadcasted by each platform. Given that the
subscription fees, set at t, will not be a¤ected by the advertising cap x, the utility of
ad-indi¤erent subscribers will not change.
As ad-sensitive subscribersutility is decreasing in the volume of advertisements but
increasing in the average advertising quality it is impossible, without knowledge of the
parameters of the model, to unambiguously rank the Nash equilibrium and advertising
cap solution in terms of ad-sensitive subscriberswelfare. On the one hand, if ad-sensitive
subscribers valuation of average ad quality, , is negligible, then, the nuisance e¤ect of
ads airtime will dominate the ad quality e¤ect, and ad-sensitive subscribers will be better
o¤ with an advertising cap x < xi . On the other hand, if  is su¢ ciently high, the ad
quality e¤ect dominates the nuisance e¤ect of ads and ad-sensitive subscribers will be
worse o¤ with an advertising cap (see the result in Proposition 5). Put di¤erently, if 
is su¢ ciently high, a tighter cap will hurt S-type subscribers because the reduction of
the average ad quality will more than o¤set the direct benet of a reduced nuisance from
advertisements themselves.
This suggests that a regulatory authority which is trying to increase viewer welfare
via restrictions on the advertising airtime might also need to consider regulating adver-
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tising quality or, at a minimum, take the e¤ect of advertising quality into consideration.
However, in practice, the implementation of quality regulation is likely to be di¢ cult as
quality is hard to clearly dene and measure.
Under an advertising cap x < xi a lower advertising fee does not expand the advertising
airtime. As a result, a lower advertising cap will incentivize platforms to increase their
advertising fees. From (35) it is clear that rms prots are decreasing with respect
to advertising fees. Since a lower advertising cap incentivizes platforms to set higher
advertising fees, a tighter advertising cap necessarily hurts advertisersprots.
The results in Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 suggest that the social e¤ects of an
advertising cap depend on both the advertising provision and the average level of ad qual-
ity. In fact, as discussed above, if  is su¢ ciently high, the introduction of an advertising
cap may make all market players (with the exception of ad-indi¤erent subscribers whose
utility does not change with x) worse o¤.
2.5 Robustness
This section addresses issues concerning the robustness of our conclusions. First, we
address how our ndings on average quality of advertisements (Proposition 5) and social
welfare (Proposition 6) would di¤er under a case of asymmetric regulation. Second, we
discuss how those ndings depend upon our specic model.
2.5.1 Asymmetric regulation
In the basic model, broadcasters are constrained by the same advertising cap. Nonethe-
less, the regulation of the maximum volume of advertising may di¤er across platforms. For
example, in the UK, the BBC is a well-known example of an ad free public TV nanced
only by licence fees and public transfers, while for other public service broadcasters the
maximum average number of advertising minutes is eight per hour. We nd other exam-
ples of asymmetric regulation in Germany and France where the Government decided to
ban commercial advertising on public TV stations, while private platforms are allowed to
broadcast some advertisements per hour.
Suppose now that there is an ad free public TV (network 1) nanced only by licence
fees and public transfers (i.e., s1 = x̂1 = 0), and an unregulated free-to-air TV (network
2) where s2 = 0 and x̂2 is chosen such that it maximizes prot. Given that advertising is
only possible on network 2, as shown in the appendix (see Stage II: rmschoice), an
advertiser x will choose an ad quality level
qx =






and consequently the average ad quality on network 2 will be













, for x̂2 > 0. (42)
Note that the average ad quality depends both on the advertising volume, x̂2, and the
proportion of ad-sensitive consumers watching network 2, ŷ2. In Proposition 5 we showed
that, in a context of regulatory symmetry, a lower advertising cap reduces the average
quality of advertisements broadcasted by a platform. Here, however, because of regulatory
asymmetry we need to take into account the e¤ect that an advertising cap may have on ŷ2
as well. This e¤ect will depend on how sensitive ad-sensitive consumers are to advertising
volumes.
If a tighter advertising cap drives advertisers to expect a su¢ ciently large expansion in
ŷ2, then advertisers will choose a better quality for their ads. In this case, a tighter adver-
tising cap may increase ad-sensitive consumerssurplus since fewer ads are broadcasted
on network 2 and the average quality of those ads has increased. Ad-indi¤erent consumers
will remain indi¤erent to advertising caps as they only take into account programming
preferences and subscription prices (which are set at zero in this case). Platform 2 will in-
crease the advertising fee up to the point where a higher advertising fee does not decrease
the demand for ad slots below the cap. However, it will be clearly worse o¤ as a result
of being constrained regarding advertising airtime. The e¤ect of a tighter advertising cap
on advertisers is dubious. On the one hand, an advertising cap will prevent some rms
from advertising their products. Thus, these rms will clearly be worse o¤. On the other
hand, the rms that obtain a slot will pay a higher advertising fee while beneting from
a wider audience. Thus, the net e¤ect for these rms is not clear.
A tighter advertising cap may, however, decrease the average ad quality. This will
be the case if advertisers expect ŷ2 to increase only by a su¢ ciently small amount, or to
decrease. If  is su¢ ciently high, the average ad quality e¤ect dominates the nuisance
e¤ect of ad airtime, and ad-sensitive consumers watching network 2 will be worse o¤with
a cap. Also, note that due to the decrease of the average ad quality, some consumers
may switch from network 2 to network 1. Thus, this group of consumers must be worse
o¤ as well. As discussed above, ad-indi¤erent consumers will remain indi¤erent to caps,
while platform 2 will increase advertising fees but will clearly be worse o¤ through being
constrained in advertising airtime. A tighter advertising cap may decrease rmsprots
for two reasons. First, a set of rms will be unable to advertise their products as there
are not enough advertising slots under a binding regulatory cap. Second, the rms that
benet from an advertising slot will pay higher advertising fees while obtaining a lower
return on ads due to consumer switching (from network 2 to network 1) and the lower ad
quality, which will reduce the purchase probability of ad-sensitive consumers.
93
In a nutshell, while the result that a lower cap may reduce the average ad quality and
harm social welfare is still a possibility under asymmetric regulation, it is not clear that
this must necessarily be the case.
2.5.2 Alternative models
We have adopted a model with specic assumptions regarding the demand for adver-
tisements and the impact of ad quality on consumer behavior. Firms are monopolists of
new goods who wish to inform consumers of their productsexistence and characteristics.
When trade occurs, rms extract all the gains from trade. The incentive for rm x to
improve ad quality is driven by the increase in the buying probability displayed by S-type
consumers, rather than an increase in their willingness to pay for the product. These are
strong assumptions and it is important to discuss the sensitivity of our main results to
our model specications.
New goods may be substitutes for consumers. For example, consumers may purchase
only one good from those they have been informed about. In this case there is a business
stealing e¤ect in placing an ad with better quality insofar as trade may come in detriment
of the advertisers competitors. A constraint in advertising airtime may restrict the degree
of competition in the goods market, i.e., reduce the number of e¤ective players in the goods
market down to those who can advertise on TV. Once the cap comes into e¤ect, the shift
in market structure may be such that advertising rms have fewer incentives for investing
in ad quality. In this case, a degree of substitution among goods reinforces our result
that a lower advertising cap will reduce the average quality of advertisements and, in
turn, may decrease the utility of ad-sensitive subscribers. However, depending on how
market competition is modeled, advertising rms may have further incentives to invest in
ad quality under a cap. In this latter case, while our result on the average ad quality is
still a possibility, it is less likely than in the basic model when rms are monopolists of
new goods.
Supposing that rms do not gain all the surplus (!   c) from trade would reduce the
marginal benet of ad quality to rms and consequently would have a negative impact on
the average ad quality qi in (33). Note that this negative impact happens regardless of the
imposition of an advertising cap. Our qualitative result regarding the impact of a lower
advertising cap on the average quality of advertisements (Proposition 5) will hold even if
we allocate a smaller proportion of the total surplus from trade to rms.75 The qualitative
welfare e¤ects of an advertising cap on media platformsprots and advertisersprots
will hold as previously explained and set out in Proposition 6. In relation to (both S-type
and I-type) consumers, we need to take into account that the e¤ect of a tighter advertising
75This can be shown, for example, if advertising rms retain a fraction 0 <  < 1 of the total surplus,
i.e., retain  (!   c), rather than !   c.
94
cap will cause a reduction in the number of transactions. As a result, consumers will get a
lower surplus in the goods market. In this case, if  is su¢ ciently high, the introduction of
an advertising cap may make all market players worse o¤, including the I-type consumers.
Assume now that ad quality increases S-type consumerswillingness to pay for the
product, rather than increasing their buying probability. In particular, if a rm with a
new product featured by type x invests in qx units of ad quality, an I-type consumer will
be willing to pay (! c) to purchase the product with probability x, while an ad-sensitive
consumer will be willing to pay (!   c +pqx) to purchase the product with probability
x. The prot for a multi-homing rm x is
(x)  (!   c+pqx)x+ (!   c) (1  )x  qx   f1   f2,
assuming that the rm is able to engage in a policy of price discrimination between ad-
indi¤erent and ad-sensitive consumers. For example, this may consist in discriminating













x̂2i   3x̂i + 3
3
, for x̂i > 0.
It is straightforward that dqi=dx̂i = 2x̂i   3 < 0, given that 0 < x̂i < 1, meaning that
an advertising cap may increase the average ad quality on platforms. On the one hand,
the TV viewing experience for subscribers may be improved as fewer ads are broadcasted
and the average ad quality is improved. On the other hand, platforms that rely only on
advertising revenues will be worse o¤ due to the regulatory constraint, and rmsprots
will decrease as advertising fees are higher and some rms will be unable to advertise.
We can conclude that the impact of an ad airtime cap on the average ad quality
depends on whether the ad quality increases the purchase probability or the willingness
to pay of S-type consumers. In the latter case, regulating the advertising airtime may
increase subscriberswelfare, even though it is not clear in which direction the aggregate
social welfare will be a¤ected.
2.6 Conclusions
Entertaining and informative contents are the bait to get prospective purchasers of
consumer goods exposed to advertisements. What makes broadcasting di¤erent from
other goods is that the broadcast delivers two goods, the contents to subscribers and
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the audience to the advertising rms. Thus, it is useful to take a two-sided markets
perspective when addressing economic issues on the TV broadcasting market.
In this chapter we showed that the average ad quality broadcast by a media platform
may be increasing in the volume of ads. The marginal gain of investment in ad quality
is lower for rms with a higher informative e¤ect. Thus, the marginal advertiser on
a platform exhibits higher ad quality compared to rms with a higher informative e¤ect
and, consequently, platforms selling more advertising slots will broadcast higher ad quality
on average. We concluded that advertising caps may, thus, cause the average ad quality
to decrease.
We showed that an advertising cap may generate the following welfare e¤ects. Media
platforms become worse o¤ through being constrained in advertising airtime. Provided
that a lower advertising cap incentivizes platforms to set higher advertising fees, as a lower
advertising fee could not increase the volume of advertising sales, a tighter advertising cap
will necessarily hurt advertisersprots. The e¤ect on subscriberswelfare is ambiguous
because the ad quality reduction resulting from a cap o¤sets the direct subscribersgain
from watching fewer ads. We found that if ad-sensitive subscribers are su¢ ciently sensitive
to ad quality (i.e., the quality reduction outweighs the direct e¤ect of the cap), a cap may
even reduce the social welfare level. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority
that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might
necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical,
take the e¤ect of advertising quality into consideration.
Although this chapter does not provide the denitive answer to the question of whether
regulating the advertising airtime increases subscriber surplus and the aggregate social
welfare, it does provide a framework which can be used to answer this question. Such
a framework, to the best of the authors knowledge, is currently absent in the economic
analysis of advertising caps and ad quality.
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An I-type subscriber located at z will choose to subscribe platform 1 if v   s1   tz >
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when v is su¢ ciently high to ensure full participation.
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(1  x) < 0 at qx = qx, for ŷi > 0.
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(1  x) < 0 at qx = qx.
From here onwards we focus our attention on the case where rms choose to multi-home
(this assumption will be veried in equilibrium). Plugging the ad quality solution qx in
(x) we get
(x) = (!   c)







(!   c) (1  x)
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  f1   f2
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2
2
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The prot of the marginal advertiser is zero, i.e.,







  (fi + fj) = 0, i 6= j, i; j = 1; 2
where x̂i  1  x and x is the marginal advertiser on the interval [0; 1] on which rms are
uniformly distributed. Solving the zero-prot condition with respect to x̂i, we get rms
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demand function for advertising slots in platform i76
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as long 0  x̂i  1 is satised.
Stage I: platformschoice
Platform is problem is
max
fi;si
i (fi; si)  si (ŷi + (1  ) ẑi) + fix̂i subject to
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Note that if rms choose to advertise in both platforms, we have x̂i = x̂j and, therefore,
qi = qj. This implies that ŷi (x̂i; x̂j; qi; qj; si; sj) = 12 +
sj si
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(! c)2 since, by (36), we have that

(! c)2 > 1
implying x̂i > 1.
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Note that 0 < x̂i < 1 must hold by condition (36). Also, according to Lemma 1, in a
symmetric equilibrium, rms multi-home or do not advertise at all.
2.8.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1When broadcasting ads on both platform 1 and 2, the prot of
rm x is dened as
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4q1:5x
(1  x) < 0 at qx = qx. 
Proof of Lemma 1 This proof consists in showing that rms do not single-home if






x;j. A necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for rm x to choose
to single-home on platform i is
(!   c)Dx;i   qx   fi  0.
If rm x advertises on platform i, given the one-o¤ cost of making an advertisement of
quality qx, the prot from advertising also on platform j will be (!   c)Dx;j   fj. Firm
x will multi-home if
(!   c)Dx;j   fj  0.
If
(!   c)Dx;j   f j  (!   c)Dx;i   qx   f i ,






f i   f j

, (43)
then, provided (!   c)Dx;i qx fi  0, rms will choose multi-homing. In a symmetric
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equilibrium, where f i = f





x;j, (43) simplies to
qx  (!   c) 0  0 = 0,
which is veried for any qx  0. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium, if it is protable
for rm x to advertise via platform i, then it is also protable for rm x to advertise via
platform j. 
































0@  2   2 (!   c) + 2 (fi + fj)q     2 (!   c) + 2 (fi + fj)+
 2
 
   2 (!   c) + 2 (fi + fj)

1A
3 (!   c)
 




3 (!   c)






























> 0 by condition
(36).

























 0, where X  9  5
2(! c)

> 0 by condition (36).
(iii) Given that si = t, it is straightforward that @s

i =@ = 0. 
104










































72 + 30X + 26
p
9 + 5X   5X
p















where 0 < X  
2(! c)




























































(ii) Note that si does not depend on . Therefore, the utility of ad-indi¤erent sub-
scribers, as described in (34), will not change with  as well.
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Otherwise, the utility of ad-sensitive subscribers will decrease with .
(iv) In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, advertiser xs prot is
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qx   f 1   f 2
0
if platforms 1 and 2
if no ads
,







. Hence, if rm x buys
























given that @ (x) =@qx = 0 by the ad quality FOC and @f
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i =@ < 0 as shown in the proof
of Proposition 3 (ii). 






















therefore, at x̂i = x < x̂i , a lower advertising cap x will cause the average advertising
quality in platform i to decrease. 
Proof of Proposition 6 (i) Under an advertising cap, platform is problem is
max
fi;si
i (fi; si)  si (ŷi + (1  ) ẑi) + fix̂i subject to
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Hereafter, a variable with a bar on top refers to the model with a cap. In a symmetric



































































































by condition (36), we can conclude that di=dx >
0 at x < x̂i , i.e., a lower advertising cap x will cause platform is prot to decrease.
(ii) Note that si does not depend on x. Therefore, the utility of ad-indi¤erent sub-
scribers, as described in (34), will not change with x as well.
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(iii) The utility of an ad-sensitive subscriber y is given by
US (y) =
(
v   x (1  q1)  s1   ty








































































since 0  x < xi  1 and 0 <
2(! c)

< 1 by condition (36). This means that a lower
advertising cap will incentivize platforms to increase their advertising fees. From (35) it
is clear that rmsprots are decreasing in advertising fees. Thus, a lower advertising cap
will decrease advertisersprots due to the higher advertising fees set by platforms. 
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Chapter 3
3 The No-Surcharge Rule and network e¤ects: a wel-
fare analysis
3.1 Introduction
Motivation. Payment cards79 have been experiencing fast growth which has drawn
attention to some of the contentious features of this industry, namely the No-Surcharge
Rule (NSR).80 The NSR means that a merchant charges at most the same amount for
a payment card transaction as for cash.81 In several countries, the NSR has been under
examination by regulatory and competition authorities, central banks and courts. For
example, in the US, on October 5th, 2010, Visa and MasterCard reached a settlement with
the US DOJ that allows merchants to reward consumers for paying with credit or debit
cards that charge the merchant lower fees, while American Express Co. (AmEx) vowed to
ght a Government antitrust lawsuit.82 In early 2010, the Portuguese Government decided
to make the NSR mandatory by law claiming consumer protection and that the use of
electronic payments is more e¢ cient than cash and thus should be protected. Since April
2013, the UK Government has implemented a ban on payment card surcharges placed
by some businesses such as ights, cinemas and hotels, as a means to protect consumers
from paying excessive credit and debit card transactions fees.83 In other countries, such
as Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden, the NSR has been abolished (Prager et al.,
79The payment cards industry includes credit, debit, and prepaid cards. We will focus our attention
on payment cards with rewards programs attached. With payment card rewards, consumers have an
additional benet of earning rewards virtually every time they use their payment card, rather than cash.
For example, payment card rewards may comprise cashback or points which can be exchanged for travels
and other goods and services. Rewards may also be construed as the features coupled with card usage such
as theft-insurance for goods purchased with the card, or even dispute-resolution protection by electronic
payment networks.
80In 2002, transactions done on electronic payment networks in the US exceeded $1.7 trillion (Schwartz
and Vincent, 2004). In 2006, payment cards were used in 47 billion transactions for a total of $3.1 trillion
(Shy and Wang, 2010). In 2008, debit and prepaid card purchases topped $3.285 trillion (almost a quarter
of US GDP). In the UK it is expected that consumer card use will rise by 75% from nearly 10 billion
payments in 2012 to nearly 17 billion in 2022 (see http://www.paymentscouncil.org.uk).
81Although infrequent, there have been cases where card payments were discounted relatively to cash,
e.g., in Germany during the transition to the euro. Also in Argentina and Colombia since 2003 Govern-
ments have been providing VAT discounts to transactions processed with debit or credit cards.
82SeeMasterCard, Visa Settle as AmEx Fights U.S. Lawsuit, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-10-04/mastercard-visa-settle-antitrust-case-as-american-express-fights-lawsuit.
html.
83See Ticket charges: No more excessivecard surcharges, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
business-22042309.
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2009). Critics of the NSR have claimed that it ine¢ ciently encourages the use of more
costly forms of payment (e.g., credit cards) over the less costly (e.g., cash), as well as more
costly credit cards compared to less costly credit cards, leading to a Greshams Law of
Payments.
Description of the chapter. The main contribution of this chapter is to highlight
potential (in)e¢ ciencies of the NSR, in particular: (i) the improvement of retail price e¢ -
ciency for cardholders, and (ii) the ine¢ ciency of merchant acceptance. The ine¢ ciency of
merchant acceptance will be particularly overwhelming in the presence of strong network
e¤ects from merchants to cardholders.84 We base our analysis on a three-party model with
consumers (comprising cardholders and cash payers), merchants and a prot-maximizing
EPN.85
There is a mass of consumers normalized to one. We assume that a proportion 0 <  <
1 of consumers are cardholders, i.e., have cash and card as feasible payment instruments,
while the remaining (1  ) are cash payers, i.e., only have cash as a feasible payment
instrument. Cardholders care about the extent of merchant acceptance o¤ered by the
EPN (network e¤ects from merchants to cardholders).
There is a mass one of prot-maximizing merchants that are local monopolists. A
monopoly market structure provides a good rst-order approximation to a number of mar-
kets where merchants have market power. Such market structure facilitates our welfare
analysis of the NSR as we do not have to model potential strategic e¤ects that typically
arise in oligopoly markets. We note that the case of perfectly competitive merchants has
been covered in previous articles, see for example, Gans and King (2003), and Wright
(2003). Previous research has shown that under perfect competition the social surplus
does not change regardless of the existence of the NSR. This is because perfectly com-
petitive merchants will separate into those that accept cards and those that do not (see
related literaturebelow for further details). Merchants bear a fee as a supply cost for
card transactions, while not facing explicit costs for cash transactions. The incentives for
a merchant to accept card payments are: (i) transactional benets from card usage (e.g.
cash-handling costsreduction), and (ii) a higher demand (depending on card rewards)
if cardholders can pay with card, as opposed to cash.86 Merchants are heterogeneous in
their transactional benets from card usage.
84These network e¤ects may be justied by a preference that cardholders have for not carrying cash
due to convenience and security reasons.
85Our analysis primarily addresses a closed network, but it may also characterize a four-party network
if acquirers (issuers) are identical and perfectly competitive, while issuers (acquirers) are identical and
collude when setting the fees to cardholders (merchants). One advantage of a three-party model is that
we do not need to be concerned with the interchange fee, which, in a four-party setup compensates the
issuing bank each time cardholders use the card in a purchase.
86Another reason why a merchant may accept card payments is due to the business stealinge¤ect.
However, since by assumption merchants are local monopolists, such an e¤ect is disregarded from our
model.
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There is one prot-maximizing EPN setting, per card transaction, a fee to merchants
and a reward to cardholders. As the number of cardholders is xed we assume that there
are no xed fees (e.g., an annual membership fee).
We provide an e¢ ciency justication for the implementation of the NSR. We show
that the imposition of the NSR causes the volume of card transactions to increase and
the volume of cash transactions to fall. Under the NSR, cardholders will pay a lower
price (closer to marginal cost) which improves retail price e¢ ciency for goods sold to
cardholders. An important aspect in our model is that a transfer of a unit of a good
from a cash payer to a cardholder (choosing to pay with card, rather than cash) implies a
reduction in the marginal cost of providing that good. Thus, a transfer of cash transactions
into card transactions, as a consequence of the NSR implementation, will be more cost-
e¤ective.
Also, we discuss the welfare variations introduced by the NSR in the presence of
network e¤ects. If network e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong, then, with the exception of the
EPN, all groups of agents (i.e., cash payers, cardholders and merchants) will be worse
o¤ with the NSR implementation. We show that the NSR will be socially undesirable if
network e¤ects from merchants to cardholders are su¢ ciently strong. In our model, the
NSR implementation reduces card acceptance. Therefore, if network e¤ects on cardholders
are su¢ ciently strong, the NSR destroys value in the cardholder side of the market. This
is the case provided that the network size of card acceptance matters to cardholders and
under the NSR fewer merchants will accept payment cards.
Related literature. Formal economic analysis of electronic payment systems was ini-
tiated by Baxter (1983) with an analysis of the NaBanCo litigation.87 The theoretical
payment card literature has been growing, especially during the last decade, by address-
ing the issue of how costs of payment cards are and might be divided among EPNs,
merchants and cardholders. The models considered in this literature point out that EPNs
may charge fees signicantly in excess of their costs to merchants and provide incentives
to cardholders to increase card adoption and usage. To a great extent, this literature has
not distinguished prepaid cards from debit or credit cards. Usually these models (e.g.,
Rochet and Tirole (R&T) (2002, 2003), Cabral (2006), Wright (2010)) focus on the adop-
tion and usage of payment cards versus all other payment instruments and have showed
that competition levels among merchants and among EPNs, along with consumer and
merchant demand elasticities, are relevant factors in determining model outcomes.88
EPNs are a type of two-sided markets. The two-sided markets literature has been
employed to investigate the structure of fees paid by cardholders and merchants. This
87See Frankel and Shampine (2006) for a summary on the NaBanCo case (National Bancard Corpora-
tion vs. Visa US Inc.).
88See Chakravorti (2010) for an excellent review of the growing payment card literature and discussion
of the impact of regulatory interventions on card adoption, usage, and welfare.
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strand of literature combines the network economics literature, which studies how agents
utility changes with participation of other agents in the network, and the multiproduct
rm literature, which investigates how rms choose prices when o¤ering more than one
product.
The seminal articles in two-sided markets by R&T (2003, 2006) and Armstrong (2006)
investigate the determinants of the price balance between two groups of end-users (e.g.,
consumers and merchants) when each group exerts a network e¤ect on the other, and both
are intermediated by a platform (e.g., an EPN). Some of the discussed determinants of
the price balance are: the possibility of multi-homing (access to more than one platform),
platform di¤erentiation, presence of same-side externalities, platform compatibility, per-
transaction or lump-sum pricing and relative size of cross-group externalities. However,
as far as we know, the two-sided markets literature has been silent about the NSR im-
plications on platform fees, prots and welfare, since it assumes that end-users are not
allowed to negotiate prices of platform services.
Chakravorti and Roson (2006) compare the welfare level when two networks operate
as competitors and as a cartel. One of their ndings corroborates the conclusion of R&T
(2003) that network competition does not imply, from a social standpoint, a better or
worse balance of fees between consumers and merchants. Chakravorti and Roson show
that, in general, the welfare gain of a drop in the total network fee more than compensates
the deterioration in the e¢ ciency of the fee balance. Moreover, network competition
unambiguously increases consumer and merchant surpluses.
Gans and King (2003) show that, under a general four-party model of a payment
system, abolishing the NSR is one su¢ cient condition to reach the neutrality of the
interchange fee (IF), i.e., variations in the IF do not lead to changes in consumersdecisions
on purchases, consumersand merchantsadoption decisions nor issuers, acquirersand
merchantsprots. However, Gans and King did not do a welfare analysis.
Wright (2003) undertakes the welfare analysis of the NSR under two-merchant compe-
tition extremes: monopoly and Bertrand competition. The author shows that (i) the NSR
is socially desirable when merchants operating in a monopoly EPN engage in price dis-
crimination based on payment instruments, and (ii) under Bertrand competition among
merchants, the social surplus does not change regardless the existence of the NSR. Wright
explains that if merchants are monopolists, the imposition of the NSR prevents them from
surcharging excessively, therefore, the NSR increases social surplus. If merchants compete
à la Bertrand, they pass to consumers the full benets and costs associated with the pay-
ment instruments used to complete the transaction. Hence, under the NSR, competitive
merchants only accept cash or only accept card payments, and prices in the goods market
are equal to the respective marginal cost net of benets. Under surcharging, competitive
merchants accept both types of payment and price discriminate. However, Wright con-
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sidered the total quantity of transactions xed, as all other literature (with the exception
of Schwartz and Vincent (2006)) to our knowledge.
Schwartz and Vincent (2006) investigate the NSR welfare distribution e¤ects among
cash users and cardholders when a merchant is a local monopolist. Although the authors
allow for elastic demand in the goods market, they assume that consumers are exogenously
divided between a group that use only cards (i.e., cardholders cannot use cash), while the
others use only cash. They conclude that the NSR harms cash users and merchants, bene-
ts cardholders, and is protable to the EPN. However, Schwartz and Vincent, considered
the existence of only one merchant in their analysis, excluding the study of variations in
the merchant acceptance network caused by the NSR implementation, as we do in this
chapter.
This chapter builds on the existing literature by providing a model that provides new
insights on the welfare e¤ects of the NSR. In particular, we argue that the NSR: (i)
promotes retail price e¢ ciency for cardholders, and (ii) generates ine¢ ciency in merchant
acceptance. We note that the ine¢ ciency in merchant acceptance is particularly harmful
to social welfare in the presence of su¢ ciently strong network e¤ects. Our model di¤ers
from the existing literature, at least, in two main aspects. First, to the best of our
knowledge, articles studying the NSR have not considered network e¤ects in the analysis,
whilst in our results network e¤ects play an important role. Second, we consider, in
a same model, merchant heterogeneity with respect to transactional benets from card
usage, together with endogenous transaction volumes. This allows us to study in a same
model the impacts of the NSR both in terms of the merchant acceptance and transaction
volumes in the economy.
3.2 The model
In this section we present a model with two payment instruments (cash and cards),89
characterize each participating agent (consumers, merchants and a proprietary EPN) and
describe how they interact in a three-stage game. The elements of our model are as
follows.
Consumers. There is a mass one of consumers split in two types: E-type (i.e., card-
holders) and C-type (i.e., cash payers) consumers.90 E-type consumers hold cards from
89Cash is the default payment instrument accessible to all consumers and merchants at no cost. As
compared to cash, the EPN o¤ers a service for electronic transactions that may yield positive benets
for consumers and merchants.
90In the US, the fraction of households who have a credit card has been steady at about 70 to 75
percent during the past two decades, suggesting the maturity of the market (Schuh, Shy and Stavins
(2010)). About 24% of US households do not hold cards of any kind (Schwartz and Vincent (2006)).
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an EPN and have mass , where 0 <  < 1.91 E-type consumers can purchase goods
using either cash or card (electronic transactions). C-type consumers, with mass 1   ,
do not hold a payment card and purchase goods using only cash.92
The demand for a good, per cash payer, is
qc (pc)  v   pc, (44)
where v > 0 is the consumersmaximal willingness to pay for the good itself, qc is the
number of transactions per cash payer and pc is the price per transaction paid by such a




When using a payment card with reward, r, per unit transacted, the demand for a
good, per cardholder, is
qe (pe)  v + r   pe, (45)
where qe is the number of transactions per cardholder and pe is the price per transaction
paid by such a consumer. The consumer surplus per cardholder paying with card (rather
than cash) is then given by CSe 
R v+r
pe
qe (x) dx. If a cardholder pays cash to purchase
a good, for example, because a merchant accepts only cash, the cardholders demand in
that instance (at that specic merchant) will be given by (44), rather than (45).
We assume that cardholders care about the extent of merchant acceptance o¤ered by
the EPN. The larger the merchant acceptance by the EPN, the larger will be the benet
of holding a payment card from it (network e¤ect).93 Let D  0 denote the number of
merchants accepting payments processed under the EPN. Let bBD measure the benet, in
addition to the total consumer surplus, per cardholder, from accessing to an acceptance
network of D merchants, where bB  0. Note that bB is unrelated with the consumers
willingness to pay (demand) for the goods themselves.
These families may be unable to get payment cards or have a preference for anonymity when making a
transaction.
91Presently, cashless payments represent 92 percent of transactions in France, 89 percent in the UK,
62 percent in Japan and 31 percent in Russia. See MasterCard report (September 2013) at http:
//www.mastercardadvisors.com/cashlessjourney.
92Presently, cash payments represent 45 percent of transactions in China and 20 percent in the US.
Only 15 percent of payments made in Australia are cash, while in Egypt cash represents 93 percent of
transactions. Worldwide, around 85 percent of all retail payment transactions are done with cash. See
MasterCard report (September 2013) at http://www.mastercardadvisors.com/cashlessjourney.
93A reason for this may be the security of paying by card, rather than cash. If cash is stolen, will be
hardly recovered. Whereas if a payment card is stolen, the cardholder can cancel the card immediately
before fraudulent purchases are made. Moreover, EPNs have sophisticated safeguards (e.g., real time
active fraud detection system, chip & PIN authentication) in place to protect cardholders in the event of
unauthorized use. Thus, a larger merchant acceptance may lead cardholders to carry a smaller amount
of cash. Also, cash may imply costs to get, e.g., time to withdraw cash from banks.
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Merchants. There is a mass one of merchants, each of whom supplying an independent
good. Merchants are prot-maximizing local monopolists. The marginal cost of producing
the goods demanded by consumers is c, where 0 < c < v. Merchants bear a fee, m, as
a supply cost for card transactions, while not facing explicit costs for cash transactions.
Merchants are heterogeneous in their transactional benets from card usage, bS, where bS




. Merchants know their own bS, which reects potential
savings from cash-handling costsreduction or from increased security. The EPN knows
the distribution of bS but not the transactional benet from card usage for individual
merchants. We assume that bS  c, otherwise the net marginal cost of a card transaction
(c  bS) would be negative for merchants with bS su¢ ciently high. Additionally, we
assume that bS  v  c in order to ensure that cash payers are also served when the NSR
is in place.
The prot of a merchant with transactional benet bS is (pe   c+ bS  m) qe (pe) from
a cardholder paying with card and (pc   c) qc (pc) from a cash payer, where qe (pe) and
qc (pc) are dened, respectively, by (45) and (44). Assuming that cardholders will pay
with card,94 for given values of (m; r), merchantsprot will be
(bS) =
(
(pc   c) (v   pc)
 (pe   c+ bS  m) (v + r   pe) + (1  ) (pc   c) (v   pc)
if only cash
if cash and card
.
(46)
We assume that all merchants must accept cash, due to its status as legal tender. A
merchant will accept to run transactions under the EPN if and only if, in equilibrium, the
option of accepting cash and card is at least as protable as accepting only cash (default
option).
Electronic Payment Network. There is one prot-maximizing EPN.95 The EPN
charges a merchant fee, m, per card transaction, to merchants accepting card payments.
Simultaneously, the EPN nances a reward, r, per card transaction, to cardholders.
Hence, the EPN will choose r  m, otherwise would have negative prot. Rewards
can be thought of as a negative price of card use. For example, can take the form of di-
rect monetary rebates (cashback), or goods, such as frequent yer points. A card payment
requires the merchant (payee) and the cardholder (payor) to have a common electronic
payment network, i.e., the EPN.
Without loss of generality, EPNs marginal cost of servicing a card transaction is
94This assumption will be veried in equilibrium, both when merchants can surcharge and under the
NSR.
95Although the monopoly case does not occur in practice, Cabral (2006) suggests that it may provide
a good rst-order approximation to the reality of a number of countries. The assumption of a monopolist
EPN has been used in a number of research articles, e.g., Schwartz and Vincent (2006).
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normalized to zero.96 We assume, for simplicity, like Schwartz and Vincent (2006), that
only linear pricing is feasible for the EPN. Therefore, there are no membership fees (e.g.,




EPN (m; r) = (m  r)T (m; r) ,
where T (m; r)  bS
R bS
bS
qe (bS) dbS is the total volume of card transactions and let b

S
denote the transactional benet at which a merchant is indi¤erent between accepting
cash and card payments or only cash.
A summary of the models notation is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Notation
 Mass of cardholders in the population.
v Consumersmaximal willingness to pay for a unit of a good.
c Marginal cost of producing a good.
bB Cardholders benet (network e¤ect) from having an additional merchant
accepting card payments.
bS Merchant benet of a card transaction relatively to cash.
bS Maximum value of bS.
D Mass of merchants accepting card payments processed under the EPN.
qe Demand, per cardholder, for a good.
qc Demand, per cash payer, for a good.
pe Price of a unit of a good with card payment processed under the EPN.
pc Price of a unit of a good when cash is used for payment.
CSc Consumer surplus, per cash payer, for a good.
CSe Consumer surplus, per cardholder paying with card, for a good.
m Merchant fee per card transaction processed under the EPN.
r Cardholder reward per card transaction processed under the EPN.
T Total number of card transactions processed under the EPN.
Timing of the game. The participating agents interact according to the following
sequential game. First, the EPN sets the electronic payment system rule. In particular,
a rule is set whereby merchants are either allowed to set a surcharge for a card payment,
or not. Second, given the rule, the EPN sets the merchant fee, m, and the cardholder
reward, r, per transaction processed. Third, merchants observe (m; r) and decide whether
96Nonetheless, the EPN may have to support a xed cost, which must be su¢ ciently small such that,
in equilibrium, prot is non-negative. Otherwise, the EPN would exit the market and there would be no
alternative to cash payments.
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to accept card transactions or not. Fourth, merchants accepting only cash dene the
price pc (bS), while merchants accepting both cash and card payments dene, respectively,
the prices pc (bS) and pe (bS). Fifth, consumers without a payment card will make all
purchases with cash, while cardholders will be able to choose between cash or card, if a
merchant accepts both payment methods. If a merchant chooses to accept only cash, all
consumers (regardless of holding a payment card) may only purchase goods with cash at
that merchant. A summary of the timing of the model follows in Table 2.
Table 2: The timing of the model
I. The payment system rule (surcharging or NSR) is set.
II. The EPN sets the merchant fee, m, and the cardholder reward, r, per
transaction processed.
III. Merchants decide whether to join the EPN, or not.
IV. Merchants set prices for goods (pc (bS) and pe (bS) if a merchant accepts
both card and cash, or only pc (bS) if a merchant accepts only cash).
V. Consumers decide which payment instrument to use at each merchant,
given the set of payment instruments accepted by each merchant.
3.3 The social optimum benchmark
We set out, as benchmark, the rst-best solution. Note that merchants fees and
cardholdersrewards are mere transfers from merchants to the EPN and from the EPN
to cardholders, respectively. For that reason card fees and rewards are not relevant in the
rst-best analysis. In the rst-best solution, merchants should join the EPN whenever the
social benet arising from accepting payment cards (e.g., cash-handling costsreduction,
increased security in payments) exceeds the social cost of doing so (costs are zero by
assumption), i.e., bS  0. Thus, in the rst-best solution, all cardholders should use their
cards and all merchants should accept card payments, i.e., Dopt = 1.
The level of production for each good that achieves the maximum total surplus is such
that the marginal social benet equals the marginal social cost. Thus, social optimality
involves prices being set at poptc = c and p
opt
e = c  bS.






(v   x) dx






(v   x) dx

dbS.
One distortion that will prevent the social optimum from being achieved in the market so-
lution is the extent to which the EPN sets merchant fees above costs. Similarly, monopoly
97EPNs and merchantsprots are zero. Consumerssurplus (i.e., cash payersand cardholdersjoint
consumer surplus) corresponds to total surplus in the economy.
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merchants have an incentive to charge prices above the respective marginal cost. As in
Wright (2003), the NSR will be powerless to eliminate such distortions.
In the following sections we present the market equilibria when merchants are allowed
to surcharge and when the NSR is in place. We compare the levels of consumerssurpluses
(cash payers and cardholders), merchantsprots and the EPNs prot obtained in equi-
librium under each one of the payment system rules. Technical details and calculations
follow in an appendix.
3.4 Equilibrium with merchant surcharging
In this section we set out the equilibrium when merchant surcharging is allowed, i.e.,
merchants may price discriminate consumers according to the payment instrument. Given
the demands in (44) and (45) for a cash payer and a cardholder, respectively, a merchant






v + c+m+ r   bS
2
. (48)
A merchant will accept to run transactions under the EPN if and only if the option of
accepting cash and card is at least as protable as accepting only cash. Only merchants
with a transactional benet bS su¢ ciently high will accept card payments, in particular
bS  bS  m  r. Thus, the mass of merchants accepting card payments will be













per cash payer, and
CSe =
(v   c+ bS   (m  r))2
8
per cardholder.
A cardholder will choose to pay with card, rather than cash, if and only if
CSc  CSe , bS  m  r.
Hence, if merchants accept card payments (i.e., merchants with a transactional benet in
the range m  r  bS  bS), a cardholder will choose to pay with card, rather than cash,
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at those merchantsshops. The volume of card transactions will be given by
T (m  r) = bS
Z bS
m r
v   c  (m  r) + bS
2
dbS.
Note that the volume of card transactions is a function ofm r, but notm or r separately.
Therefore, the EPNs problem can be written as
max
m rbS
EPN (m  r) = (m  r)T (m  r) .
This leads to the following neutrality result.98
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium with merchant surcharging, the volume of card transac-
tions, merchantsprots and EPNs prot depend only on the EPNs margin m  r, and
not on m and r individually. That is, if (m; r) maximizes the EPNs prot, then so
does any pair (m0; r0) where m0   r0 = m   r.
Proof All proofs are in an appendix. 
Proposition 1 is in line with the result in standard Microeconomics literature that the
e¤ective incidence of a tax does not depend on whether the tax is formally placed on
consumers or on merchants. This is because a tax can a¤ect demand or supply in the
markets for goods, and hence can change equilibrium prices. These price changes can shift
the economic burden of a tax away from its formal incidence. Proposition 1 is in fact a
general property of payment systems when merchants can surcharge (see Gans and King
(2003)). However, note that, as it will become clear in the next section, in the presence
of the NSR, EPNs prots will depend on m and r individually.
When merchants are allowed to surcharge card payments, the solution for EPNs
problem is








4 (v   c)2 +bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS

. (49)
It is noteworthy that 0 < m   r < bS ensuring the existence of a mass of merchants
accepting card payments. In particular, when merchants are allowed to surcharge, the
mass of merchants accepting card payments is









4 (v   c)2 +bS
 




98A similar result was noted in Schwartz and Vincent (2006) and can be found in previous research
work such as Gans and King (2003).
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3.5 Equilibrium under the NSR
Under the NSR, each and every merchant accepting card payments will set a single
price to all consumers regardless of payment instrument. Hereafter, a variable with an
upper indice NSR refers to the model under the NSR.
Merchants that accept only cash will charge pNSRc =
v+c
2
, while merchants with trans-





A merchant will accept to run transactions under the EPN if and only if the option of
accepting cash and card is at least as protable as accepting only cash. Only merchants
with a transactional benet bS su¢ ciently high will accept card payments, in particular,
under the NSR,
bS  bNSRS (m; r) 
q
(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r)  (v   c+ 2r    (m+ r))

. (50)
Proposition 2 Fix m and r at any given positive level. Compared to the case where
merchants are allowed to surcharge, the number of merchants accepting card payments is
lower under the NSR.
Proposition 2 can be shown by comparing the expression bNSRS (m; r) in (50) against
bS (m; r)  m  r. We get that
bNSRS (m; r)  bS (m; r) > 0, 4 (1  ) r2 > 0,
thus, bNSRS (m; r) > b

S (m; r) and consequently D
NSR (m; r) < D (m; r). Under the NSR,
the mass of merchants accepting card payments is







(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r)  (v   c+ 2r    (m+ r))
bS
.
Merchants accepting card payments are clearly worse o¤ through being constrained
in the ability to engage in price discrimination (i.e., under the NSR). Therefore, some
merchants that choose to accept card payments when allowed to surcharge, will choose
not to do so under the imposition of the NSR. When merchants are allowed to surcharge





NSREPN (m; r) = (m  r)TNSR (m; r) subject to











bNSRS (m; r)  bS.
The optimal solution for the EPNs problem is8<: mNSR =
1
3




4 (v   c)2 +bS
 










4 (v   c)2 +bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS
 , (51)
where mNSR + rNSR = bS. It is noteworthy that








4 (v   c)2 +bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS

,
which is equal to m   r as set out in (49), i.e., the EPNs prot margin m  r is equal
under the two rules (merchant surcharging and NSR). Also, according to Proposition 1,
it may be the case that m = mNSR and r = rNSR.





xed, if the NSR is imposed, then: (i) the volume of cash
transactions will fall and the volume of card transactions will rise, while the total volume
of transactions will remain unchanged, per merchant that accepts card payments under the
NSR; (ii) the total volume of transactions per merchant that accepts card payments under
surcharging but not under the NSR will fall; and (iii) the total volume of transactions in
the economy as a whole will fall.
Under surcharging, equilibrium quantities do not depend on how m   r is divided
between m and r. In particular, the same outcome would arise if we set (m; r) = 
mNSR; rNSR

, i.e., the optimal values under the NSR. Merchant surcharging leads to a






= pe (bS). However,




constrains the retail pricing
for merchants accepting card payments. In particular, under the NSR, merchants ac-








by assumption.99 The im-
position of a single price causes the volume of cash transactions to fall and the volume
99The condition bS  v   c ensures that the group of cash payers will be served when the NSR is in
place. Under this condition, pNSRe (bS) is lower than cash payersmaximal willingness to pay for a unit
of a good, v.
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of card transactions to rise, per merchant accepting card payments. The total volume of
transactions per merchant remains the same because of the linearity of demands.
In Proposition 2 we discussed that the number of merchants accepting card payments is
lower under the NSR than under merchant surcharging. When surcharging is allowed, re-
tail prices are (pc ; p







while a cash payer purchases qc =
v c
2
< qe (bS), since bS  m   r. At merchants that
accept card payments under surcharging but not under the NSR, cardholders will have
to pay cash when the NSR is in place. This means that, at these merchants, cardholders
will purchase a lower quantity under the NSR, while cash payers will purchase the same
quantity regardless of the NSR implementation.
In a nutshell, if the NSR is implemented, the total volume of transactions will remain
unchanged for some merchants,100 while it will fall for the remaining merchants.101 We
can conclude, then, that in the economy as a whole the total volume of transactions will
fall.
3.6 Welfare analysis
In this section, we investigate the welfare variations that the NSR implies on each
group of agents in the absence of network e¤ects (Proposition 4). Two di¤erent aspects of
economic e¢ ciency related to the NSR are discussed: retail price e¢ ciency and e¢ ciency
in merchant acceptance. We provide an e¢ ciency justication for the implementation of
the NSR (see below the sub-section on NSR and retail price e¢ ciency for cardholders).
In particular, as a consequence of the NSR implementation, card transactions shift to
more cost-e¤ective merchants. Also, we discuss the welfare variations introduced by the
NSR in the presence of network e¤ects. If network e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong, then,
with the exception of the EPN, all groups of agents (i.e., cash payers, cardholders and
merchants) will be worse o¤ with the NSR implementation (Proposition 5). We conclude
that, in the presence of su¢ ciently strong network e¤ects from merchants to cardholders,
the NSR is socially undesirable (Corollary to Proposition 5).102
Proposition 4 Compared to the equilibrium with merchant surcharging, under the NSR:
(i) EPNs prot margin per card transaction (m  r) and prot remain unchanged; (ii)
cash payers transactions and the respective consumer surplus are lower; (iii) if  suf-
100In particular, the total volume of transactions, per merchant, will remain unchanged for merchants





, and those in the range bS 2 [0; bS) that accept only cash, irrespective of
the NSR.





that accept card payments if and only if are allowed to surcharge.
102According to Proposition 1, it may be the case that m = mNSR and r = rNSR. Henceforth, we






ciently high and bB = 0 (i.e., no network e¤ects), cardholders transactions and the
respective consumer surplus will be higher; and (iv) merchantsprots are lower.





determined in (51). The prot margin, per card transaction,mNSR rNSR, is therefore the
same as under merchant surcharging. In Proposition 3 we showed that, as a consequence of
the NSR implementation, the volume of card transactions per merchant will rise. However,
in Proposition 2 we showed that if the NSR is implemented, the number of merchants
accepting card payments will decrease. These two e¤ects will o¤set each other resulting
in an unchanged total volume of card transactions in the economy as a whole. Given that
neither the prot margin, per card transaction, nor the total volume of card transactions
is altered with the NSR implementation, the EPNs prot will be invariant to the NSR.
If the NSR is implemented, cash users will make a lower volume of transactions with
merchants that accept both cash and card payments. This is because these merchants
mark up their retail prices for all consumers resulting in cardholders being subsidized
by cash payers.103 By subsidized we mean that merchant fees are passed on to all
consumers in the form of higher retail prices irrespective of the payment instruments that
consumers use. Thus, cash payers must pay higher retail prices to cover merchantsfees
associated with the payment cards. Given that these merchant fees are used to nance
rewards to cardholders, and since cash payers do not receive rewards, cash payers also
nance part of the rewards given to cardholders. As a consequence, cash payersconsumer
surplus is lower under the NSR.
Despite the fact that the number of card accepting merchants decreases with the NSR
(see Proposition 2), cardholders will make the same volume of card transactions. In
other words, if the NSR is implemented, cardholders will concentrate the volume of card
transactions in a smaller group of merchants (i.e., the group of merchants that accept
card payments under the NSR). As previously discussed, under the NSR, cardholders
are subsidizedby cash payers when shopping at merchants that accept both cash and
card payments. Therefore, the volume of card transactions, per card accepting merchant,
increases with the NSR implementation. Additionally, given that a higher number of
merchants will accept only cash under the NSR, cardholders will make more cash trans-
actions (keeping xed the volume of cash transactions per merchant, as compared to the
surcharging equilibrium). In a nutshell, under the NSR, cardholders will make the same
volume of card transactions and more cash transactions, as compared to the surcharging
equilibrium.
In terms of cardholderswelfare, on the one hand, cardholderssurplus is higher at
103The result of welfare transfers from cash payers to cardholders was highlighted in previous research
work. See, for example, Gans and King (2003), and Schwartz and Vincent (2006). See Schuh, Shy and
Stavins (2010) for an empirical application of this result with US data.
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merchants that accept card payments under the NSR. This is due to the subsidy ef-
fect from cash payers. On the other hand, the reduced merchant acceptance of cards
triggered by the NSR implementation (see Proposition 2) makes cardholderssurplus to
decrease. Cardholders will be better o¤ with the NSR if the subsidye¤ect dominates
the merchant acceptance e¤ect. It is noteworthy that if the fraction of cardholders,
, is su¢ ciently high, the merchant acceptancee¤ect will be weakened. That is, the
number of merchants rejecting card payments because of the NSR will decrease in , if
 is su¢ ciently high. Hence, in the absence of network e¤ects and for a su¢ ciently high
 the subsidy e¤ect dominates the merchant acceptance e¤ect and, consequently,
cardholderssurplus increases with the NSR implementation.
Merchants, as a group, are clearly worse o¤through being constrained in their ability to
price discriminate, in particular, those merchants that accept card payments. Nonethe-
less, merchants with a su¢ ciently low transaction benet, i.e., merchants in the range
bS 2 [0; bS), choosing to accept only cash regardless of the NSR implementation, will be
indi¤erent to the NSR implementation.
From Proposition 4, we can conclude that the NSR may generate opposite welfare
variations on di¤erent groups of agents. Thus, it is unclear whether the NSR is welfare
enhancing for society as a whole. In order to better understand the impacts of the NSR
on social welfare, we discuss below two di¤erent aspects of economic e¢ ciency related to
the NSR: retail price e¢ ciency and e¢ ciency in merchant acceptance (including network
e¤ects).
3.6.1 NSR and retail price e¢ ciency for cardholders
A monopolist at the retail level does not e¢ ciently allocate resources. The negative
slope of the demand curve means that the price charged by a monopolist is greater than
marginal revenue. As a prot-maximizing merchant that equates marginal revenue with
marginal cost, the price charged by a monopolist is greater than its marginal cost. The
inequality between price and marginal cost is what makes monopoly ine¢ cient. For retail
price e¢ ciency, the price of a good should reect its marginal cost.
In Proposition 3 (i) we set out that the imposition of the NSR causes the volume
of card transactions to increase, the volume of cash transactions to fall, while the total
volume of transactions, per card accepting merchant, will remain unchanged. This is
because pc  pNSRe (bS)  pe (bS) and so, under the NSR, cardholders will pay a lower
price (closer to marginal cost) which improves retail price e¢ ciency for goods sold to
cardholders.
An important aspect in our model is that a transfer of a unit of a good from a cash
payer to a cardholder (choosing to pay with card, rather than cash) implies a reduction
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Thus, a transfer of cash transactions into card transactions, as a consequence of the NSR
implementation, will be more cost-e¤ective. Also, it is noteworthy that the total volume
of card transactions in the economy as a whole will be the same regardless of whether
the NSR is in place (see proof of Proposition 4 (i)). However, under the NSR, card










under merchant surcharging, where bNSRS > b

S (see Proposition 2). As a consequence
of the NSR implementation, card transactions shift to more cost-e¤ective merchants and
may enhance social welfare.104
3.6.2 NSR, network e¤ects and (in)e¢ ciency in merchant acceptance
E¢ ciency in merchant acceptance involves minimizing the costs of supplying a good. In
our model, the costs associated with a card transaction are lower compared to cash. Thus,
from the social perspective, it is cost-e¤ective that all merchants accept card payments,
i.e., Dopt = 1. Moreover, due to security concerns and/or cardholdersopportunity cost
regarding the time required to withdraw cash from banks, cardholders care about the
extent of merchant acceptance o¤ered by the EPN. This network e¤ect from merchants
to cardholders can be taken into account by setting bB > 0. Below we set out the welfare
e¤ects of the NSR when network e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong.
Proposition 5 Compared to the equilibrium with merchant surcharging, in the presence
of su¢ ciently strong network e¤ects, i.e., bB su¢ ciently high, with the exception of the
EPN, all agents (i.e., cash payers, cardholders and merchants) are worse o¤ with the NSR
implementation.
In Proposition 4 we discussed the reasons why cash payers and merchants are worse o¤
with the NSR implementation. In terms of cardholderssurplus, we concluded that in the
absence of network e¤ects and for a su¢ ciently high , the subsidy e¤ect dominates
the merchant acceptance e¤ect. Thus, cardholders surplus increases with the NSR
implementation. However, cardholders may strongly prefer an EPN with larger accep-
tance. Given that the number of merchants accepting card payments decreases with the
NSR, a su¢ ciently strong preference for not carrying cash (i.e., su¢ ciently strong network




v; c; ;bS ; bB






and the total surplus in the economy under the NSR will be higher in 2:12 than the one under merchant
surcharging. The expressions for the total surplus in the economy can be found in appendix. In particular,
see the sub-sections entitled Welfare analysis with merchant surchargingand Welfare analysis under
the NSR.
125
Corollary to Proposition 5 Compared to the equilibrium with merchant surcharging, in
the presence of su¢ ciently strong network e¤ects, i.e., bB su¢ ciently high, total welfare
decreases with the NSR implementation.
In light of the welfare analysis set out above, we concluded that in the presence
of su¢ ciently strong network e¤ects from merchants to cardholders, then, cash payers,
cardholders and merchants are worse o¤under the NSR (see Proposition 5), while the EPN
is indi¤erent to the NSR implementation (see Proposition 4). Thus, it is straightforward
that, if network e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong, total surplus must decrease with the NSR
implementation.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we built a three-party model with consumers (cash payers and card-
holders), merchants and an EPN. We consider in a same model: merchant heterogeneity
with respect to transactional benets of accepting cards, network e¤ects from merchants
to cardholders and endogenous transaction volumes. Relative to the existing economic
literature on the NSR our chapter makes two contributions.
First, we provide an e¢ ciency justication for the implementation of the NSR. We
show that the imposition of the NSR causes the volume of card transactions to increase
and the volume of cash transactions to fall. Under the NSR, cardholders will pay a lower
price (closer to marginal cost) which improves retail price e¢ ciency for goods sold to
cardholders. An important aspect in our model is that a transfer of a unit of a good
from a cash payer to a cardholder (choosing to pay with card, rather than cash) implies a
reduction in the marginal cost of providing that good. Thus, a transfer of cash transactions
into card transactions, as a consequence of the NSR implementation, will be more cost-
e¤ective.
Second, we discuss the welfare variations introduced by the NSR in the presence of
network e¤ects. If network e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong, then, with the exception of the
EPN, all groups of agents (i.e., cash payers, cardholders and merchants) will be worse
o¤ with the NSR implementation. We show that the NSR will be socially undesirable if
network e¤ects from merchants to cardholders are su¢ ciently strong. In our model, the
NSR implementation reduces card acceptance. Therefore, if network e¤ects on cardholders
are su¢ ciently strong, the NSR destroys value in the cardholder side of the market. This
is the case provided that the network size of card acceptance matters to cardholders and
under the NSR fewer merchants will accept payment cards.
In our model we assumed monopolistic merchants. However, di¤erent market struc-
tures co-exist in practice. An extension of our model is to allow for some industries to
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be perfectly competitive, while others to be monopolistic. It is noteworthy that the ex-
isting literature (e.g., Gans and King (2003), and Wright (2003)) shows that the NSR is
irrelevant in perfectly competitive markets since merchants will separate into those that
accept cards and those that do not. Therefore, the results with monopolistic merchants
as set out in this chapter should carry over to a more general setting with a combination
of monopolies and perfectly competitive markets.
In order to focus on how the NSR a¤ects transaction volumes, per consumer, our
analysis abstracted away from an endogenous consumerschoice of the payment instru-
ments. A possible extension of this model would include analyzing the welfare e¤ects of
the NSR with such endogenous choices. Other direction would be to consider di¤erent
merchant market structures (e.g., oligopolies, where the business stealing e¤ect may
play a role).
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3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Equilibrium with merchant surcharging
Stage V: consumerschoices
Consumerssurplus can be computed from the demands given in (44) and (45). Con-




qc (x) dx =
Z v
pc
(v   x) dx = 1
2
(v   pc)2 , (52)




qe (x) dx =
Z v+r
pe
(v + r   x) dx = 1
2
(v + r   pe)2 . (53)
At merchants that accept both cash and card payments, cardholders can choose the
payment method to use, i.e., the payment instrument that maximizes their surplus at a
given merchant.
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Stage IV: merchants set prices
If a consumer pays with cash, then a merchant solves
max
pc








SOC :  2 < 0.
If a consumer pays with card, then a card accepting merchant solves
max
pe
(pe   c m+ bS) (v + r   pe) =
1
4
(v   c  (m  r) + bS)2
FOC : v   2pe + r + c+m  bS = 0, pe (bS) =
v + c+m+ r   bS
2
,
SOC :  2 < 0.
Stage III: merchants decide whether to join the EPN
A merchant will accept card payments if and only if
1
4
(v   c  (m  r) + bS)2 
1
4
(v   c)2 ,
bS  bS (m; r) = m  r.
Thus, the mass of merchants accepting card payments will be


























(v   c  (m  r) + bS)2 ,
and a cardholder will choose to pay with card, rather than cash, if and only if
CSc  CSe , bS  bS (m; r) = m  r.
Hence, in equilibrium with merchant surcharging, if a merchant accepts card payments,
a cardholder will choose to pay with card, rather than cash.





EPN (m; r) = (m  r)T (m; r) subject to





v   c m+ r + bS
2
dbS
m  r  bS,
where
















(v   c  (m  r))
 










Platforms problem can be re-written as
max
m rbS





(v   c  (m  r))
 





















4 (v   c)2 +bS
 












4 (v   c)2 +bS
 














4 (v   c)2 +bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS

< bS,
ensuring the existence of a mass of merchants accepting card payments. In particular,
the mass of merchants accepting card payments is









4 (v   c)2 +bS
 










4 (v   c)2 +bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS

was ruled out
because it does not satisfy the SOC of EPNs problem.
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3.9.2 Welfare analysis with merchant surcharging
Consumerssurplus
The consumer surplus of the group of cash users, TCSc, is










































v   c  (m   r) + bS
3
3





where m   r is determined in (54).
Merchantsprot





























v   c  (m   r) + bS
2
2










v   c  (m   r) + bS
3
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(v   c  (m   r))
 











where m   r is determined in (54).
Total surplus











































































where m   r is determined in (54).
3.9.3 Equilibrium under the NSR
Stage V: consumerschoices
See section Equilibrium with merchant surchargingin appendix.
Stage IV: merchants set prices
















SOC :  2 < 0.
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A merchant that accepts both card and cash payments solves106
max
pNSRe
NSRe (bS) = 
 
pNSRe   c+ bS  m
  








FOC : v + c  2pNSRe +  (m+ r   bS) = 0, pNSRe (bS) =
v + c+  (m+ r   bS)
2
,
SOC :  2 < 0.
Hence, under the NSR, the prot of a merchant accepting both card and cash payments
is
NSRe (bS) = 












v   c+  (m+ r   bS)
2





Stage III: merchants decide whether to join the EPN




(v   c)2 .
Under the NSR, the marginal merchant accepting card payments is located at107









bNSRS (m; r)  bS (m; r) > 0, 4 (1  ) r2 > 0,
thus, bNSRS (m; r) > b

S (m; r) and D
NSR (m; r) < D (m; r). The mass of merchants
accepting card payments is







(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r)  (v   c+ 2r    (m+ r))
bS
.
Stage II: EPNs pricing
EPNs problem is
106Given that the price is the same regardless of the mean of payment, for r  0, all cardholders prefer
a card payment.







 was ruled out of




NSREPN (m; r) = (m  r)TNSR (m; r) subject to











bS  bNSRS (m; r)
where
TNSR (m; r) =

bS
24(v   c) bS   






























The optimal solution for EPNs problem is1088<: mNSR =
1
3






2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2
rNSR =  1
3








2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2
, (57)
note that mNSR + rNSR = bS. The Hessian matrix of the EPNs prot function is
H (m; r) =














3mNSR + rNSR   2bS











2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2
1A < 0,
108Three other candidate solutions can be derived from the FOCs. However, those candidates were ruled




















0@ bS  2 (v   c) + bS+ 4 (v   c)2+
 2
 




2 (v   c) + bS








2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2   2
 




2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2 < 0,q
bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2 < 2
 





2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2   4
 




2 (v   c) + bS

< 0.
3.9.4 Welfare analysis under the NSR
Consumerssurplus















The consumer surplus of a cash payer from shopping at a merchant with a transactional
benet bS and accepting card payments is
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The consumer surplus of a cardholder from shopping at a merchant with transactional
























2 (v   c) + bS
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, while the prot of a merchant
with transactional benet bS accepting card payments is
NSRe (bS) = 
 






















































   r) ,
given that








4 (v   c)2 +bS
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= T  (m; r) .
Total surplus
























































EPN (m; r) = (m  r)T (m; r) subject to





v   c  (m  r) + bS
2
dbS
bS  m  r,
where
















(v   c  (m  r))
 






























Let X denote the solution for the EPNs problem above. If m  r = X and m0  r0 =
m   r, then it follows that m0   r0 = X. 









. Thus, DNSR (m; r) < D (m; r), bNSRS (m; r) >
bS (m; r), where b
NSR




and bS (m; r)  m r.
We can show that bNSRS (m; r) > b





(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r)  (v   c+ 2r    (m+ r))

> m  r ,q
(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r)  (v   c+ 2r    (m+ r)) > (m  r),q
(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r) > v   c+ 2r (1  ),
(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r)  (v   c+ 2r (1  ))2 > 0,
4r2 (1  ) > 0,
since 0 <  < 1 and r > 0 by assumption. 


















under the NSR. It is straightforward that (1  ) qc  (1  ) qNSRc
given that 0  bS  bS.


























, mNSR+ rNSR  bS , bS  bS which is true by assumption.






Q (bS)  qe + (1  ) qc =
v   c   (m   r   bS)
2
under surcharging, and
QNSR (bS)  qNSRe + (1  ) qNSRc =
v   c  
 
mNSR   rNSR   bS

2




, it is clear that Q = QNSR.







payments if surcharging is allowed, otherwise, under the NSR, a merchant will accept














, under the NSR.




, using the fact that mNSR  rNSR = bS and given that
0  bS  bS by assumption, it is clear that Q  QNSR.
(iii) The total volume of transactions will remain unchanged for merchants in the range
[0; bS) as these merchants will always choose to accept only cash irrespective of the NSR.
If the NSR is implemented, as shown in part (i) of this proposition, the total volume






if the NSR is implemented, as shown in part (ii) of this proposition, the total volume






. We can conclude, then,
that in the economy as a whole the total volume of transactions will fall with the NSR
implementation. 
Proof of Proposition 4 (i) The solution to the EPNs problem, when merchants are
allowed to surcharge, is given in (54),








4 (v   c)2 +bS
 




The solution to the EPNs problem, when merchants are under the NSR, is given in (57),8<: mNSR =
1
3






2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2
rNSR =  1
3








2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2
,
thus, it is clear that
mNSR   rNSR = m   r.
Now, note that when merchants are allowed to surcharge, the volume of card transactions
is given by





v   c  (m   r) + bS
2
dbS,












v   c  
 










is dened in (56). For m = mNSR = m and r = rNSR = r,
T  (m; r)  TNSR (m; r) =
 (1  )
 




given that, in equilibrium, m+ r = mNSR + rNSR = bS. Thus, the EPNs prot must be
the same regardless of the NSR implementation.












both cash and card payments. Thus, the aggregate volume of transactions made by a
cash payer must be lower under the NSR, given that qNSRc (bS) < q

c at merchants with
transactional benets bS < bS accepting card payments.
If merchants are allowed to surcharge, the consumer surplus of a cash user is (v   c)2 =8
at each and every merchant. Under the NSR, the consumer surplus of a cash user is
(v   c)2 =8 at merchants accepting only cash, while being
 





merchants accepting cash and card payments. Thus, the consumer surplus of a cash
payer must be lower under the NSR, given that
 




=8 < (v   c)2 =8 at
merchants with transactional benets bS < bS accepting card payments.






















































































is dened in (56).
We can show that the expression in (58) is smaller than the one in (60). Using the
fact that mNSR + rNSR = bS, the di¤erence between (60) and (58) can be written as
(v   c)
q
4r (1  ) (v   c+ r) + (v   c)2   2r (1  ) (v   c)  (v   c)2
2bS
> 0
, 4 (1  ) r2 (v   c)2 > 0.
We can show that if  is su¢ ciently high, the expression in (59) will be smaller than
the one in (61). Using the fact that mNSR + rNSR = bS, the di¤erence between (61) and
(59), denoted by TCSe below, can be written as
TCSe =
0@ (12 (v   c) + 8r) (1  ) r2   2 (v   c)3+
+
 
2 (v   c)2   4r (1  ) (v   c+ r)
q












< 0, if  su¢ ciently high. Thus, if  su¢ ciently high, TCSe > 0.
(iv) Merchants with transactional benets in the range [0; bS) will only accept cash
irrespective of the NSR implementation. Thus, the prot for these merchants must be
the same, regardless of the NSR.






will accept card pay-
ments if surcharging is allowed, otherwise, under the NSR, the merchant will accept only
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2 if NSRif surcharging allowed .
























will be worse o¤
with the NSR implementation.





will accept card pay-
ments regardless of the NSR implementation. Within this range, a merchants prot will
be
NSR (bS) = 
 





























if NSR is in place, and
 (bS) = 













. In particular, using the fact that mNSR + rNSR = bS, we get












will be worse o¤with the NSR implementation.

Proof of Proposition 5 In Proposition 4 (i) it is shown that the EPNs prot remains
unchanged to the NSR implementation, thus, the EPN will not be worse o¤with the NSR
implementation. In Proposition 4 (ii) and (iv), it is shown, respectively, that cash payers
surplus and merchantsprots are lower under the NSR.
In the presence of network e¤ects from merchants to cardholders, the variation in
cardholders surplus from an equilibrium with surcharging to an equilibrium with the



















as discussed in Proposition 2. Therefore, the variation in cardholders












  (DNSR (mNSR; rNSR) D (m; r)) . 
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 5 In light of the proof of Proposition 5, we can
conclude that in the presence of su¢ ciently strong network e¤ects from merchants to
cardholders, then, cash payers, cardholders and merchants are worse o¤ under the NSR,
while the EPN is indi¤erent to the NSR implementation (see Proposition 4). Thus, it is
straightforward that, if network e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong, total surplus must decrease
with the NSR implementation. 
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